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ABSTRACT
The development of the global biotechnology industry largely coincided with the
development of the US biotechnology industry. This resulted in this industry's
oligopolistic and centralised nature where only a few multinational chemical and
pharmaceutical companies control most biotechnology processes and production of
commodities emanating from these processes. The governance of biotechnology
has, until recently, been dominated by state actors who have endeavoured to secure
national interests, including those of large multinational corporations (MNCs) based
within their boundaries.
The technological ability of developed states to exploit and use unevenly distributed
resources to their advantage means that an uneven relationship exists between
these and poor developing countries. This has been highlighted by differences in
public opinion about the role and application of biotechnology in society. While some
opinions favour the use and application of biotechnology to enhance food supplies
and boost production levels and trade, other opinions caution against the possible
hazards that genetically manipulated organisms (GMOs) hold for the environment
and human existence.
The commercialisation of biotechnology has resulted in the exponential growth of
genetically manipulated crops in especially the United States and countries like
Argentina and Canada. These countries produce large surpluses of staple grains
such as corn and soya and try to sell these to countries with food supply problems.
The clash in commercial interests stemming from developed countries' insistence on
the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) on genetically manipulated (GM)
seeds has caused considerable conflict with poor farmers who will not be able to
sustain their livelihoods if they cannot save seeds for future harvests.
This is one aspect of the problems surrounding the protection of knowledge products
that is exacerbated by the scientific uncertainty pertaining to the risk involved with
biotechnology. While some observers agitate for precaution with the use of GMOs,
others feel that a lack of scientific proof of harm is sufficient grounds for proceeding
with developments in biotechnology. Conversely, there are some that feel that
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biotechnology is market driven instead of human needs driven, ultimately resulting in
developing countries receiving very little benefit from it.
The Cartagena Protocol on biosafety was drafted to address some of the difficulties
involved with the transboundary movement of GMOs. Although it holds very specific
advantages for developing countries, as a regulatory framework it is limited in its
scope and application. Developing countries are limited in their policy options to
address their need to protect biodiversity and secure their food supply. This means
that considerable challenges and constraints await these countries in utilising global
governance of public goods and building their human and technological capacities.
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OPSOMMING
Die ontwikkeling van die globale biotegnologie-industriehet grootliks saamgeval met
die ontwikkeling van die Verenigde State se biotegnologie-industrie. Dit het
aanleiding gegee tot hierdie industrie se oligopolistiese en gesentraliseerde aard
waar slegs enkele multinasionale chemiese en farmaseutiese maatskappye die
meeste biotegnologie prosesse en die vervaardiging van kommoditeite uit daardie
prosesse beheer. Die regering van biotegnologie was tot onlangs oorheers deur
staatsakteurs wie gepoog het om nasionale belange te beskerm, insluitend die
belange van multinasionale korporasies (MNK) wat vanuit hulle grondgebied
funksioneer.
Die tegnologiese vermoë van ontwikkelde state om oneweredig verspreide
hulpbronne tot eie gewin te benut beteken dat 'n ongelyke verhouding bestaan
tussen hierdie en arm ontwikkelende state. Dit word beklemtoon deur verskille in
openbare mening oor die rol en aanwending van biotegnologie in die samelewing.
Terwyl sekere opinies ten gunste van die aanwending van biotegnologie vir die
verbetering van voedselbronne en produksievlakke en handel is, dui ander opinies
op die moontlike gevare wat geneties gemanipuleerde organismes (GMOs) vir die
omgewing en menslike voortbestaan inhou.
Die kommersialisering van biotegnologie het gelei tot die eksponensiële groei van
geneties gemanipuleerde gewasse in veral die Verenigde State en state soos
Argentinië en Kanada. Hierdie state produseer groot hoeveelhede stapelgrane soos
mielies en soja en poog om dit te verkoop aan state met
voedselvoorsieningsprobleme. Die botsing in kommersiële belange wat spruit uit
ontwikkelde state se aandrang op die beskerming van intellektuele eiendomsreg op
geneties gemanipuleerde saad veroorsaak beduidende konflik met arm landbouers
wie nie hulle lewensonderhoud kan verseker as hulle nie saad kan berg vir
toekomstige saaiseisoene nie.
Dit is een aspek van die problematiek rondom die beskerming van kennisprodukte
wat vererger word deur die wetenskaplike onsekerheid wat gepaard gaan met die
risiko's van biotegnologie. Terwyl sekere waarnemers vir waaksaamheid pleit in die
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gebruik van GMOs, is daar ander wat voel dat 'n gebrek aan wetenskaplike bewyse
van skade genoegsame gronde is vir die voortsetting van ontwikkelings in
biotegnologie. Insgelyks is daar diegene wat meen dat biotegnologie markgedrewe
in plaas van menslike behoefte gedrewe is, wat uiteindelik daartoe lei dat
ontwikkelende state baie min voordeel daaruit trek.
Die Kartagena Protokoloor bioveiligheid is opgestel om van die probleme betrokke
by die oorgrens verskuiwing van GMOs aan te spreek. Hoewel dit spesifieke
voordele vir ontikkelende state inhou is dit as reguleringsraamwerk beperk in omvang
en aanwending. Ontwikkelende state het beperkte beleidsopsies om hulle behoefte
om biodiversiteit te beskerm en voedselvoorsiening te verseker, aan te spreek. Dit
beteken dat beduidende uitdagings en beperkings hierdie state in die benutting van
globale regering van openbare goedere vir die bou van menslike en tegnologiese
kapasiteite in die gesig staar.
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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CARTAGENA
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"Half of politics today is conducted in science and technology, half of what we
regard as nature is a technical artifact sealing a social bond" (Allen, referring to
Latour, 1998: 169).
1. Background
Biotechnology can be defined as "the use of BIOLOGICAL processes for industrial or
other purposes, e.g. in producing ANTIBIOTIC drugs" (Crowther, 1995:107). The
Greek word "bios" means life and the English "bio" is often used to denote that which
has to do with life or living orqanisrns, For its part, the word "technology" has a much
more varied range of meanings, from the study of the way humans change and
manage their environment, to any set or collection of human-made tools. Here
technology is conceived of as a "set of methods, know-how, tools, instruments and
machines, as well as ... organizational and managerial principles, designed to
increase the efficiency of productive activities" (Bifani, 1989: 136). Thus, technology
can also be understood to involve tools or mechanisms to solve problems or make
useful products [http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/guide2000/whatis.html]. or "the scientific
study and use of applied sciences" (Crowther, 1995:1226). But these definitions
shed very little light on the controversy and politics surrounding biotechnology.
During the 1960s and 1970s biotechnology advanced to a point where scientists
were able to manipulate some of the smallest known parts of organisms, their cells
and molecules (e.g. DNA and proteins), in addition to the use of whole organisms.
This "new" biotechnology means that cellular and molecular processes in live
organisms
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2are used to solve problems or make new products through various new technologies 1
[http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/guide2000/whatis.html]. These new technologies have
introduced a problematic dimension into international relations which, up to now, has
been characterised by a lack of an overall regime or protocol on the handling of
biotechnology on various levels such as international trade and intellectual property
rights. At the same time consumers and activists have objected to some of the uses
of biotechnology, especially where genetic engineering is involved. This has sparked
a debate on the ethics and social values surrounding some of the biotechnology
developments and practices. This is a debate that has various levels of interest and
where the dividing lines are still being explored, making the issue of biotechnology in
international politics an interesting one as it unfolds at the beginning of this new
millennium. The following words by Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:230) indicate some of
the dynamics and complexity that biotechnology has generated:
"Modern biotechnology has brought biology from a predominantly analytical phase to a
new synthetic phase in its historical development. The possibilities for rearranging
species are, for all practical purposes, unlimited. Various interests are involved in a
struggle over the power images of modern biology. Power is central to the
myth making that is taking place., The grand techno-myth is that with genetic
engineering we can fine-tune nature, preserve its diversity while reaping its bounty".
Biotechnology does not, however, only challenge the worlds of policy-makers,
biologists and geneticists. Biotechnology's influence on society and nature and the
way mankind thinks about these phenomena is so widespread that it can be called
profound.
2. Problem Statement
The twentieth century was an era characterised by tremendous growth in man's
capacity to interact with his fellow man and the environment. It saw two wars that
were great in the magnitude of their destruction and devastation combined with loss
Examples of these new technologies include cell culture technology, biosensor technology, genetic
modification technology, antisense technology, protein engineering technology [http://www.bio.org/aboutbio/
guide2000/whatis.html), recombinant DNA, gene transfer, embryo manipulation, embryo transfer, plant
regeneration, cell culture, monoclonal antibodies, and bioprocess engineering (Board on Agriculture in Rueth,
Kung and Colwell, 1992:355).
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possible, such as the aeroplane, the motorised vehicle, flights to the moon, television,
microwave ovens, regular space flights, cellular communication, and the internet, to
name but a few. These inventions have left most of the human race awe-struck with
the wonders of technology and the expectation that it could solve almost any
problem. Unfortunately, the wonders of technology have not meant universal
benevolence to mankind. Harmful waste products, pollution, and environmental
degradation, the effects of which were already patently manifest during the height of
the industrial revolution more than a century earlier, accompany many new
technologies. The spoils of new technology also do not fall on all people equally,
creating new challenges of equity and justice. This became especially clear after the
Second World War.
Powers of production and destruction were developed simultaneously after 1945
(Sakamoto, 1995: 132). During the Cold War industrialised countries created
immense wealth for certain sectors of its populations while at the same time
developing military hardware and nuclear capacities that could wipe out the entire
human race in a few hours. The extent of this affluence was of such a nature that the
environmental destruction and its impact on marginalised societies faded into
obscurity. As one author put it, "the very structural condition which generated the
catastrophic danger made it possible for them (North) to forget about the real danger
of catastrophe" (Sakamoto, 1995: 132). This process has been exacerbated by what
has come to be known as the unstoppable force of globalisation.
One of the consequences of globalisation is destruction of the environment (Cox,
1995:41). This is facilitated by what Cox identifies as new forms of hegemony,
imperialism and dominance when he states, "The aggressive search for resources by
economically dominant interests and the off-loading of polluting and energy-intensive
processes to newly industrializing countries has resulted in a kind of environmental
neo-colonialism - the dominant societies clean up and move to more knowledge-
intensive production while those following in their tracks become sites of
environmental degradation" (Cox, 1995:41-42). Biotechnology is one of the
developments that are part of the process of knowledge-intensive production that can
lead to the unequal distribution of power and resources. Yet, it seems that there is
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these forces of technology. Biotechnology seems to be a part of "a more general
acceleration of scientific discovery and technological innovation" that is expanding at
a rate that existing regulatory mechanisms can not handle (Pirages, 1990:106).
Developments in biotechnology do not only have a fundamental influence on our
understanding of technology and life in general, but also hold profound implications
for food, pharmaceutical, chemical and agro-chemical industries. Its use in biological
weapons and warfare can also affect military and national security in the battlefield of
the future in very dramatic ways (Munson, 1993:497). Yet, despite the importance of
biotechnology in the fields mentioned, and despite its potential misuse, no
consolidated and clear set of rules that is geared specifically towards the
management, use and control of biotechnology have yet been introduced into the
international political framework. Many conventions and protocols exist to safeguard
national interests and protect the environment, but they are not coordinated or unified
in purpose, scope or application. In January 2000, the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety was adopted in Montreal, Canada. But its scope and focus is limited to the
regulation of the transboundary movement of genetically manipulated organisms
(GMOs).
Multilateral negotiations with the aim of creating a Convention on Biological Diversity
had already begun in 1990. The purpose at the time was to provide governments
with a guide to achieve sustainable development (Munson, 1993:498). Recognition
by governments of the importance of biotechnology was demonstrated during the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June
1992, when biotechnology was placed on the agenda, both within the negotiations for
a Biodiversity Convention, and in the so-called Agenda 21, UNCED's programme of
action. The result of these negotiations was a split between the USA, favouring a
looser regime with regards to the handling of genetically manipulated organisms
(GMOs), and the European Community, which saw the necessity for an International
Code of Conduct on biotechnology to regulate biotechnology at all levels (Munson,
1993:500). Many developing countries supported Europe in asking for more control
over the development and use of biotechnology.
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package, summarised firstly in Article 19 of the Biodiversity Convention, which
obliges contracting parties firstly to "consider the need for and modalities of a
protocol setting out the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified
organism resulting from biotechnology". Secondly, Chapter 16 of Agenda 21, on the
"Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnology", requires governments to
"consider the need for and feasibility of internationally agreed guidelines on safety in
biotechnology releases". Despite the USA's full participation in the formulation of the
final draft of the biosafety "compromise", President Bush was the only OECD leader
who did not sign the Convention on Biological Diversity at the Rio Earth Summit. His
explanation was that it would adversely affect US economic interests, the
competitiveness of the US biotechnology industry, American jobs, and their
intellectual property rights. He said "(I)t is our science, our technology that helps the
world the most. ..in this instance, not signing is the best for the rest of the world"
(Munson, 1993:501-2).
Scientists have not yet been able to provide conclusive evidence that biotechnology,
and especially GMOs, will not adversely affect the environment and biodiversity as
we know it, and it is doubted that they will ever be able to. It is therefore imperative
that developments in biotechnology proceed with the necessary caution and vigilance
associated with a posture of long-term responsibility and consequences in mind. The
scientific community is anxious to see how the development of a set of rules or
protocol on biotechnology develops, as this will determine in which direction/s their
work can proceed. At the same time strategists and national security planners,
international traders and economists, bio-technicians and bio-industrialists,
environmentalists and lobbyists, and various informed communities are all awaiting
the establishment of a more secure regime in which biotechnology will develop. This
thesis will explore and examine the problems surrounding the development of such a
regime.
3. Questions that need to be answered
From the problem statement it is evident that biotechnology influences many
dimensions and levels of the globalising world. It is a technology that challenges
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has been responsible for stimulating the thoughts of economists and social scientists
because of its impact on trade and development as well as on power and structural
relations. Biotechnology not only poses new questions of moral responsibility and
ethics where genetic manipulation is concerned. It has sparked a renewed
groundswell by environmentalists and anti-globalisation activists who view the role of
technology and free markets as threats to the future existence of human society.
These dynamics have presented countless new questions that need to be answered
if any understanding of the future role of biotechnology is to be understood. Only
some of these questions will be addressed in this thesis. They are:
• What is the nature and direction of genetic governance?
• Who determines the allocation of values in biotechnology?
• What is the role of biotechnology in international trade?
• Why has biotechnology become a part of knowledge protection?
• How should the debate about risk and safety of biotechnology be understood?
• How have environmental issues been regulated in the past?
• What is the content, nature and role of the Cartagena Protocol?
• What are the issues that the Cartagena Protocol does not resolve?
• How do biotechnology and regulatory issues affect developing countries?
• Why is biodiversity and food security important to developing countries?
• Which are the obstacles developing countries face in building capacity?
Before attempting to answer these questions, a common understanding of the
meaning of biotechnology is necessary.
4. Conceptualisation of Biotechnology
Biotechnology is defined by Persley and Doyle (1999:2) as "... any technique that
uses living organisms or substances from those organisms to make or modify a
product, improve plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for specific uses.
The u.s. Office of Technology Assessment states that "biotechnology includes any
technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify
products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop micro-organisms for specific
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manipulation of genes or DNA sequences. When biologists remove genes from cells
and manipulate them in a laboratory to reinsert them into the organism from which it
was removed, or another organism, it is called recombinant DNA or rDNA
technology. This technology is deemed revolutionary because it enables scientists to
create 'new' products, or organisms, by "merely" joining together pieces of DNA from
different organisms (Wiegele, 1991:25). One typology of the essential components of
modern biotechnology focuses on the following: Genomics: the molecular
characterisiation of all species. Bioinformatics: the assembly of data from genomic
analysis into accessible forms. Transformation: the introduction of single genes
conferring potentially useful traits into plant, livestock, fish, and tree species.
Molecular breeding: the identification and evaluation of desirable traits in breeding
programs with the use of market-assisted selection. Diagnostics: the use of
molecular characterisation to provide more accurate and quicker identification of
pathogens. Vaccine technology: use of modern immunology to develop recombinant
DNA vaccines for improving control of lethal diseases (Persley and Doyle, 1999:2).
An alternative range of technoloqies/ denoted by biotechnology is sited by Wiegeie
(1991 :22), who indicates that these can be used in various industrial and other
applications. This can place the definitional emphasis on the processes involved to
produce products. However, some definitions specifically highlight the products that
emanate from the processes of biotechnology. This stems from the perceived impact
that these products have or can have in society, whether it is political, social or
environmental. These aspects are dealt with in more depth in later chapters. How
the study is conducted needs also to be considered.
5. Theory, Methodology and Research Design
5.1. A Conceptualisation of Theory
Social theory can be defined as "a system of interconnected abstractions or ideas
that condenses and organizes knowledge about the social world" (Neuman,
Examples of these technologies include molecular and cellular manipulation, separation and
purification technologies, biomolecular instrumentation, cell culturing, enzymology, and X-ray crystallography
(Wiegele, 1991 :22).
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way to proceed upon the path of discovery or how to acquire knowledge. Thus,
social theory, or theories are embedded in different schools of thought, different
approaches, different worldviews, or different paradigms that each have specific
criteria about the nature of reality (ontology) and how knowledge can best be
acquired (epistemology).
5.2. Theoretical Alternatives
In the social sciences in general, a distinction can be made between positivist,
interpretive and critical approaches (Neuman, 2000:63). The advent of the
behavioural revolution in the social sciences has meant that positivism has become
the dominant approach, with the other approaches regarded by most as secondary or
not taken seriously at all. The same tendency is true for International Relations and
International Political Economy, where the theoretical framework of Realism, and in
its updates guise, neo-Realism, has been predominant. Some scholars call this
predominance orthodoxy, with the alternative approaches labeled heterodoxy (see
George, 1995). The heterodoxy approaches have also been called reflectivist,
including the theories of Post-modernism, Critical Theory and Constructivism
(Woods, 1996:24).
The political-economic framework of critical structuralism informs the theoretical
framework that underlies this thesis. A brief explanation for electing to use critical
theory rather than any of the other frameworks is in order. Although Critical Theory
has much in common with the other reflectivist theories, the specific differences in
approach as they relate to a study of an international regime need to be highlighted.
The Post-modernist approach is similar to Critical Theory for its criticism of
materialism and rationalism. It was also the first theory to point to the way social
constructions of reality have taken place, thereby acting in opposition to the often
preferred theory and method of neo-Realism (Wendt, 1999:32). Yet, despite its
strong critical voice and "rebellion against hegemonic ways of thinking", post-
modernists do not offer much beyond this rebellion (Woods, 1996:25). A third
reflectivist theory is that of Constructivism, which looks at the international system as
a construction that can be reconstructed (Kennedy-Pipe, 2000:752).
Constructivism's main proponent, Alexander Wendt, follows an approach he calls
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sociology" (Wendt, 1999:1). Although Constructivism manages to direct attention to
the rules and norms that make up the boundaries of interest articulation and
formulation, it offers very little resistance to the orthodoxy in International Relations
theory (Woods, 1996:26). Wendt, by his own admittance, uses the dialogue of
Realism as found in concepts such as the state, national interest, anarchy, and
science (Wendt, 1999:33). Thus, Constructivism, for its lack of an emancipatory
capacity, is rejected in favour of a critical theory approach.
There are many variants of structuralist theorising, which makes a brief explanation
for choosing the critical theory variant appropriate. In its common usage, structure
refers to the way something is organised, built or put together, while structuralism
refers to the relations between elements of a system rather than to the elements
themselves (Crowther, 1998:1186). The latter usage was the result of the work done
by the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, whose epistemology was applied by
the French social anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, to social science in his effort
to encourage the development of models to reveal the underlying structural
mechanisms which guide the surface phenomena of social life. This usage later
found fruition in structuralist Marxism of which the basic idea was that structure
conditions outcome, where Marx contended that the economic substructure in
capitalist societies determine the political and ideological superstructure that results
in class divisions. Vladimir I. Lenin took this view to the international level. He called
the exploitative relationship of industrial countries with their colonial possessions
imperialist and unjust (Salaam & Veseth, 1996:59-60).
More recent examples of structuralism that highlights imperialism, or the unequal
relationship between developed and developing countries, include the writing of
André Gunder Frank, Raul Prebisch and Immanuel Wallerstein. Frank was a neo-
Marxist who fathered the basic ideas of dependencia theorising, which found
popularity in Latin America during the middle of the twentieth century. Prebisch gave
rise to a related but different form of Latin American structuralism developed in
collaboration with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The
main plight in this instance was for national strategies of import-substituting
industrialisation and regional integration coupled to international cooperation, policies
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later adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) established by Prebisch in 1964 (McLean, 1996:481). Wallerstein
developed the so-called modern world system theory that sees interstate relationship
according to a core-periphery model, where developed and industrialised states are
able to secure and advance their interests while poor and developing countries serve
as suppliers to these stronger economies' functioning. Emphasis is not exclusively
on the state level but also on class relations that exist at all levels of society within
and between states and other actors (Salaam & Veseth, 1996:71-2). Although these
theories are useful in highlighting the position of the underprivileged, they have been
discredited for their oversimplified typologies; because the so-called underdeveloped
have not managed to successfully speak with a united voice; and because the
economic and sometimes political successes of a number of the South-East Asian
states have shown that underdevelopment can be overcome without specific
privileging from the rich North.
These and other forms of structuralism each emphasise specific elements of society
and how these elements are interrelated. What they all have in common is the
fundamental difference in approach to international political economy when
compared to that of liberals and mercantilists. Where liberals and mercantilists focus
on the individual and the state respectively, structuralists focus on class divisions and
the global political economy. This structuralist viewpoint is taken as a broad frame of
departure in this study. More specifically, critical structuralism takes structure to
denote "persistent social practices, made by collective human activity and
transformed through collective human activity" (Vico sited by Cox, 1987:4). The
power relations that emerge from these structures are determined mostly by
production relations, each with its own power dynamic, which fall within a range of
being dominant and oppressive to being equitable and just. Production is shaped by
power relationships and also creates resources that can be "transformed" into other
forms of power such as financial power, ideological power, military power, and power
over products emanating from the access to and use of knowledge (Cox, 1987:5).
The difference between historical structuralist theory and critical structuralism lies in
the interaction of human behaviour with these structures. The historical approach
takes structures as given entities that can not be altered by human action - they
need to be accepted and actions have to be directed to adapt to structure. The
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critical structuralist approach takes structures as man-made entities that can be
altered by collective effort; i.e. they are "transformable". These differences are
explored further in the next section.
5.3. The neo-Realist/Critical Theory Divide
Theorists from different schools of thought have examined structures emanating from
different power relationships with different, sometimes opposing results. One of the
most prominent examples of this in International Political Economy is the theoretical
divide between the neo-Realist work of Kenneth Waltz and the Critical Theory work of
Robert Cox. This divide is explored further in this section with said theorists as the
protagonists.
Realism, as the dominant school of thought in IR and IPE "came to be framed by a
Westphalian legacy which placed sovereignty, the state and the anarchical interstate
system at the core of the discipline" (Jabri, 2000:307). For Realists, change in
anarchical systems is only possible "when it comes from the top, when it is in the
interests of the major powers, and when it does not unbalance the systemic order
based on the "self-help" principle" (George, 1994:117).
Traditionalist/Realist theorising for people like Descartes, Locke, Hume, Comte,
Popper and Keohane takes the form of a "cognitive reaction to reality". Seen thus,
theory is not part of the construction of reality, but always follows reality so that it
becomes a mere tool to place reality into different categories (George, 1994:132). In
criticism of this approach, Susan Strange states that neo-Realism focuses on the
status quo to the exclusion of hidden agendas. It gives no voice to the voiceless
such as the underprivileged, the disenfranchised or the unborn about the functioning
of the system, let alone changing it (George, 1994: 134). This exclusionary principle
is also mentioned by Cox, when he says that "(p )roblem-solving theories can be
represented, in the broader perspective of critical theory, as serving particular
national, sectional, or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order."
(Cox, 1981:446)
George explains the inevitable outcome of realist/neo-realist reasoning in his reaction
to Gilpin's Political Economy of International Relations (1987). Using a Traditional
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rational-actor model, Gilpin reduces behaviour in the state system to a "symplistic
utilitarian calculus", the inevitable end-result of which is denotes anarchism which is
overcome by the order created by institutional mechanisms (e.g. World
Bank/IMFIWTO). A further inevitable implication is that states' interests are best
served when they support these institutional mechanisms and play by the rules laid
down through the hegemonic leadership of the United States. This Gramscian view
is evident in the word of Cox: "Nee-realism puts the accent on states reduced to their
dimension of material force and similarly reduces the structure of world order to the
balance of power as a configuration of material forces". (Cox, 1981:453). This so-
called "knowledge/power nexus" used by Gilpin, Waltz and other exponents of neo-
Realism has a one-sided view of international affairs, namely that of large capitalist
states, and seek a structural stability and political order maintaining the interests of
these states in a conservative manner (George, 1994: 128). Waltz sees instability
and war as the results of changing power distribution across states in an anarchical
international system (McLean, 1996:481) that is threatening and conflictual (Jabri,
2000:305). The neo-Realist view thus differs very little in this respect from its
predecessor, orthodox Realism, Le. that states should prepare for the inevitibality of
conflict and war.
Yet, Buzan (1995:212) warns that we should not regard Waltz as a "structural
determinist". Waltz recognised that "structural causes could never offer more than a
partial explanation of international outcomes", and that unit-level and system-level
outcomes needed always to be considered simultaneously (Buzan, 1995:212).
Despite Buzan's cautionary remarks, Strange's earlier comment still seems relevant.
When Buzan refers to unit- and system-level outcomes the frame of reference is still
that of states and state interest. The state-centered bias does not make provision for
the specific treatment of the problems of the "underclass" or those aggregates of
people excluded from political agendas by hegemons whose main aim is favourable
trade balances and national security. Thus, the reaction to any challenge to the said
stable order involves questions such as: "How will this influence trade?", or, "Is it in
the interest of the American economy?", or, "Will we (America) still have the
comparative advantage?". The sentiments underlying these questions are reflected
in the reaction of George to the work of Krasner when he states, "Exposed also at the
core of neo-Realist structuralism, again, is a modernist ontology that is paradoxically
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reductionist and reliant upon positivist premises concerning the anarchic structure
that just exists (beyaund explanation) "out there"" (George, 1994: 130). This brings
the discussion to the reflectivist school of thought, and more precisely, to Critical
Theory.
The Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School tried to avoid the scientific orthodoxy of
the time that led to reductionist theorising. This was an attempt to recapture the
philosophical essence of Marxism in the evaluation of society and culture. They
argued that social progress did not depend "on concrete social practice associated
with critical reflection on dominant knowledge/power relations". George (1994: 151)
explains further that posiitivism was used to transform a particular knowledge form,
namely scientific empricism, into a sociopolitical force with universal application, thus
reducing critical reason to instrumentalist ends and relinquishing social power to the
knowledge of the scientist or expert. In this instance the saying, 'Knowledge is
power', becomes very real, where the positivist language of the natural science is
applied uncritically to social life (George, 1994:151).
In their edited book, The New International Political Economy, Murphy and Tooze
(1991: 17) criticise the orthodoxy of IPE methodologies on three basic fronts, stating
that its positivism and empiricism makes it restrictive; that its methodological
individualism results in the locus of explanation being restricted either to "economic
man" or the "state as individual"; and that orthodox IPE theory lies in totality within
three opposing and mutually exclusive "ideologies" and their respective constructs.
When the issue agenda of orthodox IPE is examined critically, it becomes evident
that certain issues are priveleged "within a universe that is constructed so as to
exclude a number of other important questions and issues" (Murphy and Tooze,
1991:24). This priveleging of issues is centered around the interests of the United
States government to maintain its role as singular superpower in a post-Cold War
globalised world where priveleged trade and comparative advantage have taken the
place of ideological rivalry as the number one foreign policy priority. In such a
structural dispensation, even national secuirity, the mainstay of traditional realism, is
measured in terms of economic superiority and trade surpluses as opposed to
recession and deficits. This results in the neglect of crucial issues such as
technological change, population dynamics, and resource depletion on international
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security forums and IPE analysis. Furthermore, questions of the exact nature of the
ethical life, dependency, insecurity, powerlessness, and opportunities to change
these, do not feature at all on the orthodox IPE list of concerns, probably because "it
has few organic links to those who would raise them" (Murphy and Tooze, 1991 :27).
It was Robert Cox who "confronted" nee-Realism with an emancipatory perspective
during the 1980s. In turn, his approach was influenced by the work of Habermas,
Gramsci and antistructuralist Marxism (George, 1994:176). Cox drew attention to the
way Morgenthau objectified Realism and supported American hegemony for its
supposed role in maintaining order. Cox drew attention to some of the important
philosophical principles ignored by neo-Realist orthodoxy. Firstly, Cox rejected the
idea of an independent reality "out there" that could be grasped by means of
empirical observation. Instead he maintains that "knowledge of reality is always
intrinsically connected to social practice (forces) and to the ways human affairs are
organised in particular times and places" (George, 1994:177). This historical view is
explicitly stated when Cox says that "Critical theory is theory of history in the sense of
being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical
change" (Cox, 1981:446).
By focusing on social forces, Cox manages to reach beyond the conventional Marxist
notion of social relations of production, thereby laying bare three dimensions of
power: the power involved in the productive process; the power inherent in class
relationship, or social power; and political power or state control (George, 1994:178).
By moving away from a neo-Realist state centric approach and adopting a critical
approach that views power as a multi-faceted phenomenon that shapes the lives of
people in societies at different levels of a globalised world, it becomes possible to
recognise the predicaments of the underclasses, the poor, the marginalised, the
exploited, and the underdeveloped. It follows that these individuals and communities
should want to change their circumstances. Critical theory makes it possible to look
for avenues and possibilities of change.; of questioning status quo belief systems and
orthodoxies; of questioning long-standing power relationships that have theorised
itself beyond rapproach. Ultimately, Critical Theory makes it possible to emancipate
and discover; to see reality and how it has changed; and finally, to discover where
and how reality on its part can be changed.
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Social scientists use theory to try and understand the reality around them - to get "a
grip" on reality. In this sense theory is developed in reaction to events that have
already occurred. This chronology may also be reversed when theory prompts
behaviour to take place in a certain manner or alters the way certain actions are
executed. Thus, theory may precede reality. This is why Cox maintains that theory
is not an entity with its own inherent driving force separate from historical context.
Rather, "(t)heory is the way the mind works to understand the reality it confronts"
(Cox, 1995:31). This link means that theory "is always for someone and for some
purpose". Cox makes a distinction between theories employed to maintain existing
social orders and theories used to change social realities. The first is labeled as
'problem-solving theory', which accepts the existing social order as a given except for
certain problems that need to be corrected from time to time. The latter is labeled
'critical theory', which questions the origins of existing social order/s and seeks
methods to change that order (Cox, 1995:31-32). In an earlier work, Cox states the
same principle as follows: "Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favor a
social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of
choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world".
(Cox, 1981 :447). Cox is confident that Critical Theory is a viable alternative to the
orthodoxy of neo-Realism when he posits that "(I)n this way critical theory can be a
guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-
solving theory is a guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the
existing order." (Cox, 1981:447). A brief examination of the capabilities inherent to
Critical Theory in effecting change, as opposed to the static approach of neo-
Realism, follows.
As a means of inquiry, political economy is more critical than merely problem-solving.
As Cox denotes:
Political economy by contrast (to political science and economics), is
concerned with the historically constituted frameworks or structures within
which political and economic activity takes place. It stands back from the
apparent fixity of the present to ask how the existing structures came into
being and how they may be changing, or how they may be induced to change.
In this sense, political economy is critical theory." (Cox, 1995:32)
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To understand the nature of our existence (ontology) at a particular point in time,
social scientists take a synchronic view of reality. But reality changes over time
leading to structural change. To grasp the nature and extent of change over time, a
diachronic/longitudinal or historical dialectical approach is necessary (Cox, 1995:34-
5). This can be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:
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Another author that has drawn attention to the uneven power relations in IPE is
Stephen Gill (1995). He talks of "varied and complex efforts ... by the forces of the
political right and those of neoclassical economists and financial capital, to develop a
politico-legal famework for the reconstruction of capital on a world scale, and thus for
the intensification of market forms of discipline" (Gill, 1995:78). This is another way
of illustrating in practical terms the results of perpetuating neo-realist orthodoxy in
theory, Le. those with power and wealth employ not only academics and scientists to
maintain the status quo. Nor do they rely solely on ideology to direct others' action to
desired outcomes. Hegemons and self-appointed custodians of "economic
sensibility" have been the architects of what Gill calls a "new constitutionalism",
designed to keep privelegeing the rich and to prevent intervention by poor countries,
or any nonactor that tries to become a 'player' (Gill, 1995:78). Cox (1987:395)
identifies such frameworks or structures at three levels of inquiry: social relations of
production, forms of state, and structures of world order. A study of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, as a norm-based international policy and action document,
falls within the latter of these structures.
5.4. Critical Theory and International Regimes
The main reasons for relying on this theoretical point of departure are, firstly, to
highlight the position of developing countries in the unfolding of international relations
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as it impacts on science and technology and the politics of biotechnology; and
secondly, to explore whether a regime such as the Cartagena Protocol together with
the Convention on Biodiversity has the capacity to facilitate a change in this
precarious position the farmers and communities of developing countries find
themselves in. The hope is to balance some of the views expressed by developed
countries where the focus is mostly on economic advantage, industrial growth, and
technological competitiveness, often resulting in the exclusion from the international
agenda of what is needed for developing countries to advance their people,
infrastructure and economies. It needs to be said at this point that the concept
'developing countries' is a very arbitrary classification tool that does not make
provision for the divergent nature of the societies, economies, culture and politics of
those countries belonging to the so-called South. Even the classification of
developed, developing, and least developed does not account for the unique
situation of each nation-state, and even less so for specific communities and
indigenous peoples that are so often the focus of development and social studies.
Nevertheless, from a structuralist perspective a distinction needs to be made
between the rich and the poor, the dependent and the self-sufficient, and the
powerful and the powerless. In this. thesis the relationship portrayed is that between
developed countries (also called the rich North), and developing countries (called the
poor South). The former is characterised by industrialisation, market economies and
long-term prospects of stable economic growth, while the latter shows characteristics
of lesser industriaiisation and agrarian-based command economies that are often
hostile to open markets with mostly bleak prospects of economic development and
growth.
5.5. Methodology and Research Design
The purpose of the study is mainly to explore and describe, with only some
explanation. Biotechnology is a rapidly developing field where changes take place in
a revolutionary fashion. These developments need constantly to be explored just as
do the effects thereof on mankind's ethical and social value responses to those
developments. The international politics of biotechnology has a relatively short
history with certain developments that need to be described in order to highlight the
main issues of contention and the progression that has been made in establishing a
set of rules or controlling regime. For a clear understanding of these dynamics, it is
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necessary to describe certain relationships, and where possible, to explain why they
have come about and how they could affect the future of biotechnology.
The unit of analysis is a transnational institution, namely the emerging regime that
determines the rules, values and decision-making practices that govern the
production, legitimisation and dissemination of technologies that involve the
manipulation of living organisms, Le. biotechnology. Transnational institutions, like
states, are abstractions that become more tangible when viewed as a set of rules, as
examples of human or social artifacts. Coupled to this, the contributions of certain
states and corporations that influence the biotechnology debate will be analysed as
examples of groups and organisations. The level of analysis is mainly macro, with
elements of the meso- and micro-levels entering the study. International regime
dynamic lies mainly on the macro level as it deals with the relationships between
large aggregates or groups over a wide range of issues on a global level. Where
individuals and organisations interact on the macro level and bring personal and
state-views to the different debates, the meso-level is introduced. Where the focus is
on the family or household level the micro-level becomes evident.
This is a qualitative study. Certain research guidelines are stated which are persued
by means of conceptualisation of key concepts and argumentation of pertinent
questions, which are informed by theory. As many aspects surrounding the
biotechnology debate have to do with people's values and certain ethical issues,
there are no quantitative answers to be arrived at or empirical answers to be found.
Rather, the normative aspects that underlie the different actors' approach to
biotechnology provide the backdrop for the study. Furthermore, the thesis will be
ideographic to the extent that it examines a very specific aspect of international
relations and the dynamic that is peculiar to biotechnology. It is also a cross-
sectional study because it examines a specific phenomenon at a given point in time
and will not be repeated.
6. Limits to the Research
Apart from being of acute interest to the student, biotechnology in international
relations is already affecting people's lives on various levels. Ethically and morally,
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developments in biotechnology have opened up a Pandora's box. In terms of
international trade, it has introduced a new dimension to comparative advantage. In
terms of sustainable food production and supply, it is promising dramatic increases in
agricultural production, which at the same time is disputed. To environmentalists and
green lobbyists, it has brought new issues to add to the debate on better interaction
with the environment. And to big industry who are intent on establishing and
protecting intellectual property rights on their knowledge products, it has brought new
challenges. There are more examples, but what is important is that biotechnology,
whether seen as a benevolent or malevolent development, is not going to go away.
Rather, it is going to change societies profoundly in the future in ways that have not
been contemplated. What is needed is better understanding of what these changes
will entail and how to manage them. A first step in that direction is not to overstate
one's intentions and, at the same time, to set limits to what is to be accomplished.
This study will seek mainly to explore possible answers to the list of questions
already stated. The section on biotechnology is thus limited to genetic governance
and does not seek to elaborate on international relations in general. The following
section deals with trade and agriculture, but does not attempt to address agriculture
in its entirety. Similarly, the section on the Cartagena Protocol is limited to a review
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the contents of the Cartagena Protocol and
the issue of safety as embodied in the precautionary principle. It is not intended to
explore the significance of the protocol at other levels other than its role as a
regulatory framework. The implications of the Cartagena Protocol for developing
countries are limited to global public goods issues, biodiversity, and food security.
The author recognises that this is a very limited selection when considering the
dynamics and breadth of biotechnology issues. However, the reasoning is that these
three issues are at the core of what biotechnology's significance to developing
countries is and will be in the near future. Under the section on capacity building a
capita selecta of challenges and constraints was necessary to keep the length of the
document within prescribed limits. Here, again, it is recognised that there are many
other challenges and constraints that might be of equal significance to developing
countries.
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This study highlights some of the pertinent problems facing developing countries
when dealing with biotechnology. It does not endeavour to provide tentative answers
to all of these challenges. Nor is it the intention to prescribe to policy-makers what
their most suitable options are. Rather, the approach is one of stating alternatives
and exploring the viability of certain orthodox attitudes. Furthermore, the study
provides established typologies and explores certain new modes of classification. It
does not presume to construct any models or theories. Rather, as the preceding
section indicates, an existing theoretical framework (critical structuralism) is used to
guide the inquiry. The study remains, therefore, largely exploratory and descriptive,
with only certain aspects of biotechnology and its role in international political
economy explained.
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CHAPTER2
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
"Contemporary world politics is a matter of wealth and poverty, life and death"
(Robert O. Keohane, 1988:289).
This chapter deals with the role biotechnology plays in the international and global
arenas. It starts with an overview of the biotechnology industry to indicate the
structural inequalities that have given rise to this oligopolistic regime. This is followed
by a discussion of genetic governance, where, firstly, the focus is on regimes and
international legal instruments, next, on international and supranational
organisations, and, lastly, on non-state actors in general. The aim of this section is to
indicate the role and position of different actors and to get an understanding of how
they influence the governance of biotechnology. Looking at the structural features of
the biotechnology regime follows this. Identifying the main points of international
public opinion on biotechnology concludes the chapter, which indicate that it is highly
divided and often unnecessarily emotional.
1. The Evolution of the Biotechnology Industry
The roots of science in genetics can be traced back to 1865 with the discovery by
Mendel of the law of genetics. Mendel's work on the inheritance patterns of peas
was published in that year, but it was only until 1900 that the significance thereof was
better appreciated. The discovery in 1953 by James Watson and Francis Crick of the
double helical structure of DNA was the starting point of a tremendous amount of
research in the field of genetics. This also resulted in biotechnology being defined
more narrowly, Le. focusing on the manipulation of genes to the exclusion of
fermentation techniques and animal breeding. Techniques for splicing genes and
recombination have been used since the early 1970s. But the biotechnology
industry's proper establishment and growth coincided with the growth of the U.S.
biotechnology industry.
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The U.S. biotechnology industry was founded in the early 1980s when reforms were
made to the institutional environment for technological innovation (Daemmrich and
Sagar, 2000: 1). In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that microorganisms could
be patented. The protection of intellectual property rights created an incentive for
private companies to invest substantial amounts of capital in the development of
commercially attractive transgenic crops. This made it possible for the first time to
protect, by means of patents, new types of plants and parts of plants such as seeds,
tissue cultures, and genes (Paarlberg, 2000:25). By the early 1990s, a significant
number of new companies had formed in the medicine, agriculture, human
identification and other sectors and areas of technology. Between 1996 and 1998
U.S. sales of biotechnology products rose from $9.2 billion to $13.4 billion, while
market capitalisation rose from $83 billion to $97 billion over the same period
(Daemmrich and Sagar, 2000:1). A brief explanation of the nature of biotechnology
vis a vis other sciences accounts for some of the reasons why this sector has shown
such phenomenal growth.
Biotechnology is described by some not as 'Big' science (manipulation of very high
energies), but as "high intensity" science, because it is concerned with the
manipulation of information (Russell, 1990:10). Russell states that information and
knowledge "form the heart of modern biotechnology". Biotechnology is characterised
by transnational movements of information through a variety of formal and informal
communication channels. The industry is also characterised by openness in the
tradition of scientific exchange and publication, and at the same time by secrecy
resulting from the sensitivity of certain types of basic research (military research
included). Thus, the advent of globalisation, with its emphasis on the rapid
dissemination for information, created an ideal breeding ground for a technology
such as biotechnology to flourish. Government officials in the United States, Europe
and Japan were soon convinced that aggressive development of a biotechnology
sector would be integral to economic growth and industrial competitiveness (Sharp in
Daemmrich and Sagar, 2000: 1) indicates that. Thus, especially in the US, new
relationships between academic scientists and the private sector were formed with
funds readily available from venture capitalists, stock offerings and federal budgets.
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The development of the biotechnology industry in Europe during the 1980s was
somewhat different. Large chemical and pharmaceutical firms established in-house
research laboratories and invested in North American start-up firms. Because of the
concern that European countries and some multinational firms were falling behind the
U.S. in competitive terms and economic progress, collaborative research agreements
were entered into and purchases of U.S. biotechnology firms took place. What
exacerbated the competitive position of nations in Europe, Africa and Latin America
further was the combination of stricter environmental and safety regulations together'
with risk-adverse investment practices. Because of what Henzler (in Daemmrich and
Sagar, 2000:2) calls an "anti-business" culture in these regions, research personnel
and investments were shifted to the United States, spawning the growth of its
biotechnology industry even further.
By the mid-1990s the US had established a biotechnology industry with large,
multinational "life science" firms. European chemical companies soon redefined
themselves as life science firms. The result is that only a few global firms hold the
intellectual property rights to DNA sequences useful in food and pharmaceutical
research and production (Thomas jn Daemmrich and Sagar, 2000:2). During this
same period there was loosening of regulatory controls over research with genetically
modified organisms that led to the establishment of a number of new biotechnology
firms in Europe, Asia and to a lesser degree in Africa and Latin America. According
to Daemmrich and Sagar (2000:2) the growth in the biotechnology industry in the
mid-1990s is evidence that governments and the public in these regions recognised
the value of this sector for national competitiveness. For nations to be able to
compete, they need to be able to harness their innovative capacities.
Barriers to innovation were overcome by decreased regulatory oversight, changes in
public opinion, and the harmonisation of investment policies. This trend, however,
was short lived. Since the late 1990s to the present, environmental lobbyists and
public interest groups have protested anew the efforts by especially the United States
biotechnology companies to export their products. This has led to Europe taking a
position of caution on the possible risks involved in the release of biotechnology
products into the environment. On 25 June 1999, the European Union's environment
ministers adopted a decision imposing a de facto moratorium on the export of
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biotechnology products to new markets - something which would bring them,
together with various groups from the developing world, at loggerheads with the
United States when it came to efforts to draw up a biosafety protocol. Two days
earlier, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) indicated
that it was to tighten safety regulationson genetically modified crops. In addition, on
23 June 1999, the Brazilian State of Rio Grande do Sui declared itself a genetically
modified free zone.
The 1999 G-8 summit's call for an international inquiry into the safety of genetically
modified (GM) foods indicates the importance of biotechnology in international
politics (Brodnig, 1999 (a):1). Russell (1990:5) sites three reasons why
biotechnology is of significance to international relations. In the first place,
biotechnology has the capacity to be used as weapons of mass destruction. Here it
is necessary to establish (or at least attempt to establish) which actors are
undertaking military-oriented biotechnology research. This is problematic, since
biotechnology research can be done in small laboratories on small scale.
Furthermore, the development of biotechnology for purposes of warfare can closely
resemble the development of this. technology for benevolent purposes. Pirages
(1990:106) uses the term "dual-use" when referring to the application of
biotechnology for both peaceful and aggressive measures. The same laboratories,
techniques, and equipment used for benevolent research can be used for the
manufacturing of biologicalweapons.
Secondly, the practice of biotechnology has resulted in international agreements that
need to be studied and scrutinised by international relations scholars. Specific
attention needs to be paid to how comprehensive and adequate these agreements,
protocols and treaties are in terms of the interests of different role players (the South
versus the North), and changes that take place due to new developments in science
and technology. Such internationalagreements also have significance for states that
battle with food supply, especially those who have not managed to establish
economic growth and sustainabledevelopment.
Thirdly, international relations scholars need to be aware of the implications of
biotechnology warfare and of how such a war can be prevented. This should not be
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restricted to traditional conceptualisationsof warfare. Russell (1990:5) indicates the
necessity to think of biologicalwarfare not only in terms of its applications or threat of
its use by state and non-state actors, but to be cognisant of political power that can
be derived from the control of knowledge in the modern international political
economy. The acquisition of structural political power from gaining control over
knowledge products has shaped the biotechnology industry and determines which
actors are in the best position to determine and uphold "the rules of the game". This
matter is dealt with in more detail in subsequent sections and chapters.. Here, it is
necessary to identify· the influence of biotechnology on the international political
system.
A broader view of biotechnology is evident in the three sets of circumstances
identified by Caldwell (in Wiegele, 1991:13) that have influenced the way in which
biotechnology has influencedthe internationalsystem:
1. The first circumstance relates to the amount of willingness with which a nation
accepts scientific innovation. It seems that nations with established scientific
infrastructures are more accepting of biotechnology - European nations being the
exception.
2. A second set of circumstances relates to how knowledge of biotechnology is
communicated to policy decision-makers and the public at large. Information
abundance may in one case cause feelings of lack of control, while in other cases it
might cause a sense of empowerment.
3. The third set of circumstances relates to the level of control that a nation is
able to exert over its use of biotechnology. Many developing countries lack scientific
infrastructure, knowledge of testing and capacity of evaluation of risk, as well as
means of establishing possible societal effects of the use of biotechnology. These
countries might find it extremely difficult to develop the broad range of skills and
educational infrastructure that is required by the nature of biotechnology (Wiegele,
1991:23). In contrast to those countries struggling to establish biotechnology
industries, a handful of countries have managedto dominate this industry.
The United States leadership in scientific research extends to biotechnology in
general and GM crops in particular. Other countries that have advanced their
biotechnology research capacities and productionof GM products include Argentina,
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
26
Canada, Australia, Mexico, certain EU countries, South Africa and China. Most
developing countries have not made any significant advances in biotechnology
research or development. Their focus has been more on the risks of this technology
than the benefits (Brodnig, 1999 (a):3). From the above the oligopolistic nature of the
biotechnology industry is evident when the dominant position of the US and Europe
is considered. It is also interesting to note that despite the rise in regionalism and the
use of supranational structures for the governance of global affairs, in the case of
biotechnology, the state seems to remain the primary unit of regulation. The
structural imbalance in states' biotechnology capacity is reflected in the way that this
sector is being governed.
2. Genetic governance
Biotechnology research is very difficult to monitor and verify and the production of
toxins and other biological agents using new techniques can be carried out in
complete secrecy in a small laboratory (Russell, 1990:8). This has prompted
authorities, some of who also have an economic incentive, to attempt the regulation
of the products of genetic manipulation. Like other knowledge-intensive areas of
international relations, the affairs of biotechnology are represented by governmental
officials, which still dominate international forums. Yet, the governance of genetic
material has been greatly influenced by a variety of actors and mechanisms not
necessarily directly representing nation-states, although it needs to be acknowledged
that the influence of states and their representatives in these mechanisms cannot be
discounted. These actors and mechanisms are discussed briefly.
2.1. Regimes and International Legal Instruments
The concept 'regime', has been defined in various, and often overlapping manners:
"networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control
effects" (Keohane and Nye in Lang, 1990:38); " ... principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue area" (Krasner in Russell, 1990:110); "sets of implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations
Issue areas here, include trade regimes, monetary regimes, oceans, and nuclear energy (Russell,
1990: 110).
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converge in a given area of international relations" (Hurrell and Kingsbury, in Brodnig,
1999 (a):2); and "the norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that states (and
sometimes other powerful actors) have created to govern international life within
specific realms" (Murphy, 2000:793). The benefit of analysing regimes is found in the
exposition of the origin of the principles and norms of the issue area that are
highlighted. This enables the researcher to better understand and scrutinise the
rules and decision-making procedure as the mechanisms by which the regime
maintains or manages order (Russell, 1990: 110).
Prior to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, a number of international legal
instruments existed to regulate, implicitly or explicitly, the governance of
biotechnology at different levels. These instruments and what they were designed to
govern are discussed briefly, mainly from the work of Wiegeie (1991, Chapter 3).
2.1.1. The Trail-Smelter Decision: During the early 1920s, the Canadian
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company Limited operated a zinc and lead
smelter along the Columbia River at Trail in British Columbia, approximately 16
kilometres north of the international. boundary with the State of Washington. During
the period 1925-1935, the US Government objected to the Canadian Government
that sulfur dioxide emissions from the mine was damaging land and trees in the
Columbia River valley, causing harm to logging, farming and cattle grazing industries.
After seeking legal arbitration twice, it was ruled in both instances that Canada pay
damages to the State of Washington and that the mine adjust its operation to a set of
guidelines to prevent damage for a year and a half (TED, 2000). Writers in
international law accept the Trail-Smelter case as establishing the principle of
national responsibility for transboundary environmental damage - a principle upheld
by international legal cases involving nuclear tests and river pollution (Wiegele,
1991 :50). It is further indicated how this case resulted in an actual regime being
established for the monitoring of sulphur dioxide emissions as well as for the principle
that international legal bodies may initiate transboundary regimes to regulate the
effects of environmental damage (Wiegele, 1991:51).
2.1.2. The Corfu Channel case: On 22 October 1946, two British Navy destroyers
struck sea mines in Albanian waters in the Corfu Channel that had been swept
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recently and considered safe. The British Navy lost 45 lives and 42 menwere injured
in the incident. The UnitedKingdompresenteda case to the United NationsSecurity
Council, which made a resolution on 9 April 1947 recommending that both
governments take the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ
ruled on 25 March 1948 that Albania was responsible for both the explosions
because it had had the responsibility to inform all ships of the minefield; that the
United Kingdom did not violate Albanian sovereignty by its presence in the Corfu
Channel; and that Albania was responsible to pay compensation. This case
illustrates that nations are responsiblefor actionswithin their jurisdictions (specifically
in their territorial waters) that might cause harm to other states and persons. This
case is applied in instances where there is a question pertaining to national
responsibility for damages resulting from the unauthorised release of genetically
manipulated organisms (Wiegele, 1991:52-3).
2.1.3. Biological weapons: Several legal instruments have been created to govern
and contain the production of biological weapons, e.g. the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
signed by 118 nations (a "no first use" pledge of biological weapons". The central
legal instrument for the qovemance of biological warfare is the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,which was signed in 1972
(Wiegele, 1991:54). Other instruments that were created as efforts to control
chemical and biological weapons include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Trilateral Agreement on Biological
Weapons (Russia, United Kingdom, and United States), the Australia Group, the
Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (US-USSR), the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (US-USSR), the MendozaAccord (Latin America), and the India-Pakistan
Agreement on ChemicalWeapons (Stimson Centre, 2000:1).
2.1.4. International commerce: From the perspectiveof firms, the issue of intellectual
property rights is of primary importance. These rights include trade secrets and
patents and related enforcement and protection. The international legal regime that
exists to manage the patent process includes the Paris Convention, the International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, the Patent Cooperation Treaty,
the European Patent Convention, the Budapest Treaty on the International
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Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure,
and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (Wiegele, 1991:56). A number of
international agencies have attempted to stimulate biotechnology activities in less-
developed countries (LOC). They include the World Health Organisation, the United
Nations Industrial Development Organisation, the Food and Agricultural Organisation,
the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation, and the
International Council of Scientific Unions. The international legal community has
focused its attention especially on two aspects in this regard. Firstly, the dwindling
resource of native plant germ plasm, most of which is found in LOCs, and secondly,
the export of field tests for genetically engineered organisms from one nation to
another. Both of these issues involve relationships between developed and
developing nations (Wiegele, 1991:57).
2.1.5. Harmonisation: The first trend towards harmonisation emanated from the
spring of 1988 at the First International Conference on the Release of Genetically
Engineered Microorganisms held in Cardiff, Wales (Wiegele, 1991:61).
2.1.6. International environmental ~egulation: Supranational legal instruments that
can be used to protect the environment include the UN Conference on the Human
Environment (Stockholm, 1972); the multilateral Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution Convention (which entered force 1983); the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
1963; the Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (Wiegele, 1991 :62-3).
2.1.7. Biotechnology and the sea: The 1957 Lake Lanoux Arbitration stipulates
regulations for the governance of biotechnology emanating from marine resources
(Wiegele, 1991 :64).
A number of other regimes regulating the release into the environment of toxic
substances include the following: the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (1979) and its additional protocols related to sulphur emissions (1985) and
to nitrogenoxide emissions (1988); the Vienna Convention on the protection of the
Ozone Layer (1985), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (1987); and the Basil Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
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of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989) (Lang, 1990:42). These protocols
were put in place during the 1970s and 1980s when it became clear that certain
developments in technology had adverse effects on the environment that could affect
not only national populations, but also the whole of human existence.
From the preceding discussion it is evident that the multitude of conventions, cases
and protocols can be considered an emerging regime on the transboundary
movement of the products of technology, specifically biotechnology. Such a regime
becomes more recognisable when it is understood as "a set of basic understandings,
rules and expectations shared by actors involved, and covering a specific area of
policy" (Nel & McGowan, 1999:328). The different rules discussed point to the
shared norms by state and non-state actors of conserving the environment,
protecting individual and group rights, and safeguarding commercial, national, and
other interests. This dimension of emerging regimes has inspired certain
supranational institutions to become involved with the governance of biotechnology
and its products.
2.2. International and Supranational Organisations
International organisations that have been involved in the governance of
biotechnology since its appearance in the international arena include the World
Health Organisation, the International Council of Scientific Unions, the United Nations
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the Food and Agricultural
Organisation, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, and the
United Nations Development Programme (Wiegele, 1991:17). Most of these
organisations are UN subsidiaries, which might account for the weakened position of
developing countries vis a vis their biotechnology capacities at the advent of the 21st
century when viewed from a structuralist perspective. One of the problems with
international institutions is that they have a legacy of being weak structures in terms
of enforcing their provisions (Pirages, 1990: 108). Where biotechnology is concerned,
this could become a serious problem for developing countries that are trying to
maintain sovereignty over their domestic biodiversity resources.
During the 1990s, a number of supranational institutions were established to regulate
international 'environmental interests' as well as the transboundary flows of natural
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resources such as genetic information and knowledge about nature. These
structures of governance, which McAfee (1999:133) calls "eco-economic
governance" include environmental treaties, such as the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the
Global Environment Facility (GEF). There is close collaboration between these
regimes and the World Bank, United Nations agencies concerned with green
environmental issues, and mainstream conservationist organisations (McAfee,
1999:133).
2.3. Other Non-state Actors
This group of non-state actors influencing the governance of biotechnology is
comprised of Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Non-governmental Organisations
(NGOs) and interest groups, and certain individuals such as scientists and
academics,which have brought new issues to the biotechnologydebate.
The consolidation of the agrobiotechnology industry has meant that a number of
powerful multinational enterprises with significant influence share this arena with a
small group of issue-oriented NGOs such as Rural Advancement Fund International
(RAFI), Genetic Resources Action Network (GRAIN), WWF (World Wide Fund for
Nature), IUCN (World Conservation Union), Indigenous Peoples' Biodiversity
Network, International Alliance of IndigenousTribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests,
and Cultural Survival, and Third World Network (TWN).
Rights-oriented interest groups include the Kari-Oca Declaration and the Indigenous
Peoples' Earth Charter (1992, Kari-Oca); Recommendation from the Voices of the
Earth Conference (1993, Amsterdam); the Charter of the Indigenous-Tribal Peoples
of the Tropical Forests (1992, Penang); and the Julyinbul Statement of principles and
Declaration Reaffirming the Self Determination and Intellectual Property Rights of
Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the West tropics Rainforest Area (1993,
Jingarrba) (Sutherland, 1998: 296); as well as advocacy organisations such as
Greenpeace (Brodnig, 1999 (a):2).
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The large number of scientists involved in pure and applied biotechnology research
contributes significantly to the biotechnologyagenda. These different actors convene
at various international forums that range from United Nations agencies and
international conventions to regional economic organisations and other political
forums such as the G-B.
The governance of biotechnology has created a number of new issues to confront
diplomats, policy-makers and representatives of the governing bodies and interest
groups mentioned. Brodnig (1999 (a):3) indicates that the more globalisation and
new technologies lead to an internationalisation of formerly domestic issues, the
more decision-making structures will be assessed against broader notions of
legitimacy and democratic rule. This should present unique challenges to especially
those countries that have experienced little economic liberalisation and democratic
governance.
The amount and variety of actors involved in the governance of biotechnology means
that a multitude of interests and values need to be balanced. This has resulted in
conflict between the global trade system and environmental safeguards. Efforts
during 1999 to adopt a Biosafety Protocol failed because of these conflicts. Brodnig
(1999 (a):2) indicates that the development and adoption of an effective global
regime for transgenic crops has also been hampered by disagreements and even
controversy in the scientific community as to the health and ecological impacts of
genetically modified organisms. Juma (1999:4) points out that the issue of the
governance of biotechnology is mostly the underlying theme in these conflicts over
control, equity, and choice. He proposes that the following set of activities can be
used to deal with these technical and governance issues: promoting consultative
processes; undertaking scientific and technical assessments; conducting research
and training; reforming national policies and institutions; harmonising standards and
sharing experiences; and facilitating technological cooperation (Juma, 1999:4-5).
This will not only require a significant reorientation of "current patterns of
technological development", but also a serious appraisal of the nature and direction
of the processes and patterns of biotechnology governance. In this regard,
biotechnology and the trade resulting from the exchange of products of this
technology have given rise to very specific international structural relationships.
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3. Structural Features of the Emerging Biotechnology Regime
For an understanding of the structural relations in biotechnology, an appreciation of
the structure of international affairs and the changes in technology in general is
necessary. Strange (1995:62) highlights certain fundamental structural changes that
have shaped the international relations of the late twentieth century. Among these
are the liberation of Central Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. payment
deficits juxtaposed against Japanese surpluses, the rapid rise of the so-called Asian
tigers or newly industrialised countries, democratisation in a number of former
authoritarian developing countries, and a move from protectionism and import
substitution to a more borderless economy that favours exports. In the time since
Strange wrote this chapter, it could be argued that some of these trends have shifted
or even shown a complete turnaround in certain case specific instances. But where
the influence of technology is concerned, the wisdom of Strange should be heeded.
Strange (1995:62) argues that the most articulated of the structural changes can be
seen in the way that technology (of industrial and agricultural production) has acted
as a "driving force" on the behaviour of governments and firms. Technology has
enabled producers to increase their production to supply markets with new and
innovative products. This was and is made possible through more advanced
processes of research, design and manufacturing. It has inevitably increased quite
dramatically the investment and cost involved in the research and development of
new technologies - something which is especially true of the biotechnology sector
which is characterised by actors possessing vastly different resources and capacities.
Many of the problems that underlie technology transfer can be addressed within the
globalist image of North-South relations (Russell, 1990:16). This approach cautions
against the possibility of exploitation and economic imperialism. He says that
biotechnology is a "prime candidate" to strengthen the North's already dominant
position of political and economic influence in the developing world. When looking at
biotechnology in its international political context it is evident that resources are very
unevenly distributed among different nations (Wiegele, 1991: 12). The talks at the
UNCED Rio Summit were aimed at the question of North-South inequality and what
was needed for social justice in a system where the so-called South had been left
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behind. Purdue (1995:101) calls this a "Iiberal, technicist tendency (that) allows
environmental problems to be defined as a lack of technology rather than a surfeit
thereof'. In the same way, development is defined as the South trying to catch up
with the North, rather than as a social justice issue of the distribution of finite
resources. This portrays the South as an "area of deficit of liberal capitalism" instead
of seeing it as a group of separate countries with different cultures and interests to
those of the North (Purdue, 1995:101). Pirages (1990:107) argues that it could be
technology, rather than capitalism, that is creating and perpetuating inequalities in
today's societies. Biotechnology, in particular, is promoting deeper interdependence
and creating inequalitiesthat would not have existedotherwise.
Purdue (1995:101-102) illustrates how the US biotechnology companies pressurised
their politicians into ensuring that Southern states buy into the idea of equitable
technology transfer as an effort to maintain 'sovereign rights'. Initially the
biotechnology industry in the US convinced the Bush administration to subordinate
the Biodiversity Convention to the rules of GATT. After Bush's refusal to sign the
treaty, Article 16 was inserted, stating that "(i)n the case of technology subject to
patents and other intellectual property rights, such access and transfer shall be
provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights". This effectively meant that the
TRIPs and bilateral arrangements would govern the Biodiversity treaty. The
hegemonic status of biotechnology is thus derived from the linkage of biodiversity
and environmentalism with established cultural patterns, such as free trade and new
scientific languages (Purdue, 1995:102). Insteadof encouraging technology transfer,
TRIPs enables industrialised countries, and the biotechnology industry in particular,
the ability to "collect the rent" on their technological dominance. These factors of
inequality in biotechnology together with factors such as environmental safety and
human health where biotechnology is harnessed have created a new dimension in
international public opinion.
4. International Public Opinion and Biotechnology
Since its infancy, biotechnology has promised to transform economic systems and
the way humans think about health and nutrition. The fact that biotechnology
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involves the altering of the genetic material of living organisms has inspired some
people to believing that it holds the answer to many health and nutrition problems
facing mankind, while others are fearing that the use of biotechnology holds potential
risk if introduced into the environment. Between these extremes are parties that aim
to maximise the benefits of the technology while minimising the risk (Juma, 1999:2).
The use of biotechnology in the manufacturing of pharmaceuticals and in agriculture
is directly linked with concerns of human health (Daemmrich, 1999: 1). When
biotechnology was first introduced to the wider arena of science and research, there
were many hopes of it enabling scientists to develop drugs with less side effects and
food products that would greatly increase production. This largely benevolent view of
biotechnology has subsequently been replaced by a great measure of caution
exercised by certain individuals, states, interest groups and consumers as to the
health and environmental risks that could emanate from the release of GMOs into the
environment.
The ethics and moral use of biotechnology have been placed in the forefront of public
debate and opinion with the cloninq of the sheep "Doily", in Great Britain. This is
despite the fact that biotechnology had been in the public mind at a lesser level of
consciousness since the mid-1970s. Recently, public attention has also shifted to
food purity and safety and the issue of labeling genetically modified food substances
(Daemmrich and Brodnig, 1999:1). There is, however, vehement disagreement
amongst scientists, policymakers, consumers and the public as to which specific
social issues and ethic agendas should be investigated and exactly which values
should predominate. Policy-making on biotechnology issues is no longer the
exclusive domain of government officials and diplomats. International interest groups
in biotechnology have tended to highlight a set of traditional issues such as
environmental affairs, safety in the workplace, legal proscriptions, the poor,
economics, agriculture, the military, and animal rights (Wiegele, 1991: 38). In
addition, the voices of industry, NGOs, academics and consumers have all
contributed to biotechnology issue debates, say Daemmrich and Brodnig (1999:2),
who explain why this debate has broadened so much.
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The broadening of the biotechnology debate can be attributed to suspicions that
technological change was driving public policy, causing ethical and social
assessments to become post-hoc activities. The major shift in this regard occurred
first in Europe and later in the developing world during the 1980s and 1990s. The
United States and Europe followed different policies where the release of GMOs into
the environment, public acceptance of GMOs, and patent protection for biological
inventions were concerned. Negative public reaction to the use of GM agricultural
products has led to the requirement by countries in Europe and recently Japan, that
some or all biotechnology-based products be clearly marked with labels to indicate
this status. This is in keeping with the precautionary principle (see Chapter 4), which
holds that until there is certainty about the safety of GM products for human use and
environmental release, precautions should be taken and the public informed (Juma
and Gupta, 1999: 1).
The differences in public opinion mentioned are indicative of different societal
perceptions of the role of individuals, tolerance for risk, and approaches to the
construction of value systems. In the light of these differences, it is important not to
view contrasts in policies merely in terms of economic interests. It is precisely ethical
and social values that often "determine the boundaries of disputes, mechanisms of
resolving conflict, and shape the very discourse, the style and contents of interactions
about biotechnology around the globe" (Daemmrich and Brodnig, 1999:2). This is
why room should be made for national divergence, even if for some it is a priority to
strive towards international harmonisation of rules, procedures and practices.
Wiegeie (1991: 40-41) is of the opinion that neither the public nor political decision-
makers are adequately informed regarding biotechnology issues. He arrives at this
conclusion after scrutinising a public opinion survey done by the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment in 1986. If Wiegeie is correct, a reason for the ignorance
could be that developments in the areas of the trade and especially the agriculture of
biotechnology have been neglected. This is where the discussion moves to in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER3
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND AGRICULTURE
"Knowledge, in the form of technology and market information, is the principle
resource in the world economy, especially knowledge in its dynamic form as the
capacity to generate new technologies and to market new products" (Robert W.
Cox, 1987:244).
The previous chapter indicated that significant power relations could result from the
planned governance of biotechnology and its related resources. This chapter deals
with the effects that such relationships have on international trade and agriculture. A
structuralist viewpoint is proposed to ensure that the politico-economic position of
developing countries of the South are balanced against the often-hegemonic position
of the developed nations of the North. The premise of this viewpoint is that a
structural imbalance results from the inability of developing countries to compete on
international markets. This weakness is a result more of the insensitive actions of
developed countries towards poorer countries than from the incapacity of the latter.
Trade rules and restrictions are designed to favour the rich and to marginalise the
poor. In an economic system that was designed to be 'liberal', rich northern countries
use methods of protection and bilateral leverage to safeguard their own economies
while struggling countries from the south are not able to escape so-called economic
backwardness and economic stagnation/stagflation. This is also true for the
biotechnology sector, especially when agricultural biotechnology, or
agrobiotechnology, is examined.
Compared with other technology sectors, perhaps with the exclusion of computer and
communication technology, advances in agricultural technology during the past two
decades have been dramatic. Agricultural production has changed from being
decentralised and labour intensive to being characterised by industrial mass
production where the use of electricity, mechanisation, chemicals, and management
sciences have become inteqrated" (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:3). Where it was
once a mode of life, agriculture has become an international mode of production,
4 This 'modem' picture of agriculture is relevant to developed nations with a broad base of
industrialisation. Some developing countries and most LDCs (least developed countries) still rely on labour
intensive agricultural sectors that are characterised by subsistence farming.
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shifting from being the hallmark of local and regional economies to being a fully
integrated sector of the global economy (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:213). According
to Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson (in Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996: 19), the
transformation of agriculture can be conceptualised as processes of appropriationism
and substitutionism. This means that agriculture is changing from a rural based
sector to one that is urban or industrial based. This paradigm has the inherent quality
of promoting agricultural innovation before consideration of factors such as economic
efficiency, markets and safety. Yet, developments in agricultural technology have not
received much public attention until recently. A possible explanation for this is the
lack of debate in the public arena on technological innovations coupled with industrial
societies' trust of technological change (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:2).
Siting the work of Fliegel and van Es, Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:18) indicate that a
distinction needs to be made between agricultural improvements and agricultural
innovations. The former refers to changes or enhancements to existing technologies,
while the latter refers to departures from existing technology. The innovative nature
of most of the biotechnology advances of the past two decades have been
responsible for changes, not only in.agriculture, but also in the way that the products
of biotechnology are introduced and traded on international markets.
The introduction of GM foods in the world market has been accompanied by efforts to
facilitate trade liberalisation (Brodnig, 1999 (b): 1). Apart from the moral and ethical
row that GM foods have sparked because of its potential impact on human health
and environmental safety, the international trade framework of biotechnology
products has come under severe scrutiny. It is here where the World Trade
Organisation's role in promoting globalisation and free trade is being assessed
against principles such as environmental conservation and risks in the trade and
transportation of GM foods. These would have been non-issues, were it not that
biotechnology experienced such rapid commercialisation over a relatively short
period of time.
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1. The Commercialisation of Biotechnology
The US's efforts to promote the early commercialisation of biotechnology products
has meant that these products, especially genetically-modified (GM) foods, have
entered international trade at a rapid rate. The global area of GM crop production
(mainly soybean, maize, canola, corn, cotton and rapeseed) has shown an estimated
growth from 1.7 million hectares in 1996 to 39.9 million hectares in 1999. This
includes an increase of 44 per cent growth between 1998 and 1999 alone.
Developing countries held 15 per cent of the area planted with transgenic varieties.
The sales volume of GM crops has increased approximately 30-fold in the period
1995 to 1999, and the global market for GM crops is projected to reach $8 billion in
2005, and $25 billion in 2010 (Falkner, 2000:301; Persley and Doyle, 1999: 1). In
1999, Brodnig (1999 (b):2) stated that around 80 biotechnology-based products were
on the market or were awaiting commercialisation. The market value of these drugs
was estimated at $12 billion and is projected to rise to $25 billion in 2005.
GM agricultural products have also increased substantially. Brodnig (1999 (b):2)
indicates that the reported global coverape of transgenic crops had risen from 11.0
million hectares in 1997 to 27.8 million hectares in 1998. These crops originated
from nine countries, of which the United States accounted for 74% of the coverage,
with the rest distributed over Argentina (15%), Canada, (10%), Australia, Mexico,
Spain France, South Africa and China (1%). These crops were mostly limited to
soybean (52%), corn (30%), cotton (9%) and canala (9%) (James in Brodnig, 1999
(b):2). According to Paarlberg (2000:26), the figures for international transgenic
crops had changed to the following by 1999: United States 72%, Argentina 17%,
Canada 10%, and the remaining one percent divided among Australia, China,
France, Mexico, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, and Spain. Paarlberg (2000:26-
27) sites as reason for the absence of Western European farmers from these figures
the consumer scare for GM foods that followed the "mad cow disease" in 1996.
Although this disease was in no way related to genetic food manipulation, it coincided
with the first attempts to import U.S. grown GM soybeans into the European Union.
However, commercialisation of biotechnology is not such a smooth process in all
countries. Environmental lobbyists, concerned consumers, the mass media and
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other social and pressure groups in Europe have forced their governments to review
their regulatory systems (Brodnig, 1999 (b):2). These groups' concerns are causing
them to conflict with the international trading and intellectual property rules that are
being promoted through organisations such as the WTO and the World intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO).
The "global environmental discourse" with which international environmental
institutions occupy themselves has been dominated by what McAfee (1999: 133) calls
"a post-neoliberal version of environmental economics" applied globally. In its
simplest form this means that post-neoliberals have a market solution for all
economic problems. As far as the environment is concerned, every aspect of nature
can be privati sed and commodified - from molecules to mountains, from human
tissue to the earth's atmosphere. This "global environmental-economic paradigm"
reduces all living entities to their constitutive components to which a monetary value
is assigned, calculated with reference to actual or hypothetical markets. By thus
measuring the worth of living things a framework" for the implementation of the triple
mandate of the CBD is established. McAfee (1999:134) says this approach to the
pricing of life "offers to nature the .cpportunity to earn its own right to survive in a
world market economy". "By promoting commodisation as the key both to
conservation and to the 'equitable sharing' of the benefits of nature, the global
environmental-economic paradigm enlists environmentalism in the service of the
worldwide expansion of capitalism" (134).
2. Biotechnology and the global trading system
Sutherland (1998:293), examining liberal cultural politics, points out that the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was intended to promote international
economic cooperation and prevent the "continuation of economic mercantilism" which
was a problem in the interbellum period. While the GATT might not have resembled
mercantilist values, it seems to have reinforced neo-realist values when one
considers that negotiations were dominated by corporate interests of the G7
countries. A considerable amount of negotiations were centered around
reinforcement of property rights and entry and exit options of transnational
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corporations. Negotiations on agricultural matters were skillfully directed to protect
the interests of large agricultural corporations in G7 countries (Gill, 1995:71). The
GATT has subsequently been reformed to the World Trade Organisation (WTO),
which has as its main function the liberalisation of international trade through the
removal of protective measures and tariffs. Thus, the WTO represents liberal cultural
values that favour open markets and the recognition of private property ownership
and rights. The G77 opposed the inclusion of intellectual property rights (IPRs) into
the GATT, but failed because of a lack of expertise and agenda setting. Multinational
corporations involved in biopharmaceutical and agrobiotechnology were keen on a
GATT that would guard against international trade in goods that were protected by
IPRs. This was accompanied by efforts to allow patents for all biotechnology
inventions, including microorganisms, parts of microorganisms, and plants.
Corporate and government stakeholders also had a "cultural preference for rigorous
and effective dispute resolution processes", which were effectively met (Sutherland,
1998:294).
Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:28) rightly point out that "(i)nnovation is not a pure
scientific ideal. It has its own political economy". Citing Kloppenburg, McAfee
(1999:144, footnote 12) indicates that international access to and exchange of
biological resources had, until the 1980s, been governed by the implicit principle now
referred to as 'common heritage', under which all interest groups treated genetic
resources as "open-access resources, free for the taking". Pressure from the states
of the South, who are rich in biodiversity, led to the UN Food and Agricultural
Organisation's adoption of the International Undertaking on Plant and Genetic
Resources, which established a 'common heritage' principle for all plant genetic
resources. The implication for farmers and other users of plant material was that
patents or other property claims on such material could not prevent them from still
producing or selling hybrid or genetically modified varieties.
However, this interpretation has been vehemently opposed by developed countries
and their multinational seed and agro-chemical companies. Under pressure from
these companies, the governments of especially the USA, the United Kingdom, and
This framework includes: (I) The conservation of biological diversity, (2) the sustainable use of
biological diversity, (3) the' equitable' sharing of the benefits of genetic resources (McAfee, 1999: 134).
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Japan, insisted that any provision of new technology to developing countries would
have to comply with "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights",
including patents (McAfee, 1999, siting CBO, 1994, Article 16). McAfee indicates
how these same countries succeeded, through Article 15, to also exclude from the
jurisdiction of the CBO the collections of germ plasm removed from source countries
before the entry into effect of the CBO on 28 December 1993.
This is yet another indication that the emerging international 'genetic resources'
market has been designed by developed countries to serve the short-term interests
of pharmaceutical and agro-chemical corporations, based on their estimates of the
potential profits to be made from them (McAfee, 1999:146-7). This resembles
Russell's (in Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:21) contention that biotechnology businesses
are "unorthodox" because they were not created to fulfill an existing need in society
or in world markets. Brandon and Klevorick (in Purdue, 1995:94) have scrutinised
the way global welfare arguments are projected and have found that global interests
seem to concurwith US interests. They indicate that the US always portrays itself as
the fair player while those in opposition find themselves foul of the rules. This is used
as legitimisation for using political power to reach economic objectives.
In this regard Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:107) talk of "bio-imperialism", which is a
term used to describe how biotechnology results in the economic subordination of
farmers in the developing world. The fear is that traditional farmers and commodities
in the South will be replaced by genetically engineered substitutes (Seabrook in
Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:107). Examples of this include artificial sweeteners that
threaten sugar produced from cane plants, artificial vanilla that can cause the seventy
thousand vanilla farmers in Madagascar to lose their income, and genetically
enhanced oil palms and cocoa butler that threaten the livelihood of large numbers of
small farmers in Africa and Latin America.
There are, however, certain analysts who contend that biotechnology could be
beneficial to developing countries. Persley, Brenner and Walgate (all in Krimsky and
Wrubel, 1996:108) have indicated how biotechnology, in the form of GM grains, could
aid developing countries with their food supplies. What these authors did not
anticipate, was that biotechnology companies' use of intellectual property rights to
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protect their products would make GM seeds expensive. Add to that the introduction
of properties to seed that makes re-use impossible and the benefits to developing
countries of biotechnology in agriculture become negligible.
The US has established a technological advantage in the area of biotechnology, and
it is doing everything in its power to ensure that the rules of this game are of their
making. The United States has an Intellectual Property Coalition, which consists of
13 companies such as Pfizer, Monsanto and Du Pont, who advise the US
Administration on biotechnology and other matters pertaining to the production and
marketing of their products. In the EU companies such as Unilever, Hoechst and
Ciba Geigy playa similar role. These 'agro-chemical giants' are using their influence
in political arenas to enforce patents for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
innovations. Laclau (in Purdue, 1995:89) says that no hegemonic project is ever
completely successful; that hegemony "is contingent upon struggles and is therefore
always socially constructed, never given and is always susceptible to subversion".
The hegemon always tries to restrict alternatives to other players/actors. One of the
most prominent tools in the hands of developed hegemons to restrict other actors is
that of intellectual property.
3. Intellectual property rights and biotechnology
According to Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:240) there is a link between the "unique
tools" of biotechnology (gene sequencing) and the legal support for the privatisation
of genetic resources. This link results from patent protection being regarded as a
necessity for transnational companies' commercial success together with a few crop
varieties that are likely to dominate the seed market as a result of the protection of
intellectual property. Before biodiversity can benefit any user it has to be
commodified and traded, it has to be privatised or ownership has to be clarified.
Intellectual property rights to genetic information is the 'conceptual cornerstone' of
proposals for the allocation of biodiversity benefits under the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), which was adopted by ninety-eight countries during the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Brazil in 1992.
The United States was not one of these signatories, the Bush administration
opposing the convention because it was argued that it would undermine U.S. patent
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protection for its biotechnology industry. The controversy over intellectual property
rights resulted in the development of a schism between biotechnology and
biodiversity (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:223-4). The assumption inherent to the
Convention is that the technology that is developed by and for developing countries
from the genetic resources in developing countries is the technology that the
developing countries need (McAfee, 1999:144).
3.1. The How and What of Protecting Commodities
Purdue (1995: 90) proposes that biotechnology is part of a scientific social movement
by biotechnology companies who are trying to persuade the world that their
ownership of life forms is in the public interest. Referring to Haas, Purdue (1995:90)
states that the epistemic community no longer defines the term 'biotechnology'.
Because of the dynamics of globalisation, hegemonic projects are no longer easily
attributed to state actions such as can be done with class or social movements within
national politics. The same dynamic influences the changes in social and biological
sciences. This means that when biotechnology companies attempt to establish
universal intellectual ownership of .genetic material, they have to do it on various
fronts. These include scientific social movements, transnational corporations,
strategic policy makers in countries such as the United States, and molecular
biological researchers. This enables biotechnology firms to hegemonise "key
scientific discourses, agricultural practice, legal definitions of knowledge, trade and
international relations ... " (Purdue, 1995:90).
According to Ashiya (1999: 1) one of the most significant developments associated
with the advent of biotechnology has been the strengthening of intellectual property
protection for biological inventions. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement under the WTO stipulates a minimum level of
protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs) to encourage the export of
knowledge-intensive goods and services. Brodnig (1999 (b):3) says "(i)t is also
intended to combat disguised or discriminatory trade restrictions resulting from
insufficient enforcement of IPR regulations". TRIPs makes provision for seven types
of intellectual property: copyright, trademarks, geographical indicators, industrial
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits and undisclosed information.
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Article 27 deals with patents where it states that "patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application" (Purdue,
1995: 97). Article 27 of TRIPs is particularly relevant to GM crops. It exempts plants
and animals from patentability, provided that plant varieties receive some form of
intellectual property protection. Some developing countries would like to use the
exemption to adopt sui generis systems that enable them to "assert national control
over plant genetic resources and the related traditional knowledge" (Brodnig, 1999
(b):3).
Disputes between states over the operation of TRIPs are dealt with in Article 64.
Such disputes are referred to the WTO's Integrated Dispute Settlement
Understanding, which will give the US, the EU and Japan the ability to "retaliate" on
perceived infringements through the use of their access to the markets for Southern
goods. For this reason Southern countries have argued that these disputes should
be settled by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), but the North
insisted that they be kept within the WTO precisely because "linking intellectual
property rights to trade gives them .more power" (Purdue, 1995:98). This illustrates
what Murphy refers to in his article on global governance when he says that
institutions such as the WTO (and the IMF and World Bank) "have contributed to the
growing numbers of the destitute as well as to the growing privilege of the world's
rich" by promoting unregulated economic globalisation (Murphy, 2000:791). But
attempts to patent biotechnology products have been shrouded in controversy from
the start.
Regular granting of patent rights on plants started with the decision of the Diamond
versus Chakrabarty case in 1980, starting in the United States and moving later to
Europe. In 1998 alone, more than 400 patents mentioning rice and biotechnology
were issued in the United States compared to 12 in 1988. The US grants patents on
all plants of a particular species into which a new gene has been inserted using
biotechnology. This means that the US grants patents to any isolated gene and DNA
sequence, the genetic engineering tools that use those sequences, and over the
plants that have been transformed using these tools. These rights do not extend to
the original plant in which the gene occurs naturally (Barton, 1999:1).
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Patents for microorganisms have come up against fierce criticism in Europe where it
is seen by human rights organisations as "antithetical to morality" (Ashiya, 1999:2).
The ethics of the ownership of living entities was foremost in the intellectual property
rights debate with the submission of patent applications for animal-human hybrids.
Barton (1999:1) states that nations have offered Plant Variety Protection (PVP, also
called Plant Breeders' Rights) since the beginning of the mid-1900s. The PVP made
provision for protection of new varieties on the condition that it was novel, distinct,
uniform, and stable. The PVP6 also gave the breeder the exclusive right to market
the new variety. With treaty revisions brought about in 1991, nations could prohibit
farmers from reusing harvested seeds. The example by Ashiya (1999:3) of
germination control technology, where seeds become sterile after one planting,
illustrates this point. Establishing harmonised practices between these regimes is
certain to create a lot of frustration for both trade liberators and environmental
protectionists. Multinational seed companies seek to maximise profits by protecting
their intellectual property in an effort to regain the money spent on research and
development. On the other hand, indigenous and local farming communities feel that
their rights are being undermined where they have traditionally saved seed for future
crops. It also enables breeders to protect material bred from already protected
materials and gain even stronger rights over products grown with protected seeds
(Barton, 1999:1).
Developing countries have been reluctant to introduce these forms of intellectual
property protection, but the TRIPs agreement requires all of its members to make
patents available in all fields of technology. The efforts by industrial countries to
protect products resulting from biotechnology have encouraged developing countries
to try and protect the genetic sources of those products by exercising their sovereign
right over them. These actions by developing countries resulted in the negotiation of
the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Barton, 1999:1-2).
The biotechnology sector has felt the effects of globalisation and market liberalisation
through greater competition influenced by technological capacities and national
policies to improve biotechnology abilities. Juma (1999:3) believes that there is room
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for compromise and consensus in the arena of market liberalisation in solving the
questions around biotechnology's potential influence on health, economies and the
environment. However, the question needs to be asked who will benefit most from
such 'compromise and consensus' in a system where market liberalisation has a built
in bias favouring the richer developed countries (Juma, 1999:3).
3.2. The Main Benefactors of Protection
Biotechnology has advanced to the point where scientists are able to combine
molecular biology with information technology; where institutional arrangements use
knowledge and technologies to improve international competitiveness. New national
systems of innovation have been created where the focus is on rapid
commercialisation of biotechnology and on reforms in intellectual property protection
systems. This has resulted in disputes over the ownership of bio-innovations in a
world where different actors are not equal in terms of their legal resources and
human capacities. Developing countries seek national control over genetic material
and new regimes of resource rights. This is met with strong opposition from the
developed world which claims that. existing mechanisms are sufficient to deal with
these matters (Juma, 1999:3).
As biotechnology develops, new structures emerge to govern and manage it. These
institutions are shaped by the value systems of the communities in which they are
found, but there are countries where regulatory mechanisms and government
oversight is still lacking. Juma (1999:3) says that "institutional flux" has caused
uncertainty about the regulation of biotechnology. Institutions such as the WTO are
still developing mechanisms of analysis and response to technological risks. Juma
(1999:3) is in favour of the transformation of existing regimes to build capacities that
match regulatory tasks, rather than creating new regimes. As with the previous point,
this statement seems to be biased in favour of the interests of developed countries
who have been instrumental in creating existing regimes to suit their needs. The
insistence of the United States of using WTO rules to regulate biotechnology, rather
6 The pyp system is governed by an international agreement and organisation called UPOV, a French
acronym for International Union for the Protection of New varieties of Plants (Barton, 1999: 1).
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than create a new regime, is an example.
Sutherland (1998:295) demonstrates how the minimum requirements set out in the
TRIP's do not guarantee the recognition of the value of indigenous and local
communities' traditional knowledge, innovations and practices. Purdue (1995:93)
argues that just as there is no non-interventionism in domestic economies, there is no
such thing as free trade: "Political power is always intrinsic to the constitution of the
terms of trade just as it is to the constitution of the market". This implies that
industrialised countries have never subjected themselves to the rules of free trade
they established in the first place. Purdue (1995:94) indicates that neo-mercantilists
dispense with ethical niceties and readily accept the 'military metaphor' of strategic
trade policy (which Purdue equates with protectionism). TRIPs form an 'agenda' for
the globalisation of U.S. intellectual property rights. This is hegemonic because it is
presented as being in the international public interest while serving specific industrial
interests in the North, especially that of the biotechnology industry (Purdue, 1995:99).
Barton (1999:2) describes the structural consequences of the trend toward
intellectual property protection by referring first to the radical increase in private-
sector research. This increase is ascribed to the possibility of profits driven by
intellectual property rights. A great deal of centralisation has also taken place to the
extent where a "global oligopoly" is led by five firms, AgrEvo, DowEIanco, DuPont,
Monsanto, and Novartis. This oligopolisation is explained partly by intellectual
property litigation, where many disputes arising from reciprocal infringement were
resolved by merging companies, especially during the period between 1996 to 1999.
Barton also expects that intellectual property rights will have a significant affect on
international trade patterns. He states that the "competitive use of variety and
intellectual property rights can be expected to increase in light of the large number of
new markets and applications for genetically modified crops. It may even become a
response to the lowering of more formal trade barriers" (Barton, 1999:2).
According to Purdue (1995:88) attempts to establish "uniform global intellectual
property rights over living material" is a hegemonic effort by the biotechnology
industry. He says "GATT has provided a fertile terrain for the hegemonic ambitions
of the biotechnology industry" (Purdue, 1995:88). According to Persley and Doyle
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(1999: 1) most of the biotechnology-basedsolutions for agriculturewill likely be in the
form of new plant seeds or new strains of livestock.
3.3. Responses from Non-benefactors of Protection
According tb Sutherland (1998:296) there is an "expanding academic literature on
agro-biodiversity, agro-ecology, ethno-biology and ethno-botany, traditional
ecological knowledge and sustainable development". At the same time the
application of biotechnology to agriculture has highlighted the "deep symbolism
associated with contemporary agrarian culture" (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:214).
Individuals and communities are confrontedwith appraisals of what the farm is and
what it ought to be, of what food and livestock are and how it can and ought to be
used by humans. Voices that are involved in the debate over the use of
biotechnology include small advocacy organisations, start-up companies,
international green organisations, traditional environmental groups, multinational
corporations, natural food associations,and animal rights supporters. There is also a
considerable amount of disagreement on biotechnology issues among organisations
and the documents that result from their deliberations. Some declarations denounce
a" tntellectual property rights over life forms. There are those that ca" for a
moratorium on biotechnology research involving indigenous peoples. An
organisation that is very active in its campaign against IPRs sought by those in
biotechnology research and development is the Rural Advancement Fund
International (RAFI). This organisation denounces bio-piracy by focusing on the
unjust way that multinational corporations enrich themselves when IPRs are claimed
over products or processes to which indigenous people have added value through
their own innovation, knowledge and customs7 (Sutherland, 1998:297). Other
concerns G77 governments and NGOs have about the application of TRIPs rules
are:
• Most countries with abundant biodiversity lack the capacity in the biotechnology
sector to maximise that comparativeadvantage.
Other NGOs opposed to IPRs include the Genetic Resources Action International (GRAIN), Searice,
the Third World Network, the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Natural Resource Policy, the
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Friends of the Earth International (FoE), the Dag Hammerskjold
Foundation (Sutherland, 1998: 297).
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• IPR laws in TRIPs recognise only novelty and private invention without providing
for collective or accumulated knowledge often found in developing countries.
• Traditional farmers will not be able to meet many of the requirements stipulated in
TRIPs rules.
• IPRs over biological material will lead to a further decline in biodiversity and the
cultural practices that helped maintain that diversity.
• Commercialisation of the seed industry will mean' that farmers in developing
countries will not be able to pay for expensive genetically engineered seeds.
• IPR protection will result in aggressive marketing of protected varieties, mono-
crop practices, industrial production, and exacerbated declining levels of
biological and cultural diversity (Sutherland, 1998:297).
Recognising the plight of developing countries, McAfee (1999:150) states that "must
as development in any meaningful sense will require increased democracy and
greater equality, so does environmental sustainability depend upon environmental
justice". The strongest opposition to IPRs and other forms of privatising and
commodification of life forms comes from locally and regionally based peasant
movements from especially South and South East Asia and Latin America (McAfee,
1999:148). Multinational NGOs that have actively highlighted the position of the
developing world include the Third World Network, Rural Advancement Foundation
International, Genetic Resources Action International, the US Institute on Agriculture
and Trade Policy, the multinational Pesticide Action Network, and others based in
Western Europe, Latin America, Ethiopia, India, and Japan. At the individual level
there are countless conservationists, scientists, and intellectuals who oppose the
patenting of organisms, human cloning, human gene collection, genetic screening
and surveillance and other biotechnological intrusions.
McAfee (1999: 149) indicates that although it does not have a united voice, this
"broad coalition" has, through its interventions, challenged green developmentalism
in the CSD on a range of important issues, including biosafety, agrobiodiversity, and
intellectual property rights. Some of the actions taken by these protesters include:
pressure for internationally recognised rights of states and indigenous nations to
refuse to allow the patenting of organisms and private monopolisation of genetic
resources and knowledge; endorsement of an international moratorium on
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bioprospecting; and rejection of any specific rights of subnational groups to local
sovereignty over resource regimes (McAfee, 1999:149-150). There are, however,
many Southern states that are not living up to their commitments to respect
"indigenous territorial boundaries and other rights". This means that affected people
turn for help to the "transnational level" where legal and public relations campaigns
are already established to protest against 'bio-piracy' and the environmental damage
caused by MNCs (McAfee, 1999: 150).
4. The Risk and Safety of Biotechnology
In the biotechnology debate over risk, there is very little consensus, if any at all. The
problem is described by Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:246) as follows: "Controversy
over the environmental risks from the applications of biotechnology to agriculture
rests on differences of opinion regarding the level of uncertainty in assessing the
probability and consequences of an adverse impact". The current understanding of
the long-term interaction between GMOs and the environment means that risks
cannot yet be quantified. Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:219) state that empirical
research cannot determine perceptions about whether biotechnology is natural or
unnatural. In the absence of such empirical information, scientists and analysts have
turned to historical, theoretical, or analogical reasoning in the search for plausible
answers (Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:247). This has meant that the debate has been
polarised between the proponents and opponents of biotechnology. Proponents of
biotechnology seem to view nature as something that humans should control and
manipulate. According to Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:221) this largely dominant view
of nature is rooted in the texts of Judea-Christianity and was later reinforced by the
"post-Baconian scientific Enlightenment". It implies that control over nature is not
only necessary, but also aesthetically, morally and religiously justifiable. Krimsky and
Wrubel (1996:221) explain this notion further by saying that "when nature is
rationalized it looks more pleasing, it better serves people's interests, and, according
to Western religious doctrine, it rewards the Creator, who has implored humans to
harness nature's secrets and subdue its irrational impulses". Opposing this view of
nature are those who see "an organic and dynamic ecosystem that cannot function
under the type of mechanistic control found in industrial manufacture" (Krimsky and
Wrubel, 1996:221). The place of humans in such a system is not one of master over
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nature, but rather one where humans are a species together with other species - a
part of nature - that need to live in balance with its environment. This view holds that
misuse of power and scientific capacity by humans ultimately results in destruction of
the environment with detrimental effects to humans, animals and plants.
Falkner (2000:300) says one of the reasons for the lack of popular support for bio-
agriculture in certain parts of the world is the uncertainty pertaining to environmental
and health risks that GMOs pose. Together with this, there seems to be a general
public distrust of scientific and corporate self-regulation. The slow pace at which
government authorities have moved to implement regulation of the biotechnology
industry, with some developing countries having no regulatory frameworks at all, has
not done the public image of the industry any good either. Falkner (2000:301) says
that the "fragmented framework" of biotechnology regulation can in no way keep up
with the rapid expansion of the agribiotech sector around the world.
One of the problems in determining the risks of biotechnology has been inadequate
long-term research, partly because budgets allocated for such research have been
neglected. Butler and Reichhardt (i.nSagar and Ashiya (1999 (b):2) indicate that the
U.S. Department Of Agriculture spends only one per cent of its biotechnology budget
on biosafety. Suspicion of risk has also meant that there have been different
responses to the way safety standards should be applied. Krimsky and Wrubel
(1996:20) indicate that new chemical products are subjected to rigorous toxicological
testing, whereas biological products are not tested as thoroughly, especially those
modified by genetic techniques. Separate processes were launched in the early
1990s to harmonise standards for biotechnology-based foods and drugs. In 1990 the
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO)
convened "an expert consultation" that recommended the development of "improved
toxicological testing methods and safety assessments with consideration of molecular
and biological characteristics of food". This move towards comparative safety
assessments was followed by a call for the implementation of the "substantial
equivalences" principle by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1991 (Daemmrich, 1999:1).
A substantial equivalent plant is a particular plant species with a novel trait, which is the same with
respect to its use and safety to the environment and human health as types of the same species without the novel
trait (AGCare, 1999: 1).
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The principle of substantial equivalence between GMOs and traditional selectively
bred varieties has been fiercely criticised by organic food advocates, including the
Campaign for Food Safety and NGOs such as Greenpeace. The criticism stems
mostly from the concern about the inability to predict the long-term impact that GMOs
might have on humans, e.g. allergic reactions (Butler in Daemmrich, 1999:2). Other
associated risks to health include potential harm to economic, societal, and individual
wellness (Daemmrich, 199:2). Where these risks are played down or where
biotechnology products are considered not to hold any risks, accusations of
protectionist trade policies have highlighted the public's mistrust in regulatory
institutions and procedures for scientific risk assessment. On this point, Wiegeie
(1991 :65) points out that there is a difference between the dangers inherent to some
product of biotechnology or research endeavor and biotechnology as a whole. The
latter, he says, is not inherently dangerous and caution should be taken to condemn
it outright.
Jasanoff (in Daemmrich, 1999:3) states that "regulatory styles are integral to the
shaping of a technology and requlations themselves serve as social constructs to
limit uncertainty and provide assurances that risks can be contained". This means
that risk perception and methods of responding to human health concerns across the
world are intertwined with cultural traditions, economic systems and structures of
governance that are difficult to harmonise based on technical standards alone. If
biotechnology companies want to assuage public fears about their products, they
need to produce safety data that is consistent and considers national differences.
Juma (1999:20) argues that the biotechnology debate will not be solved by simply
providing more information to reduce uncertainty. The debate requires a deeper
understanding of the structural benefits and risks posed by the use of biotechnology.
The development of new technologies also requires "product testing, impact
assessments, and information dissemination," processes that often take years to
refine. Juma (1999:4) indicates that pragmatic countries opt for shorter time frames
in the process of product commercialisation, which in turn sparks criticism from those
countries, consumers and lobbyists that precautionary approaches are more prudent
when the risk of releasing altered organisms into the environment are not known.
These conflicts are often confined to narrow assessments of economic losses
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incurred from not being able to market products on the one hand, and an emphasis
only on potential dangers to the exclusion of benefits on the other.
Sagar and Ashiya (1999 (b):1) indicate that "(c)oncerns over the environmental
implications of genetically-modified (GM) crops are largely based on the assumption
that new products may have harmful effects and need to be introduced in a
precautionary manner". One of the main concerns is the possible movement of
genes from GM crops to their wild relatives. The results would be serious in cases
where genes have been coded for traits such as herbicide resistance. Insect
resistant crops may reduce the need for the use of pesticides, but there is also the
risk that natural selection could lead to the breading of pests resistant to the "natural"
insecticide. There is also the concern that the use of GM crops may lead to an
increase in chemicals such as herbicides.
Krimsky and Wrubel (1996:108) state that the "strongest argument for regulating
transgenic food as food additives concerns the spread of allergenicity throughout the
food supply". In the case of allergens it is especially important that products are
labeled to enable consumers to protect themselves against substances which they
know can harm them.
A differentiation should also be made between risks that emanate from accidental
escape from a laboratory or production facility as opposed to the risk associated with
large-scale deliberate release of an organism into the environment. Similarly there is
a difference between short-term and long-term risks, and between suspected effects
for which monitoring may be implemented versus unexpected effects (Funke, 1988:
64).
Leisinger (1999: 1) distinguishes between risks that are inherent to a technology and
risks that transcend it. He argues that the debate about technology-inherent risk has
been clouded because biologists, legal experts, and "ethicists" have all expressed
opinions, sometimes on areas where they are not experts. What is needed is for
decision making and quality management issues to be kept distinct. The scientific
project level should be separate from the national policy level, which in turn should be
distinct from the international level. Technology transcending risk emanates from the
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socio-political context in which the technology is used. In developing countries these
risks arise from both the course the global economy takes and country-specific
political and social circumstances. The most critical risks have to do with the
aggravation of the prosperity gap between North and South, growth in the income
disparities and wealth distribution within societies, and the loss of biodiversity
(Leisinger, 1999: 1-2).
A problem with risk that has been pointed out previously is that scientists and
technologists involved in biotechnology do not agree on what risks are, or might be,
or how they should be measured once identified. Rather, what happens is that
scientists together with non-scientists have been involved since the advent of
biotechnology in voicing a number of concerns over a variety of biotechnology related
issues such as ethics, lifestyle, social impacts, environment, and policy. Funke
(1988:64) is of the opinion that this diversity of concerns over biotechnology could
create new social inequalities and problems. One of these problems is agreement on
how to respond to the so-called risks of biotechnology.
5. Institutional Responses to Risk Issues
Different countries and regions have made varied responses to the effects and
possible risks of biotechnology. Juma and Gupta (1999: 1) mention the measures
taken to conduct biotechnology in a safe manner. These include scientifically based,
case-by-case hazard identification and risk assessment; regulation of the end product
rather than the production process; developing a regulatory framework that builds on
existing institutions rather than establishing new ones; and building flexibility into
biosafety systems to reduce regulation of products perceived to be low-risk. These
are measures used especially in the United States. Biosafety risk assessment
involves scrutiny of the organism being assessed, intended use of the organism, and
features of the recipient environment.
Juma and Gupta (1999: 1) admit that familiarity cannot be equated with safety, but it
is used as the basis for applying existing management practices to new products.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DECO)
"recommends this approach to biosafety and the U.S. regulatory system relies on it".
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The US is making decisions based on evolving science informed by a risk-benefit
analysis, where it seems that financial benefit receives precedence over possible
risk. This is why Krimsky and Wrubel (1996: 111) state that the "use of genetic
engineering for creating plant foods and other plant products is an example of
innovation that has largely been science-driven rather than need-driven". These
authors indicate further that many of the "proposed new uses of transgenic plants,
such as the production of biopolymers and pharmaceuticals, are attempts at
increasing efficiency of production rather than filling a product need" in the market
(Krimsky and Wrubel, 1996:112). Elsewhere the same authors say that the United
States' biotechnology policy "was designed to stimulate the innovative potential of
American science and industry, to foster technology transfer, and to enable the U.S.
biotechnology industry to achieve hegemony in global markets" (Krimsky and Wrubel,
1996:251). This is somewhat different to the process decided on in Europe and most
other regions.
Europe is applying the precautionary principle where biotechnology will not be used
until more certainty about possible environmental risks become clear. Thus, in the
absence of certainty, caution ts heeded. Developing countries favour the
precautionary principle, but with the emphasis more on the socio-economic aspects
related to environmental risk. Developing countries are also concerned that their
biodiversity might be exploited without them receiving any benefit from it (Sagar and
Ashiya, 1999 (b):2). Another policy used to lure developing countries into Northern-
style development projects is the so-called 'green developmentalism'.
The attraction of green developmentalism to international policymakers is that it
obscures the identity of those who gain from environmentally destructive policies and
practices. Instead, the destruction of biodiversity is blamed on abstractions such as
'market failures' and 'policy failures' (Perrings, 1995). But the direct threats to local
culture and biodiversity are not so easily abstracted away. As McAfee (1999:151)
points out:
"(g)reen developmental ism fosters the fantasy that we can 'green the planet' while
continuing to grow along demonstrably unsustainable economic trajectories... It
purports to provide an objective metric for estimating the values of all components
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of nature worldwide, but actually offers values determined by the powers and
desires of international elites".
Prominent actors involved in the promotion of a global green developmentalist
agenda include the World Bank's EnvironmentDepartment,OECD patent offices and
representatives to international environmental negotiations, the quasi-governmental
World Intellectual Property Organisation and World Conservation Union, and
corporate lobbying bodies such as the US Biotechnology Industry Organisation.
Citing various authors, McAfee shows that green developmentalism also enjoys
growing support among large conservationist movements such as the World
Resources Institute and the Worldwide Fund of Nature, and among academic
scientists and environmental policymakers. Green developmentalism reinforces
environmental injustice on a world scale. Green developmentalist theory already
contains a bias with regard to the distribution of natural wealth and access to nature
and its benefits (McAfee, 1999: 138). By interpretingthe value of nature in relation to
international markets, Le. by denominating diversity in dollar or Euro, this paradigm
justifies the claims of those with the greatest purchasing power worldwide to the
greatest share of the earth's biomass and all it contains. McAfee states:
"Green developmental ism attempts to maintain a separation between
environmental problems and broader political-economic issues. It promotes a bias
towards technological solutions and away from socio-cultural change. It provides
justification for the continued conceptualisation of environmental goals in isolation
from development aims and without changes in existing political institutions,
distributions of economic power, and patterns of resource flows" (McAfee, 1999:
135)
Contrary to the premise of the global economic paradigm, there can be no universal
metric for comparing and exchanging the 'real values' of nature among different
groups of people from different cultures and with vastly different degrees of political
and economic power. Nor is there any way to place a price on any element of
biological diversity torn out of its social and ecological context (McAfee, 1999:139).
The development of different regimes with different principles should in future be one
of the major challenges facing international trade as well as intellectual property
rights. What further complicates the issue is that these regimes are all sovereign in
that they derive their authority from separate national jurisdictions. A regime such as
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the Cartagena Protocol uses the precautionary principle, which is not applied in the
WTO regime. This is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER4
THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY
"In the unlikely event that an international regulatory regime is established in the
near future, it will probably be far from effective" (Wiegele, 1991 :69).
This chapter deals with international regulatory frameworks that regulate the
environment and genetically manipulated organisms. The nature of the international
regulatory environment is discussed briefly, followed by a look at the historical
process that led to the establishment of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This
is followed by a discussion of the developments and dynamics that led to the
adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (see Appendix A). The main
elements of the Cartagena Protocol are described, including the meaning and role of
the precautionary principle. This is followed by a critical examination of some of the
issues not resolved by the Protocol. The chapter is concluded by a brief look at the
worth of the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol as international regulatory frameworks.
1. The Nature of the Blosatety Regulatory Environment
International discussions on the need for a global biosafety standard initially focused
on the need for developing countries to strengthen their regulatory frameworks with
regard to GMOs. Most countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America did not have
sufficient scientific or regulatory capacities to institute satisfactorily such frameworks
on a state-ta-state basis, and relied, therefore, on international legal, financial and
technological support in an international biosafety agreement. Thus, the need for a
global biosafety standard started out as a North-South issue. This was soon
changed with the growth of commercial GM applications.
Trade in GM crops in the second half of the 1990s brought the EU into direct conflict
with the US. This meant that the initial North-South issue of biotechnology was
reshaped into a conflict among northern countries over the implications of trade in
biotechnology products and the rules that should regulate such trade. The conflict
had its origins in the EU's insistence that the precautionary principle be applied to the
regulation of GMO releases into the environment; a principle which focuses on the
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potential threats of GMDs to the environment and human health. This principle
conflicted directly with the United States' adoption of the so-called science-based
method of risk assessment used in that country; an approach which accepts that a
GM crop release is safe until there is evidence that it can cause harm (Falkner,
2000:301).
Falkner (2000:301-2) indicates how the EU approach to GMD releases resulted in
the requirement for environmental evaluation and the recognition of the rights of
states to participate in evaluation procedures. This was contrasted by the United
States' more "streamlined and depoliticized" evaluation procedure that has enabled
its biotechnology industry to rapidly commercialise biotechnology research. The
United States, with its emphasis on the trade aspects of biotechnology, have
maintained that the EU is in violation of WTD rules with its precautionary approach.
It is with this transatlantic dispute over how GMD products and its release should be
regulated, that the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity initiated
international talks to consider the safety aspects of trade in GMDs in the mid-1990s
(Falkner, 2000:302).
2. The Convention on Biological Diversity
Discussions about an international biosafety standard were started in the 1980s on a
diplomatic level (Falkner, 2000:302). Multilateral negotiations aimed at establishing a
regulatory framework to deal with biological diversity started in 1990, two years
before the Rio Earth Summit. These negotiations were aimed at establishing legal
frameworks that would be environmentally sensitive and that would enable
governments of poor countries to work towards sustainable development (Munson,
1993:498).
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was launched at the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development" (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro,
colloquially known as the 'Rio Earth Summit'. During the early 1990s, developments
in the biotechnology industry had given rise to concerns about the effects that GMD
releases into the environment would have on biosafety. This led the Commission on
9 By 1998 the treaty had been ratified by 172 states, excluding the USA.
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Plant Genetic Resources (CPGR), which is a commission of the Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO), to prepare a Draft Code of Conduct on
Biotechnology. According to Article 1.1. of this code, it was intended to promote the
conservation and sustainable and safe use of plant genetic resources (Falkner,
2000:302).
The disputes that developed within the CBD are indicative of the persistence of
North-South conflicts over the control of financial and natural resources, issues that
are now excluded from other forums because of hegemonic neoliberalism. The CBD
is a UN institution and therefore most of its funds come from industrialised countries
of the north. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the World Bank have been
designated the interim funding mechanisms for the CBD. In addition to their
economic power, the OECD states and the World Bank exercise substantial
institutional power by employing their own environmental experts, lawyers and
academic consultants (McAfee, 1999:140). The main goals, according to McAfee
(1999: 140-1) of the northern states for signing the CBD were to limit the expansion of
polluting industrialisation in the global South, to preserve some tropical forests as
"carbon sinks", to slow the rate of_species extinctions, and to guarantee Northern
access to Southern ecosystems and resources as sources of primary commodities
and of 'genetic resources' for their own agrochemical, pharmaceutical, and other
biotechnology industries.
The GEF's four official programmes are biodiversity conservation, global warming,
ozone depletion, and international waters. Southern states have argued that these
programmes only reflect northern interests to the neglect of more pressing Southern
environmental concerns, such as land desertification, which was subsequently added
by the GEF, but only as a subcategory to one of the main programmes (McAfee,
1999:142).
Southern states joined the CBD after being promised new eco-development money,
the recognition that states have the sovereign right to determine access to genetic
resources in their territories, and the 'vague' promise that Northern biotechnology
might be provided to developing countries on concessional terms, and that all parties
to the treaty would receive their fair and equitable share of the benefits of biodiversity
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(McAfee, 1999:141). Southern states signed the treaty with the following goals in
mind: to attain additional foreign aid in the context of shrinking overall assistance, to
please domestic conservationists and rural social movements that made
environmentalist demands, and many of the diversity rich countries are hoping to
boost their revenue earnings by exporting their genetic 'green gold' (McAfee,
1999:141 ).
In the CSD there are four problematic concepts together with that of biodiversity that
have become instrumental in how the treaty is interpreted: global environmental
problems, genetic resources, biodiversity benefits, and intellectual property rights.
According to McAfee (1999:143) this set of interrelated concepts has been
constructed in such a way as to link any gains to developing countries of the South
from their participation in the CSD to their acceptance of the further privatisation and
commercialisation of organisms, ecosystems, and knowledge about nature. This is
further illustrated by the following words of McAfee:
"(The) equation of 'biodiversity benefits' with genetic resources, enshrined in the CSD
text, represents a discursive conquest by the shortsighted instrumentalism of the
environmental-economic paradigm. It reduces biological diversity to its purported
essence as a commodity, presumably separable from its complex relationships with
other 'units' of nature, and valuable only to the extent that it is consumed" (McAfee,
1999:144).
McAfee calls this a "reductionism" that gives only scant recognition to the complex
ecological and social relationship in which biological diversity finds itself. He warns
against viewing ecosystems as "warehouses of potential commodities" that are
utilised by consumers in distant countries rather than as the foundations of
indigenous communities: "sources of material necessity and meaning, and
biophysical context and culture" (McAfee, 1999:144). In the same vein, Munson
(1993:515) criticises the CSD for "failing to establish a vehicle for compensating the
centuries of traditional knowledge and inventions of indigenous peoples and rural
communities". This is despite the fact that the CSD is a reaffirmation of the sovereign
right of states to govern their own biological resources (Munson, 1993:504).
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Brodnig (1999 (b):2) indicates that the general principles of the global trading system
as set out under the WTO cover most aspects of biotechnology. There are however
issues of safety, such as the potential flow of genes from GM crops to the
environment, which fall under the jurisdiction of other treaties and national regimes
such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
3. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
International regulatory frameworks dealing with environmental issues that existed
before the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety include the following: the Convention on
Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979) and its additional protocols related
to sulphur emissions (1985) and to nitrogenoxide emissions (1988); the Vienna
Convention on the protection of the Ozone Layer (1985), the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987); the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
(1989) (Lang, 1990:42); The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (1992)(UNFCCC, 2000); and the Convention to Combat Desertification
(1996) (UNCCD, 2000).
Efforts to establish a Biosafety Protocol began in July 1996, a year after a group of
experts met to define the issue area to be covered by such a protocol to the CBD
(Falkner, 2000:303; Winfield, 2000:1). A Biosafety Working Group (BSWG) was
established to facilitate negotiations and it was instructed to have a final draft treaty
ready by 1998. The BSWG assembled five times between 1996 and 1998, but could
not establish sufficient agreement for a draft treaty before the scheduled date. This
led to the meeting of the BSWG for the sixth time in Cartagena, Colombia, in
February 1999, which was intended as the meeting at which a biosafety protocol was
to be adopted. However, due to fundamental disagreements on the scope, purpose
and nature of the protocol, talks were suspended at Cartagena without a protocol
being adopted (Falkner, 2000:304).
Efforts at Cartagena in Colombia in February 1999 to adopt a new biosafety protocol
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) failed because of serious
differences about perceptions and interpretations of risk. The main component of the
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draft protocol comprised of an advance informed agreement (AlA) procedure to be
followed before the transboundary movement of GMOs took place. At the time of
disagreement the categories of GMOs to be covered under the AlA procedure was
not agreed. This was one of the points on which there was most disagreement, i.e.
whether GMOs that are "intended for food, feed, or processing" rather than for
deliberate release into the environment should be covered under the AlA. The so-
called Miami group (a group of agricultural exporting countries comprising of
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United States, and Uruguay) were adamant
that agricultural commodities be excluded from the AlA procedure because these
countries did not (and still do not) see the threat to biodiversity. The other groups,
and especially the developing countries, were in favor of all "first-time transfers" of
GMOs, including commodities, to fall under the AlA procedure. Negotiators
disagreed further on whether decisions taken under AlA should be science based or
guided by the precautionary principle (Juma and Gupta, 1999:2).
An area of fierce debate at Cartagena involved the relationship between a country's
obligations under the protocol and its rights and obligations under the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) agreements. }"he debate on this issue escalated to the point
where a deadlock meant that a protocol was not agreed at Cartagena. Coupled to
this issue were disagreements about the socio-economic effects of GMOs, liability
and compensation, and the inclusion of pharmaceutical products in the protocol
(Juma and Gupta, 1999:2).
Three rounds of informal consultations followed the Cartagena talks during the period
of July 1999 to January 2000. These consultations took place within and among the
five groupings that emerged in Cartagena, namely the Miami Group of GMO-
exporting countries; the European Union, the Central East European countries
(CEE); the Compromise Group (Japan, Mexico, Norway, South Korea and
Switzerland); and the Like-Minded Group, consisting of the majority of the developing
countries. After the talks at Cartagena, the Miami Group focused its negotiating
efforts on two objectives: the exemption of transboundary movements of GMOs that
are commodities for use in food, feed or processing from the rules of the Protocol,
and the subordination of the Protocol to the rules of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) regarding international trade. The Miami Group's views on these issues led to
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the failure of efforts to hold a next round of informal negotiations in Vienna on 15-19
September 1999 (Winfield, 2000:1-2; South-North Development Monitor, 1999:2).
At a meeting of these groupings in Montreal (Canada) in January 2000, called the
Extraordinary Conference of the Parties (ExCOP), the conflicting approaches of
biodiversity protection of the CSD versus the trade liberalisation of the WTO were
pushed to the point where negotiations were once again threatened with collapse. It
is notable that non-governmental organisations played a prominent role in securing
certain agenda points through their position statement. In this statement they
declared that it was reasonable to expect the Siosafety Protocol to contain three
essential obligations for countries intending to export GMOs: advance notification of
intended export, full disclosure of information, and the explicit consent of the
receiving country prior to any transboundary movement of the GMO (NGO Position
Statement, 2000:2).
After initial successes on the procedures for informed consent, talks stalled on the
basic issues of previous contention, namely the scope of the Protocol (the range of
GMOs and products of biotechnology to be covered by the protocol), the application
of the definition of the precautionary principle instead of the use of full scientific proof,
and the status and position the protocol would have within the international trade
regime (Falkner, 2000:305; Winfield, 2000:5). The second last day of the conference
saw the Miami Group attempting to reopen some of the issues in the draft protocol.
This was met with unanimous and fierce opposition from the other groups, especially
the developing countries. Just when it seemed that talks would fail once again,
delegates emerged from chambers on the morning of 29 January 2000 with an
agreement that finalised the Cartagena Protocol on Siosafety (Falkner, 2000:306).
3.1. The Contents of the Cartagena Protocol
The Cartagena Protocol (CSD, 2000) consists of a declaration of the parties to the
Protocol (a preamble), fourty articles, and three annexes. The preamble stipulates
the relationship of the Protocol with other international agreements and indicates that
it "shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a
Party under any existing international agreements" (CSD, 2000). The next sentence
clearly states that "the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to
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other international agreements" (CBD, 2000). This establishes the principle that
countries should honour their trade obligations under the rules of the WTO, but that
they have the right to protect their biodiversity and human safety where
biotechnology and its products are concerned. From a mercantilist perspective this
seems to leave room for protection measures. But from a structuralist perspective it
allows countries to choose to put the welfare of their citizens and the environment
ahead of issues such as trade and comparative advantage.
The objective of the Protocol is spelled out in Article 1 (CBD, 2000:1):
" ... to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically
focusing on transboundary movements".
The scope of the Protocol (Article 4) indicates that it applies to "the transboundary
movement, transit, handling and use of all living modified organisms that may have
adverse effects on the conservation_and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account risks to human health". The Draft Report of the ExCOP of February
1999 made provision for inclusion into the Protocol of all but a few specific living
modified organisms (LMOs)10(The CBD opted to use the concept 'living modified
organisms' instead of 'genetically modified organisms'). However, developing
countries represented at Cartagena did not succeed in having all products derived
from LMOs included. This was largely the result of pressure from the representatives
of business and the industrial countries (Falkner, 2000:307).
Exclusion of LMOs that are pharmaceuticals intended for human use already
addressed by other international agreements is provided for in Article 5. Provision is
made for the transit and contained use of LMOs (Article 6), but the regulations
pertaining to the Advance Informed Procedure do not apply to them. Application of
the Advance Informed Agreement procedure is laid out in Article 7. Provision is also
made for the transboundary movement of LMOs (Articles 8-10, 12); risk assessment
LMOs excluded were those that were to be listed by the parties as environmentally safe; the transit and
use ofLMOs; and pharmaceutical LMOs for humans (Falkner, 2000:307).
10
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and management (Articles 15 & 16); emergency measures (Article 17); the
establishment of a Biosafety Clearing-House (Article 20); handling transport, packing
and identification; and a secretariat (Article 31).
The Advance Informed Agreement procedure, which Falkner (2000:307) calls the
"regulatory heart of the Protocol", is intended to protect the rights of importing nations
to refuse the transboundary movement of LMDs when a threat to biodiversity and/or
human health is suspected. Thus, the AlA procedure "effectively reinforces national
autonomy in environmental and health regulation against the erosive forces of
economic globalization" (Falkner, 2000:308). Supporting the challenge the
Cartagena Protocol is making to the hegemonic trade regime (WTD) used by the
United States to favour its own interests, Winfield (2000:6) states that the Protocol
can be regarded as the third of three defeats for the WTD/globalisation agenda in
less than a year. First was the abandonment of the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment followed by the collapse of the Seattle WTD Ministerial meeting. Taking
into account the number of environment Ministers that attended the Montreal
meeting, the Cartagena Protocol seems more a matter of environmental protection
than one of trade.
The potential for conflict between the trade regime of the WTD, which wants to
liberalise trade as much as possible, and the environment and safety regime of the
Cartagena Protocol, which can restrict trade of biotechnology products, seems
obvious. Much of this conflict arises from differences in the perceptions about the
character of GM crops. Brodnig (1999 (b):3) indicates that in addition to procedural
issues, "the main fault lines in this case concerned the viability of the precautionary
principle, the scope and nature of risk assessments and the role of science, as well
as the legitimacy of consumer preferences as a trade restricting factor". Falkner
(2000:307) also refers to the "role and definition of the precautionary principle within
risk assessment" which was an aspect of the AlA procedure that was responsible for
fierce debate during the final negotiation of the Protocol. The prominence of the
precautionary principle in any analysis of the Cartagena Protocol necessitates a
specific look at this concept.
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3.2. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is not a new principle. The term originated in Germany in
the 1960 as Vorsorgeprinzip, literally meaning foresight planning (SIRe, 2000:1). It
has been in use in Europe since the 1980s and was the basis of a treaty enacted in
1987 that banned the dumping of toxic substances in the North Sea (HEe, 2000:3).
The precautionary principle has been one of the most contentious aspects of the
efforts to create a biosafety protocol. It has divided most of the participants and
commentators on the issue of biosafety into two broad camps: those in favour of the
principle of precaution, and those, notably countries intending to trade in GMOs,
against it. This division is the result not only of different interests regarding biosafety
and international trade, but also because of a misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the exact meaning of the precautionary principle. During a
meeting of scientists, lawyers, policy makers and environmentalists at Wingspread 11,
Wisconsin, in January 1998, a definition of the precautionary principle was formulated
that can be of use here: "When an activity raises threats of harm to the environment
or human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and
effect relationships are not fully. established scientifically. Together with this
definition, certain key elements of the principle were also highlighted: precaution is to
be taken where scientific uncertainty prevails; alternatives to possible harmful actions
should be explored; the burden of proof lies with the proponents of an activity and not
with the recipients (victims) of the activity; democratic processes should be used to
carry out the principle and the public has the right to informed consent" (HEe,
2000: 1; Montague, 1998:2).
Taken as a whole, the spirit behind the precautionary principle supports the common
sense principles of being careful rather than brash, of saying, "better safe than sorry";
of trying to avoid doing harm rather than doing first and finding out the consequences
later on. The relationship of the principle with science is also an important one.
Those against the principle indicate that where there is no scientific proof of harm, no
caution is needed. Supporters of the precautionary principle state that scientific
certainty is not always possible and that where this is lacking, precaution is needed.
The principle further has the intention of changing people's attitudes towards their
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interrelationship with the environment. Rather than regulating the amounts of waste
and pollutants put into the environment, it would serve future generations better to
prevent harm to the environment instead of applying post hoc cleaning up strategies
and policies (HEC, 2000:1-2).
The precautionary principle is also a mechanism of addressing certain inadequacies
in existing environmental regulations. The first has already been mentioned -
"scientific certainty". The lack of certainty is used to justify the continued use of
potentially harmful substances or technology. A second issue is that of narrowly
defined ranges of "risk assessment". In the past risk usually referred to death (mostly
from cancer). Coupled to this narrow view of risk is the lack of information and
consultation. Captains of industry need to be responsible in the way that they
develop and distribute new technologies and products. The last issue is the so-
called problem of "cost-benefit analysis". More consideration is given to the cost of
short-term regulation, while the long-term costs of harm and environmental damage
is often forsaken. Taken together, these loopholes favour the development and
marketing of new products, especially in a market driven economy (HEC, 2000:3).
This brings the discussion back to t~e crux of the debate at Cartagena and Montreal,
namely conflict between an environmentally sensitive precautionary approach versus
an open market profit-driven approach. In its opposition of the precautionary
principle, the Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC, 2000:1) of Oxford in the United
Kingdom go so far as to say that it "generates a quasi-religious bigotry which history
should have has taught us to fear. Its inherent irrationality renders it unsustainable".
The insistence on scientific proof is evident from this reasoning.
Blanchfield (2000:1) indicates that science will never allow us to know everything
there is to know about a phenomenon, Le. science "cannot determine a 'truth' that is
valid for all future time"; science cannot prove that anything is 'safe' (Le. absence of
harm) because "absence of evidence" is not "evidence of absence". He comes to the
conclusion that any policy purportedly based on requiring science to prove safety is
unrealistic. Barrett (1999:2) shares these views when she states, "Central to the
Precautionary Principle is recognition of the limits of scientific knowledge". She
Countries represented by participants at Wingspread were Britain, Canada. Germany, Sweden, and the
United States «Montague, 1998:2).
II
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states that the Precautionary Principle "need not cause paralysis". Rather, it is action
oriented in that it calls for MORE, not less, research, discussion, organising and
education" (emphasis in the original).
The European Union insisted that the precautionary principle guide the AlA
procedure, to which the Miami Group objected. Whereas these two groupings took
strong positions on these issues, and later made concessions both ways, it is ironic
that the final text of the Protocol does not contain the term 'precautionary principle' in
the main document (Falkner, 2000:309). The words "precautionary approach" do
appear in the preamble, though, and seem to be stated as a matter of principle rather
than of fact. Winfield (2000:6) indicates that this establishes the precautionary
principle as a basis for decision-making and that it should be understood as including
commodities.
The United States, having the world's largest biotechnology industry, has raised
sharp criticism against the European Commission for defending the precautionary
principle where the regulation of GMOs is concerned. The US sees this as being in
direct conflict with the rules of the WTO, which are founded on science-based risk-
assessment methods (Falkner, 2000:299). Only the future will tell how the principle
of precaution will be interpreted and applied. And it is not the only unresolved issue
emanating from the Cartagena Protocol.
3.3. Issues that the Cartagena Protocol has not Resolved
Assessment of the Cartagena Protocol and the protection of biodiversity in a
globalising world where trade in free markets have become the order of the day,
reveal a number of issues which are not resolved by the Protocol. The lack of a
proper definition of the precautionary principle has already been discussed.
Provisions for trade and the environment are only dealt with in the preamble and are
vague and open to interpretation (Falkner, 2000:300). Conflict between the Protocol
and the rules of the WTO can be expected in the future.
A further unresolved point is the concern of environmentalists that biotechnology
advances at such a pace that some of the exemptions of the Protocol will soon be
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questioned (Falkner, 2000:300). This is another of those aspects that will only be
satisfactorily answered when the Protocol is tested through time and its application.
The effectiveness of the Protocol in the protection of biodiversity and human health
will depend on its ability to adapt to the rate of innovation and change in the
biotechnology industry (Falkner, 2000:300).
The issue of dispute resolution remains unresolved because the Protocol contains no
mechanism for this on its own. Parties may still have to take disputes to the WTO.
Problems are also foreseen concerning the practicality of the mechanism for notice of
potential exports of LMOs, particularly by developing countries. Export of
commodities may be too complex and confusing in future under the AlA system. The
Protocol's provision for trade with non-parties is very weak and leaves room for
abuse. No provision was made for "direct social or cultural impact assessment
regarding the introduction of LMOs". The Protocol only states that Parties are
"permitted" to take socio-economic effects into account, but that this authority is
subject to other international obligations, such as that of the WTO (Winfield, 2000:6).
The Cartagena Protocol also seems to have a number of inadequacies regarding
labeling. The shipment of bulk commodities, such as seed and animal feeds, will not
require labeling for at least two years. No labels are required for processed food
containing GMOs. The only wording required on labels for commodities is "may
contain genetically modified organisms". This is a shift brokered by the U.S.
representatives away from the initial wording of "contains genetically modified
organisms" (Mittal and Rosset, 2000:1). Informed consumers and environmentalists
can be expected to voice their concerns on these matters in the future.
4. The Worth of the ceo and the Cartagena Protocol as International
Regulatory Frameworks
Lang (1990) compiled a useful framework of five criteria, which can be used to test
new treaties concerned with protection of the environment. The first is that regimes
do not consist of only one single instrument that covers all aspects of the problem it
addresses. Environmental treaties usually start with a framework convention with
general obligations, which organise international cooperation and provide
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mechanisms for more refined rules and regulations. The CSD fits this criterion well.
More important than the framework agreement is the so-called "protocols", which are
"additional instruments that deal with specific types of substances or activities to be
prohibited or controlled". The Cartagena Protocol is specific in that it deals only with
the transboundary movement of certain GMOs, thus meeting the criterion set by
Lang.
The second criterion has to do with flexibility. Where scientific uncertainty and
considerations of economic feasibility prevail, instruments should be drafted so that
they can be amended or updated more easily than ordinary agreements. While the
CSD is a document of principle with broad aims, the Cartagena Protocol is very
specific in its scope and focus. There should thus be room for other protocols under
the CSD to deal with biosafety matters, but that fall outside the specific issue of
transboundary movement of GMOs. Those areas of the Cartagena Protocol that
leave room for interpretation give it a measure of flexibility, but as has been indicated,
this should be seen as a criticism of the Protocol rather than a praise. The reason for
this is that too much flexibility in the protocol itself might render it useless to those
that need it for the protection of their own human and biosafety - the reason why it
was drafted in the first place.
The third criterion addresses the issue of definitions and scope of the agreement. A
list of substances or activities to be controlled with their exact scientific identification
is preferable to a more general definition that leaves too much room for interpretation
and ambiguity, and might become redundant with the developments in science and
technology. On this point, the Cartagena Protocol does not address specific
substances. In Article 3.g. it refers to LMOs as "any living organism that possesses a
novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern
biotechnology" (Cartagena Protocol, 2000:2). The article dealing with the scope of
the Protocol shows that it applies to all living modified organisms (Article 4) with the
exclusion of LMOs that are pharmaceuticals for human use (Article 5). The
Cartagena Protocol may thus be criticised on this point for not being specific enough,
but when the nature of genetic manipulation is considered, this is understandable.
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The sensitive issue areas of compliance control and verification requires some form
of minimum guarantees against the occurrence of violations to be reliable. Although
the Cartagena Protocol's AlA procedure requires notification from states intending to
move GMOs across national borders, this criterion is not sufficiently met by the
Protocol. In Article 27 the Protocol states that the Parties responsible for the Protocol
shall adopt "a process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of international
rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress for damage resulting from
transboundary movements of living modified organisms" at a next meeting
(Cartagena Protocol, 2000:13). Article 34 on compliance indicates that the Protocol
does not prescribe any procedures in this regard and that procedures and
institutional mechanisms to this effect need to be created. These aspects of the
Protocol, together with some of those issues that the Protocol does not resolve,
leaves room for interpretation and possible abuse or violation.
The above four lessons will be meaningless unless there is some form of institutional
machinery that can oversee issues of administration and operationalisation of plans.
With the trade and protection disputes that have frequented the international arena in
the past decades, such tnstitutlcnal machines are essential for the establishment of
non-partisan frameworks that can ensure that all parties with an interest in the
regime/treaty are called to the table and are able to place matters on the agenda.
The Biosafety Clearing-House that is created by the Protocol is designed to play this
role. The roles, functions, and procedures of the Biosafety Clearing-House are
clearly laid out in a number of the articles in the Protocol. It still needs to be tested
for efficiency and a judgement as to its expected functioning is premature at this early
stage. The greatest test of the Biosafety Clearing-house is likely to be its ability to
streamline administrative procedures and to enable developing countries with limited
capacities to make full use of the Protocol's regulations.
While the Cartagena Protocol does create a framework to deal with the
transboundary movement of GMOs, it should not be seen as the last word on
biosafety matters relating to GMOs. Future protocols or regulatory frameworks under
the CBD may be negotiated to address the issues not resolved by the Cartagena
Protocol. Falkner (2000:299) sees the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety in January 2000 as a "significant achievement in trying to reconcile the
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respective needs of trade and the environment". In that sense the Protocol can be
seen as a victory for developing countries. The impact that the Cartagena Protocol is
likely to have on developing countries is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
"Biotechnology and its future impact on all aspects of human society is fraught with
many uncertainties" (Russell, 1990:11).
An examination of biotechnology and international relations, the implications of
biotechnology for trade and agriculture, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
seem to pose more questions than answers. The only thing that can be said with a
fair amount of certainty about the use of biotechnology is that the effects thereof on
politics, trade and agriculture have already shown both benevolent and malevolent
features in terms of the effects thereof on trade and the environment to both the
developed and developing worlds. This chapter examines this double-edged sword
characteristic of biotechnology from a developing country perspective. Subsequently
the relationship between the Cartagena Protocol and developing country needs is
examined with a focus on the need for the establishment and provision of certain
global public goods, the protection of biodiversity, and the establishment of enduring
food security. The policy options available to developing countries are included in
this section.
1. The Likely Consequences of the Introduction of Agricultural
Biotechnology into Developing Countries
There is certainly no short supply of advice to developing countries on how to make
use of the proposed benefits of biotechnology. It is argued by some that although
most biotechnology research and development is still situated in developed countries,
developing countries stand to benefit most from plant technologies as they are
experiencing the greatest losses incurred by insects, weeds and diseases (Hueth,
Kung and Colwell, 1992:362). This will, however, only become true if and when
biotechnology research is changed in focus to accompany the nutritional needs of the
populations in developing countries, Le. when research is not primarily focused on
crops used in the developed North. Others direct their advice to small farmers and
consumers on policies to guide research for the poor, protect against health and
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ecological risks, and to regulate the private sector (Pinstrup-Anderson, 1999:1).
Some of the benefits that can be derived from the use of GMOs include financial
savings for farmers by the reduction of pesticides and fertiliser, and the reduction of
pressure on agricultural land through more productive methods (Middleton, 1999:54),
improvement in states' economies, reducing hunger and malnourishment and the
development of pharmaceutical products (Sagar and Ashiya, 1999 (a):1). However,
the introduction of biotechnology into national agricultural systems will not
automatically lead to these benefits. Factors that need to be addressed
simultaneously to improve the performance and productivity of the agricultural sector
are the development of and access to agricultural input, rural extension, rural credit
and markets.
Biotechnology may benefit agricultural sectors in poor countries where a specific
sector has proven benefits derived from this technology, such as linking small flower
farms to "high-quality high-value growth markets" (Galhardi, 1995:650). The use of
biotechnology in the production of tubers in Central America is another agricultural
area that could benefit. Here the use of biotechnology could lead to foreign
exchange savings, an increase in productivity per employee, and even improvement
of the livelihood of the small producer in this area (Galhardi, 1995:651-2).
In situations where big business and multinationals become involved in local
communities through the introduction of GMOs, it is important that those local
communities' development needs are considered. In May 2000, Fred Pierce of the
New Scientist reported that Monsanto had donated the intellectual property rights
(IPR) to work done in collaboration with Florence Wambugu on the sweet potato in
Kenya to the local community where she grew up. She indicates that the Kenya
Agricultural Research Institute now holds the intellectual property rights "on behalf of
the whole of Africa" for the sweet potato genetically manipulated to resist a specific
virus (Wambugu, 2000:42).
In her criticism of the anti-GMO stance in Europe, Wambugu (2000:43) states that
there are no food shortages on that continent, and she reiterates that "there is a real
need and a real hunger here (in Africa)". She also says "GM may be better for Africa
than older technologies, like those of the Green Revolution" (Wambugu, 2000:40).
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She is concerned with the plight of women in African agriculture who spend more
than half of their working time doing weeding. She feels that a reduction of weeding
through the introduction of suitable GM food would save women a large amount of
labour that could be used more productively on other activities (Wambugu, 2000:41).
It is essential to highlight some of the main differences between the Green
Revolution 12 and the biotechnology revolution.
A result of the Green Revolution has been the maintenance of a rate of global food
production above that of the population growth rate. However, the Green Revolution
was the result of public good research through the use of public funds and improved
seed was made freely available for distribution and multiplication. The biotechnology
revolution, on the other hand, is driven by proprietary science and is already showing
characteristics of monopolisation by private firms, which protect IPR with patents that
extend beyond the first release (Swaminathan, 2000:38; Pinstrup-Anderson &
Cohen,2000:159).
A second difference between the Green Revolution and the biotechnology revolution
is the patenting of processes as well as products. The Green Revolution was
characterised by a conventional plant breeding process in the public domain funded
by public institutions. In biotechnology, there is an increase in the use of IPR
protection for both process and products emanating from that process. This may
result in public institutions being denied access to basic knowledge and processes
needed for research through the use of IPR (Pinstrup-Anderson & Cohen, 2000:163).
A third difference between the Green and the Gene Revolutions can be found in the
application of the different technologies. The technology of the Green Revolution
involved the adaptation of industrial country agricultural research to the conditions,
requirements and needs found in the developing countries. This stands in contrast to
biotechnology, which is developed predominantly for developed country agricultural
needs and consumer preferences (Pinstrup-Anderson & Cohen, 2000:163).
12 The Green Revolution refers to the increases in agricultural production in Third WorldlDeveloping countries
during the 1960s resulting from international funding of the development and use of hybrid seeds,
mechanisation, and pest control (McLean, 1996:211).
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There are four particular areas where biotechnology can influence agriculture,
namely production levels, industry structure, income distribution, and environmental
equality (Hueth, Kung and Colwell, 1992:358). These authors state that patents,
proprietary information, trade secrets, and the necessity to price products high
enough to recover research and development input costs will impede exchange of
information and technology between developed and developing countries. This
means that biotechnology, as an emerging technology will not have the desired
impact. However, these authors emphasise that agricultural biotechnologies can be
"directed to increase the efficiency of small-scale agriculture relative to large-scale
agriculture if society so chooses" (Hueth, Kung and Colwell, 1992:360). Suggestions
of how this can be done are discussed later in this chapter.
When developed countries adopt new biotechnology processes for crops produced
as export commodities in developing countries, it will lead to increases in crop yields
and an increase in supply. This, in turn, will lead to a drop in the international price of
the crop and will mean a loss in revenue to already poor countries. This should result
in job losses in the agricultural sector and could ultimately lead to decreases in
foreign exchange earnings and depreciation of currency. Worsening terms of trade
will follow and in the worst case, poverty and malnutrition will increase (Galhardi,
1995:642). Examples of the trade impact that the introduction of biotechnology
products can have on specific crops include the following (Galhardi, 1995:643-645):
• Sugar: Researchers in the North have development an enzymatic process
whereby cereal starch is transformed into high fructose corn syrups (HFCS). This
has resulted in a decline of sugar imports by the US. The resultant effect in Latin
America has been a reductionof 343 000 tonnes in sugar production and a loss in
foreign exchange earnings of US$ 130 million between 1983 and 1984. The
employment and income stability of approximately 2.5 million people directly
involved in sugar farming in the continent are attributed to this loss. Estimated
reductions in sugar production per country are 50% in the Dominican Republic,
72% in EI Salvador, 46% in Nicaragua,35% in Brazil, and 34% in Argentina.
• Coffee: This crop has been an important foreign exchange earner in Latin
America and other tropical regions for decades. Importers of coffee from the
colder North have developed coffee varieties with frost tolerance, flavour
substitution, and lower levels of caffeine. These developments reflect changes in
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consumer preferences and effect changes in the demand for traditional coffee
varieties. The adverse effect for Latin American agriculture lies in the fact that in
all the countries in the region, except for Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, coffee
production takes place mostly on small farms using family labour. This means
that a reduction in imports of traditional coffee varieties impacts directly on
thousands of families' incomeand livelihood.
• Cocoa: Cocoa is also largely produced in tropical regions and predominantly on
small holdings. The threat from biotechnology to cocoa producing countries lies
in the development of cocoa butter alternatives (CBA) from cheaper edible oils
such as palm oil. Other biotechnology techniques that threaten the use of
coconut are microbial processes, plant micropropagation and enzyme
technologies that open the possibilities of producing high value oils from cheap
crops such as palms. The Swiss food company, Nestlé, in a joint research
venture with the American biotechnology company, Calgene, are attempting the
development of cocoa butter substitutes and are trying to alter the composition of
cocoa butter. Biotechnology is also used by other researchers to transfer genes
from the cocoa plant to soya, which, if successful, could lead to cocoa being
produced in consuming countries. The resultant shifts in trade patterns between
the North and South and the effects thereof on agricultural jobs in developing
countries is not hard to see.
From these three examples it seems that the introduction of biotechnology into
agricultural systems in the developed countries of the North has already, and will in
future, result in import substitution and job losses in the developing countries of the
South. A precise estimate of the effect of declines in demand for developing country
export crops on employment "is a speculative exercise beset with difficulties and
shortcomings" (Galhardi, 1995:654). As long as the development of biotechnology
and its introduction into agricultural systems remains a gradual process, there is
opportunity for developing countries with a minimum level of technological capability
to improve their production levels and even to migrate to other crops or production
methods (Galhardi, 1995:655). However, as will be demonstrated later on, few
developing countries will be able to do this without assistance. The needs of
developing countries are subsequently discussed in relation to the Cartagena
Protocol and the policy options available to developing countries.
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2. Developing Country Needs and the Cartagena Protocol - Policy Options
Although the Cartagena Protocol provides developing countries with a regime that
will enable the management and governing of the transboundary movement of GMOs
as well as other mechanism already discussed in Chapter 4, there are pertinent
issues it does not resolve, a selection of which are mentioned briefly. Firstly, the
precautionary principle may allow some countries to use protectionist measures
under the smoke screen that they fear damage to the environment or their own
biodiversity, when such fears may not be warranted. Another problem is dealing with
trade restrictions resulting from environmental concerns versus the obligations of
nations to trade without discrimination under the WTO. Lastly, food security might be
used as an excuse to restrict market access. In such an instance a set of rules that
guarantees access to available food should be created. In all of these cases
multinational corporations and developed countries who advocate free markets need
to act in a way that builds the confidence of developing countries in these markets
(Runge and Senauer, 2000:50).
Certain articles of the Cartagena Protocol make specific reference to the needs of
developing countries. Special provisions are made under Article 11 on procedures
for GMOs intended for direct use as food, feed or processing in the absence of a
domestic regulatory framework. Least developed and developing countries should
be assisted with the implementation of the Protocol through information sharing and
the work of the Biosafety Clearing-House. Capacity building of least developed
countries, developing countries and small island developing states should take place
through the development and/or strengthening of human resources and industrial
capacities, and with financial resources and access to and transfer of technology and
knowledge through inter-state cooperation (Article 22). Developed country parties to
the protocol may provide financial and technological resources for the implementation
of the Protocol through bilateral, regional and multilateral channels (Article 28).
As far as structural inequality is concerned, it would be too idealistic to expect a
protocol with such a limited scope as the Cartagena Protocol to change much of the
socio-economic and political challenges developing countries experience. The
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Protocol, however, does provide an indication of technological and agricultural
inequalities and what both developed and developing countries can do in practical
terms to alleviate some of these. This issue is explored further in Chapter 6.
The need of developing countries to conserve biodiversity and establish food security
is approached from a global public good perspective. Before addressing these
needs, the concept "global public good" is discussed.
2.1. Developing Countries and Global Public Goods
A "public good" is an economic term referring to goods that, once produced, benefit
all of mankind. Global public goods can be understood as "goods that are unlikely to
be provided by unregulated markets" (Kaui, Grunberg and Stern in Murphy,
2000:790). Examples of such public goods include national justice systems, norms
and standards, a clean environment, and broad-based education. On the supra-
national level social scientists talk of global public goods, which include benefits that
accrue to all nations, generations, and population groups, such as financial stability,
health, peace, and environmental sustainability. The inverse of global public goods
can be termed global public bads, which equally affect people across boundaries,
such as disease, pollution, and international crime (UNDP, 2000:2).
Public goods have the characteristic that they can be enjoyed by all once they have
been established. It will be very difficult for a single person or party to claim
ownership of public goods such as education, street names or the use of clean air.
Another characteristic of public goods, whether at the local, national, or global level,
is that they tend to be limited in their availability and underprovided when
established. In other words, goods such as education and a clean environment are
not infinite resources that can be treated as products of waste (Kaui, Grunberg &
Stern, 2000).
For all nations to contribute to global public goods and to benefit from them, an
approach of international cooperation is an essential ingredient of countries' national
policies (UNDP, 2000:2). At the same time, international cooperation must take
place within the requirements of equity and justice if it is hoped that representative
participation will take place and that the results will be acceptable to all parties. On
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the national level it is important for governments to take full responsibility for the
cross-border effects (such as the transboundary movement of GMOs) that their
citizens and other interest groups (such as MNCs) generate. (Kaui, Grunberg &
Stern, 2000). These authors refer to this as the principle of "internalizing
externalities", which is neededto deal effectivelywith global public goods.
For developing countries and poor communities, the challenge of participation in
global public goods becomes a concern. When access is costly, public goods only
benefit the rich and equity is not reached. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (2000) suggest
four measures that can be taken to work towards equity in determining global public
goods and their utilisation. The first is to introduce better North-South representation
in international organisations such as the G-8 and the UN Security Council. The
negotiations to secure the Cartagena Protocol is an example of the use of skillful
negotiation by developed countries in an attempt to advance only the interests of a
handful of states in the face of opposition by all other representatives.
Secondly, globalisation necessitates the inclusion of business and civil society with
government in searching for solutions to global problems. The riots that have
become synonymous with World Trade Organisation (WTO) and World Economic
Forum (WEF) meetings should by now have sent a clear message to government
and business that bilateral decision-making to the exclusion of civil society will not
secure a lasting solution to the trade and other problems these organisations try to
address.
Thirdly, the interests of the voiceless future generations need to be protected by
paying specific attention to the long-term effects of policy-decisions. In this instance
the use of the precautionary principle in policy decisions about the use of
biotechnology and the application of its products seems reasonable until there is
more certainty about the long-term effects this technology will have on humanity and
the environment.
Lastly, more interdisciplinarity is required to ensure that the costs and benefits of
decision-making across political, social, financial, environmental and other
boundaries are balanced. In the case of biotechnology, economists and MNCs need
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to consult with biologists and interest groups from all parts of the globe before
implementing new techniques or introducing new products onto the market. This is
not only a responsibleway of dealing with new policies, but will also go a long way in
building trust betweendifferent interest groups,which up to now have dealt with each
other mostly in a confrontationalmanner.
Developing countries not only have difficulty in meeting some of their international
obligations, but they are often reluctant to enter new obligations precisely because
they lack the confidence of living up to these requirements. I agree with Kaul
Grunberg and Stern (2000) who state that "it would often be more efficient for the
international community to support poor countries in meeting their commitments than
to shoulder the costs of overproduction of global public bads". Thus, it would be
cheaper in the long run to assist developing countries with the establishment of
knowledge-protection capacities than to continue fighting piracy. This is what these
authors call cooperation that is "incentive-compatible", where there are clear net
benefits to all participating parties who perceive the benefits as fair. Environmental
protection has recently been the cause of conflict rather than cooperation at the
global level. One aspect of environmental protection that is a primary need of
developing countries is now discussed.
2.2. The Maintenance of Biodiversity
The justification to preserve biodiversity emanates from the fact that "the genetic
information it contains is a global public good" (Perrings & Lovett, 1999:301). The
preservation of biodiversity is, however, a complicated and formidable challenge in
the light of the demands that industrialisation, consumer preferences and new
technologies place on the environment. Such conservation efforts have to be
conducted on an international and even global level to be effective because
ecosystems are rarely contained within the boundaries of single nation-states.
Where conservation effectiveness is a concern, it is also necessary to adopt a
'habitat' rather than a 'species' approach in conservation strategies (Perrings &
Lovett, 1999:305). This is to ensure that not only so-called valuable species are
saved, but that entire food chains remain intact, which is necessary for biodiversity to
be maintained. The goal of biodiversity conservation "should not be to safeguard all
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wild resources in a limited set of wildlife reserves". The goal should rather be to
safeguard "critical biodiversity thresholds" (Perrings & Lovett, 1999:305).
Preserving and maintaining the biodiversity of developing countries is not the explicit
objective of the Cartagena Protocol, and there are fears that the use of GMOs will
lead to single crop practices, thus contributing to loss of biodiversity. However, like
with all technologies, biodiversity loss should not be attributed to the technology itself,
but to how it is used. All participants in technology, agriculture and government,
therefore, need to take responsibility for the maintenance of biodiversity.
Environmentalists also need to be responsible in the way they criticise technological
developments, because not all of it has adverse effects on the environment.
The potential for loss of biodiversity caused by the use of biotechnology becomes
evident by looking at the effects that agricultural intensification had in Europe. During
the last 30 years there have been declines in farmland plants, insects, and birds
caused by agricultural intensification on the continent. Contributing factors include
less use of crop rotation techniques, increased pesticide efficiency and drift, the use
of artificial fertilizers, drainage, and. intensification of soil cultivation (McLaughlin and
Mineau in Johnson, 2000:135). Britain has documented a list of 200 arable plant
species of which 25 are indexed as "Nationally Scarce" and 24 others that are of
"conservation concern". Other declines can be seen in the shift towards less diverse,
grass-dominated flora and a dramatic decline in British farmland birds with 13
species being red-listed by 1998 (various authors 13 in Johnson, 2000:135).
One of the criticisms against biotechnology firms and developed countries is the
small percentage of research funds spent on testing for biosafety. It seems fair to
expect that if a specific technology supports a particular public good criterion, states
and international institutions should become involved with its financing. Therefore,
the beneficiaries of the profits of agricultural biotechnology are obliged to contribute
to the financing of research for assessing biosafety. Similarly, if a private company
stands to profit from the sale of new seeds, it should provide sufficient funding for
research of the "environmental externalities of its product" (Van Dusen, 2000:2), not
13 Authors sited are McLaughlin & Mineau, Kleijn & Snoeing, Siriwardena & others (no date given).
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only in the country of origin, but in all ecosystemswhere it intends selling or releasing
its product.
The responsibility of governments and other authorities in maintaining biodiversity
should also not be forgotten. The loss of biodiversity does not result merely from the
use of biotechnology, but starts with a lack of political will to conserve diversity
(Leisinger, 1999:3). There is much that governments can do to contain, stop or
prevent the destruction of rainforests, the conversion of native land to agriculture, the
replacement of wild landswith monocultures,and overfishing and other practices that
have a far greater impact on biodiversity than the use of GM crops (Leisinger,
1999:3). There are four elements that could guide national policy for biodiversity
conservation. The first is a regulatory regime to protect key species, habitats and
ecological services (including protected areas). The Cartagena Protocol provides
states with useful guidelines for the establishment of regulatory mechanisms.
Second, is the establishment of an appropriate set of property rights in natural
resources (Perrings and Lovett do not define "appropriate"). Third, is a compensation
mechanism, and lastly, a supporting structure of incentives and disincentives to
induce the desired response (Perrinqs & Lovett, 1999:305). It is not difficult to see
how a strong political will should enable most governments to put at least some of
these policies into effect, even in the face of limited resources.
There are other issues of concern that public officials involvedwith national biosafety
policy in developing countries should be aware of. The first is that proprietary
science and the shrinking of "public good" research supported from public funds may
result in a situation where future technologies are controlled by a small group of
privately owned companies. The second is guarding against monoerop practices
dominated by monopolies over seed manufacturing and distribution. This could lead
to large agricultural areas being covered by only a few crop varieties (genetic strains
or hybrids). Genetic homogeneity enhances genetic vulnerability to biotic and abiotic
stresses. It can also result in "genetic enslavement", especially if terminator seeds
are introduced to developing countries by large agrochemical firms of the North. The
third is the impact of GM foods on biodiversity. It is expected to result in genetic
erosion through the replacement of a variety of indigenous plants with one or two
new varieties. Lastly, policy-makers should strive for equity and justice when the
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benefits of biotechnology are distributed amongst interest groups. In the past,
conservers of biotechnology and those possessing traditional knowledge have
remained poor, while those who exploit this knowledge through biotechnology have
become materially rich, resulting in accusations of biopiracy (Swaminathan, 2000:39).
It is important to recognise that current levels of production in intensive agriculture
may be sustained for decades to come, but the same may not be true for the
consequences that this process will have on social, economic and environmental
systems. Caution with the protection of biodiversity is especially important where the
long-term consequences of the use of herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant crops
are not yet known with certainty (Johnson, 2000:132) (see Chapter 4 for a discussion
of the Precautionary Principle). The importance of maintaining biodiversity and
ecological integrity in developing countries is articulated proficiently by Johnson
(2000:136):
Environmental damage resulting from the unwise use of biotechnology in
agriculture would be a serious issue in developing countries where biodiversity and
environmental factors such as unpolluted ground and surface water are
fundamental resources used by large numbers of people. Intact and rich
ecosystems are important not only for their intrinsic values but also as sources of
revenue, whether from sustainable harvesting or from tourism.
A need of developing countries that is closely associated with the protection of
biodiversity is that of food security.
2.3. Establishing and Maintaining Food Security
Food security can be defined as the "acquirement of both sufficient and nutritious
quantities of food" (Sen in Van Rooyen, 2000:8). This simple definition makes the
attainment of food security seem equally simple, yet millions of people are
malnourished or starving in the developing and underdeveloped world. One fifth of
the global population (an estimated 1.2 billion people) live in absolute poverty, which
the World Bank defines as the equivalent or less of US$1 per day (Pinstrup-Anderson
& Cohen, 2000:159). Even more people suffer from micronutrient deficiencies such
as iron and vitamin A. An estimated 2 billion people (one in every three) are
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anaemic, mostly as a result of iron deficiency. This is why so many authors are of
the opinion that poverty causes famine and food insecurity at the individual level
(Swaminathan, 2000:40; Altiery & Rossett, 2000; Pinstrup-Anderson& Cohen, 2000).
One of the primary causes of poverty and food insecurity in underdeveloped
countries in both urban and rural communities is low productivity levels in agriculture.
There are other global problems that contribute to food insecurity. One is increasing
populations coupled with a reduction in arable land and water supplies
(Swaminathan, 2000:37). In these countries it is precisely agriculture that is
expected to be the motor behind economic growth and poverty alleviation. In
countries such as Indonesia, South Korea, India, and China, increases in agricultural
production through agricultural research, also called the Green Revolution, was the
driving force behind the broad-based economic growth and declines in poverty in
recent decades (Pinstrup-Anderson& Cohen, 2000:160). Another problem has to do
with changes in consumer and spending patterns. Improvements in purchasing
power and urbanisation lead to increaseddemands for animal products,which places
an increased burden on food grain requirements. Additionally, marine fish stocks are
becoming stagnant or depleted and the ecological foundations of agriculture (land,
water, forests, biodiversity, and atmosphere) are damaged at increasing rates. There
is also evidence of climate changes and a rise in the sea level.
New technologies, such as biotechnology, cause high levels of excitement in
economic and commercial spheres, but its potential impact on societies and the
environment are not yet understood or appreciated (Swaminathan, 2000:37). There
are a number of developing countries, such as Argentina, Mexico and South Africa,
that have demonstrated an interest in the role biotechnology can play in improving
the alleviation of hunger and establishing sustainable nutrition. This can best be
achieved with a focus on research on more tropical staples that are cheap, labour
intensive, give high yields, and are suitable for local soil and climate conditions
(Sagar and Ashiya, 1999 (a):2). Unfortunately most of the developments in
biotechnology R&D are driven by the trends in markets in the developedworld. This
research typically focuses on crops that are animal staples and on attributes that
minimise labour, thus doing very little to bridge the gap between the rich and the
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poor. The question arises what contribution the Cartagena Protocol can make in the
improvement of poor countries' food supply.
The Cartagena Protocol has the objective of establishing protection and safety when
genetically modified organisms resulting from biotechnology are transferred, handled
and used. It is not intended to create mechanisms that will help poor countries
increase their food supply. However, this does not mean that it cannot or will not
benefit poor countries in this regard. If appropriate biotechnology transfer" can take
place to developing countries in a timely fashion, it is expected that food supplies can
become sustainable if other conditions already mentioned are favourable.
One of the problems with food security is that many states and politicians still regard
food self-reliance as a form of national strength that should be sought and guarded
jealously. From this nationalist perspective, foreign competition is seen as a threat
and leads to protection measures such as that of the United States' sugar, wool and
mohair programmes (Runge and Senauer, 2000:42). This phenomenon becomes
more pronounced among nations that have a history of food shortages, hunger and
malnutrition, such as is commonly found among many developing countries. In India,
for example, every five-year plan since its independence in 1947 has been
dominated by plans to raise food production and reduce reliance on imports. These
efforts were focused on the production of mainly wheat and rice to the exclusion of
other crops. This resulted in self-sufficiency in wheat and rice to the extent that by
1995 some of its production could be exported. However, the neglect of other crops
and foodstuffs has meant that more than half of India's population is short of energy
requirements and 75 percent are protein undernourished (Runge and Senauer,
2000:44).
Such efforts to become food self-sufficient has meant that many developing countries
shun international trade as a source of cheaper food, reasoning that international
markets are too insecure. Runge and Senauer (2000:41-2) make the point that this
attitude has less to do with the stability of markets than with these governments'
"aversion" to free markets. Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs
14 There are a number of issues of which developing countries should be aware when getting
involved in the transfer of technology to ensure that it is appropriate. These are discussed in Chapter
6.
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and Trade (GATT), agriculture has been a point of contention. However under
pressure from the United States and Europe, it was kept off the agenda for the first
seven rounds of negotiations. At the Uruguay Round of 1986-93 European and
American interests in agriculture were brought to the table when it was argued that
freer trade would be adverse to farmers in both these regions. This same period saw
the emergence of conflict between environmentalists and agricultural trade
liberalisation. It was only when the debates around GMOs emerged that
environmentalists and free trade advocates started dealing directly with the effects
that trade would have on food security (Runge and Senauer, 2000:45-6). These
debates have connected agriculture, trade, the environment, and food security "to
form a complex relationship that cries out for a global structure of rules and
disciplines" (Runge and Senauer, 2000:47). In this instance the Cartagena Protocol,
with its inclusion of the principle of precaution, is a step in that direction.
The role of the WTO in this regard could be to link food security and GM issues to a
broader framework of trade regulation, intellectual property, and the environment.
Food security as a global common good will have to be dealt with on the supra-
national level through rules and mechanisms that are suitable to all role-players. It is
a "problem of collective national action that can be pursued only through multilateral
policies, just like international commerce or environmental issues" (Runge and
Senauer, 2000:48). The provision of food security as a global public good is
contingent upon concessions by and negotiated agreements between role-players in
both the developed and developing worlds. It entails the improvement of developing
countries' access to cheaper food from exporting developed countries. It also means
that developed countries should lower their tariffs on all goods from developing
countries so that emerging markets can earn cash to import food. Lastly, the benefits
of biotechnology should be accessible to developing countries to enable them to
stabilise their food supplies and increase their agricultural production (Runge and
Senauer, 2000:39).
Specific food security policies for developing countries can be divided into four broad
categories. On the national level development frameworks need to be established. It
would be ideal if governments could set up biosafety regulatory structures before the
introduction of biotechnology into their agricultural systems. The major elements of
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effective biosafety systems are written guidelines, structure, roles and
responsibilities; well-trained regulatory authorities; an information system and
response mechanisms (Cohen, Falconi and Komen, 1999:2-3). Such frameworks
need to ensure the availability of food through the establishment of an environment
that facilitates the safe use of biotechnology through investment regulation,
intellectual property protection, and good governance (Van Rooyen, 2000:8; Persley
& Doyle, 1999:3). These frameworks will be greatly enhanced by actively linking
biotechnology and information technology. In this way new scientific discoveries
worldwide can be assessed and applied to the problems of food insecurity and
poverty in a timely manner (Persley and Doyle, 1999:3). Such frameworks are
essential elements in securing social improvements through the use of
biotechnology. This is the only way to ensure that this technologywill reach the broad
mass of the population of both genders. This is significant in terms of the benefits of
biotechnology on small pieces of land, because of the technology's land-saving
characteristics. As Leisinger (1999:2) points out, "(t)he economic and social impact
of biotechnology can only be as good as the sociopolitical soil in which new varieties
are planted".
On the micro-level food security for households needs to be secured through better
access to and distribution of income. Attention also needs to be given to improved
production capacity to acquire food at the household level. Specific plans need to be
designed for the utilisation of nutritious foods on the individual level. Such an
approach incorporates the strategies of reducing poverty at the household level and
of economic growth and development at the national level (Van Rooyen, 2000:8).
Poor communities are especially vulnerable where their diet is concerned. These
communities mostly suffer from a lack of energy, protein, and micro-nutrients.
Research should focus on those crops that best serve the needs of poor
communities, e.g. bananas, cassava, yams, sweet potatoes, rice, maize, wheat, and
millet. If biotechnology does not benefit developing countries the mistake will likely
not be that of the technology, but because the technology was not given a chance.
Where policymakers do decide to make use of biotechnology to the benefit of those
at the household level they will need to allocate additional public resources to
agricultural research, and to the conversion of social benefits to private benefits so
that private sector research can be expanded. This implies that intellectual property
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rights will need to be protected - something which is not always appropriate to
especially poor farmers who could not afford seeds that become expensive because
of protection rights on genetic manipulation(Pinstrup-Anderson,1999:1).
Strategies for the minimisation and management of risk need to be implemented.
Determining priorities and assessing relative risks and benefits need to be done in
consultation with the poor. This needs to be followed by designing policies that
minimise technology-transcending risks that adversely affect the poor (Persley and
Doyle, 1999:3). Pinstrup-Anderson (1999:2) states that GM foods are not
"intrinsically good or bad for human health". How GM foods affect health depends on
their specific content and the possibility of causing allergic reactions. In these cases,
GM foods should be labeled clearly to indicate such risks. This also applies to foods
of which the content or process of manufacturing may have cultural or religious
significance. Policymakers need to be wary of herbicide resistance from GM plants
to other plants that are not modified, and resistance to GM plants in insect
populations when drafting policy to deal with ecological risks. Food security and
biosafety regulations should heed international agreements and give an indication of
a society's acceptable risk levels, including "the risks associated with not using
modern biotechnology to achieve desired goals" (Pinstrup-Anderson, 1999:3). The
practical implication of implementing such policies means that developing countries
will need a minimum amount of human and technical capacity to carry out biosafety
tests, something which many poor countries lack (see Chapter 6 for suggestions on
capacity building).
The role of government and the private sector in the use and management of
biotechnology needs to be clear. A first policy objective could be to determine what
investments governments and the international development community will have to
make in human and financial resources in order to ensure that biosolutions to the
problems of food security reach the poor. I agreewith Pinstrup-Andersonand Cohen
(2000:161) that it is of particular importance to developing countries to have public
investment in agricultural research for them to achieve food security. Yet, low-
income developing countries still spend only 0.5 percent of the value of their
agricultural production on agricultural research, compared to 2 percent in more
developed countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa there are only 42 agricultural
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researchers per million economically active persons in agriculture, compared to 2458
in industrial countries (Pardy and Alston in Pinstrup-Anderson & Cohen, 2000: 160).
In many developing countries the availability of funds is not always the problem, but
rather the way that funds are allocated to wasteful projects and resources that do not
always benefit the poor. The obligation of private companies is to ensure that the
results of research and development are not beyond the reach of the poor because
of price difficulties and escalations. Leisinger (1999:2-3) suggests that this
information be made available free or on favourable conditions. Effective antitrust
legislation and institutions to enforce legislation are needed, especially in small
developing countries where one or only a few seed distribution companies operate.
Effective legislation means that intellectual property rights must be enforced in
agreement with both the WTO rules and the CSD (Pinstrup-Anderson, 1999:3).
However, the differences in the application of IPR between these two organisations
need to be reconciled.
Officials involved in public policy making for agricultural research need to consider
those areas of research that can compliment work done in the private sector. It is
expected that the private sector will focus its attention on crops that will have
commercial value in the developed world and in the process neglect those crops that
are used by poor farmers and that are utilised by developing countries. Additionally,
the private research sector can be expected to be less sensitive to environmental
concerns than the public sector. It is thus a daunting task that faces the public sector
in its efforts to ensure that poor farmers can still make a sustainable living (Barton,
1999:2). The final chapter examines some of these challenges and constraints
developing countries face when dealing with capacity building in the introduction,
use, and management of biotechnology in their agricultural systems.
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CHAPTER6
CONCLUSIONS - CHALLENGES AND CONTRAINTS FACING DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
"(Tjhe transfer of technology will be a dominant issue in international political
economy for some time to come" (David Salaam & Michael Veseth, 1996:200).
In the previous chapter the likely effects of the use of biotechnology by developing
countries in their agricultural systems were examined together with the specific needs
and policy options of these countries. In this chapter, the challenges and constraints
in capacity buil~ing facing developing countries when dealing with biotechnology, as
well as some general conclusions are dealt with. This is done in three sections,
starting with those capacities needed to govern the use of biotechnology and the
institutional frameworks needed to do so. This is followed by a look at those
capacities needed by developing countries to close the so-called knowledge gap that
exists between them and the developed world. Developing countries lack human'
capacity when it comes to education in science, engineering and technology. If they
intend to make use of biotechnology, there are very specific capacities that need to
be developed. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of the challenges
facing recipients of technology before, during and after the process of technology
transfer and an opinion on the worth of the Cartagena Protocol.
1. Institutional Infrastructure and Governance Capacities
Developing countries could benefit from biotechnology if they can succeed in
harnessing its potential as a mechanism to increase levels of agricultural production
and to establish food security. Conversely, biotechnology could harm developing
countries if they were to become the dumping grounds for untested genetically
modified organisms and continue to be excluded from rule making in the international
trade and production arenas. It is therefore imperative for these countries to
establish and maintain minimum regulatory frameworks to deal with the
transboundary movement of GMOs. On the international level, Barton (1999:3)
expects significant political pressure on national governments to comply with TRIPs
under the WTO. For those countries that do not have the competency to do this,
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certain enabling measures can be taken. Appropriate legal training in the court
structures, private firms and law schools should establish structures of competency
as far as the rules of TRIPs are concerned, because the fundamental standards and
compromises of TRIPs are unlikely to change. At the same time, it could lead to a
more informed public opinion and meaningful debate on biotechnology issues. It is
vital for poor nations to develop their legal and scientific human resources into
systems with competence in dealing with these complex issues, because they will be
faced with policy questions that "combine issues of science with issues of intellectual
property, competition law, and international trade" (Barton, 1999:3). Failure in these
arenas could seriously compromise developing country agricultural systems.
The Cartagena Protocol has removed a lot of the guesswork for countries lacking the
expertise or finance to institute such mechanisms where biotechnology is concerned.
The Cartagena Protocol was designed to strengthen the regulatory powers of
developing countries (Krasner, 2000:310) by specifying certain procedures (e.g. the
Advance Informed Agreement Procedure of Article 7 and the Decision Procedure of
Article 10) and by indicating to countries how to handle documentation (Transport,
Packaging and Identification in Article 18) and set up national focal points (Article 19).
Article 22 states specifically that parties to the Protocol "shall cooperate in the
development and/or strengthening of human resources and institutional capacities in
biosafety, including biotechnology". The subsequent paragraph makes it clear that
the needs of developing countries with regard to financial resources and technology
transfer "shall be taken fully into account for capacity-building in biosafety" (CBD,
2000:12). It remains to be seen how much assistance and consideration developing
countries will receive from developed countries in the development of these
capacities. On the national level there are also certain capacities that government
and institutional frameworks dealing with biotechnology issues will have to contend
with.
Firstly, policymakers, researchers and scientists involved with the introduction of
biotechnology to developing countries need to determine the benefits and risks of
biotechnology applications in their particular countries. Identifying essential
productivity constraints and deciding to what extent a national research agenda
should embrace technology can follow this. The Important question national
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agriculture research systems (NARS) face is how to integrate biotechnology into
existing research programmes and priorities. This can only be done with adequate
consideration of the high development costs, new demands on human, financial, and
managerial resources, international collaboration, negative public perceptions, safety
problems and intellectual property rights dilemmas that biotechnology brings (Cohen,
Falconi and Kamen, 1999:1).
Secondly, developing countries need to consider the four major elements of effective
biosafety systems. They are (a) written guidelines that define the structure of the
system and the roles and responsibility of all interest groups; (b) well-trained
regulatory authorities; (c) an information system; and (d) response mechanisms.
This can be followed by the definition of a clear research agenda by determining
what the main constraints in agriculture are. Other issues in need of consideration
are national capacity; cost of R&D and infrastructure; regulations for risk assessment .
of new products; managing IPRs; creating delivery systems; and establishing suitable
institutional and legal frameworks for managing lP (Cohen, Falconi and Kamen,
1999:2-3). It seems that developing countries have a difficult task ahead of them
where policy choices will not be made any easier by the emotive nature of some of
the debates surrounding these issues.
Developing countries need further to acquire managerial, analytical, and technical
strengths in order to build a strong national capacity for understanding and analysing
biotechnology problems, policies and issues (Cohen, Falconi and Kamen, 1999:3).
Unfortunately there are various funding constraints that prohibit this. Reasons for
funding constraints that pose a challenge include the implementation of fiscal
austerity policies, a lack of understanding of biotechnology among policymakers,
insufficient research impact, dependence of funds from a single source, and a lack of
political or financial support from agribusiness and farmers and their organisations
(Cohen, Falconi and Kamen, 1999:3). Agricultural problems facing small farmers in
developing countries that policymakers dealing with biotechnology should be aware
of include crop losses due to insects, diseases, weeds, and drought, which all affect
income and food supply. Further problems include acid soils, low soil fertility and
lack of access to cheaper fertilisers; poor infrastructures and dysfunctional markets
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for inputs and outputs; and lack of access to credit and technical assistance
(Pinstrup-Anderson, 1999: 1).
An improvement in the regulatory environment through for example the adoption of
biosafety procedures can provide a suitable environment for biotechnology research.
Sagar and Ashiya (1999 (a):2) contend that "a redirection in research efforts will
require new incentives for the private sector to support research efforts responsive to
developing country needs".. However, biosafety measures cannot be effectively
implemented without adequate institutional and human capacity at the national level
(Juma and Gupta, 1999:2). Capacity building as an essential area for international
cooperation was, already identified in the draft biosafety protocol. Together with this,
it is important that the public is involved in risk assessment and decision making
where GMOs are concerned. In this regard, it is not sufficient just to provide the
public with information. What is needed is for a relationship of trust to be established
between "science and society" (Juma and Gupta, 1999:3). Such a relationship will
not develop if the risk assessment process lacks transparency and if data where
ongoing field trials are held is not published (Van Dusen, 2000:2). This means that
biotechnology will also have to be managed on the local level where indigenous and
rural communities' basic needs have to be addressed. It is here where the globalised
nature of technology, development, knowledge rights and trade issues show clear
signs of interconnectedness and cross-boundary influences.
Indigenous people need to conserve traditional medical and crop-cultivation
knowledge and practices which are threatened by modernisation and shifting cultural
values and patterns. The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) has
decided to explore the intellectual property needs, rights, and expectations of holders
of traditional knowledge, innovations, and culture. This is a necessary step in
widening conceptualisations of intellectual property rights (IPR). From an ethical
perspective it is vital that this component of IPR be included when the TRIPs (Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights) agreement of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) is reviewed. If policy-makers and high-level decision-makers
are serious about the nature of public interest and want societies to have trust in the
development of biotechnology, it is also crucial that they pay attention to complete
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disclosure of information, decision-making in an open and transparent manner, and
to involving all stakeholders in the process (Sagar and Ashiya, 1999 (a):3).
There seems to be a lack of objectivity in the discussion of policy issues associated
with biotechnology. Discussions are often sidetracked by ideological positions that
do not allow for plurality of viewpoints or policy options. Critics of biotechnology see
only the disadvantages associated with the technology to the extent where it has
been branded as an "evil" or "sinister" force (Wiegele, 1991 :30). On the other hand,
the proponents of especially commercial biotechnology often disregard (traditional)
public concerns and conceptions of life and morality that conflict with new science
and technology ,methods. These disputes are not made any easier by the hitherto
lack of agreement on methods of assessing risks associated with the release of
genetically manipulated organisms (Wiegele, 1991 :36). One of the greatest
challenges GMOs pose in terms of policy-making, is finding a way to give companies
a fair return on their innovation, science, engineering and technology expenditures,
while at the same time ensuring that poor farmers and indigenous communities
develop and maintain sustainable livelihoods (Middleton, 1999:54). But these
changes will not come easily. The difficulties of such changes are reflected in the
following words of Robert Cox: "The reconstruction of society and political authority
from the bottom up would require a different sense of the polity: one that put
emphasis on arousing capacities for collective action inspired by common purposes"
(Cox, 1995:45). To do this, human and technical capacities need to be established
and expanded to aid better understanding of the nature and complexities of
biotechnology.
2. Building Human Capacities
Biotechnology can only benefit developing countries if the necessary institutional and
societal infrastructure is in place to handle its introduction and governance. A vital
component of this infrastructure is a basic science capacity "to surround the
biotechnology sector" and to allow for objective decision-making on risks and benefits
(Van Dusen, 2000: 1). There are four major constraints to the development of
biotechnology infrastructure and application in developing countries sited by Hueth,
Kung and Collwell (1992). They are:
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• A lack of information exchange between scientists from developed and
developing countries because of the treatment of such information as property.
• The development by multinational corporations of technologies inappropriate to
developing countries.
• The lack of scientific skills and personnel in developing countries to develop
appropriate technologies.
• Inadequate labour and management skills for the successful implementation and
use of advanced technologies.
These constraints point to two factors. The first two constraints indicate that because
developed countries, influenced by their powerful multinational industries, treat
knowledge products emanating from biotechnology as economic resources with
proprietary value, they are reluctant to share this resource with others unless they
can be compensated for their research and development expenditure. It further
indicates that biotechnology research and development in the North is focused solely
on the needs of consumers in developed countries, a point that has been stated and
explained before. Because private companies and MNCs dominate biotechnology in
these countries, the only motive is profit in the short term with little attention given to
the effects it has on maintaining biodiversity. Furthermore, these countries'
comparative advantage in the biotechnology sector is likely to be enhanced in the
future because they do most of the research and development (Hueth, Kung and
Colwell, 1992:363). The second two constraints point to the lack of capacity in the
developing world to enter into and make use of the benefits of biotechnology. This is
evidence, once again, of the unequal distribution of power and capacity between
developed and developing countries. The existence of regulatory mechanisms such
as the Cartagena Protocol is important for the protection of at least some of the basic
interests of developing countries. The Protocol provides a framework with practical
measures that can be used to regulate the movement of GMOs. It also places a
responsibility on developed countries not to turn a blind eye to the specific needs of
the least developed and developing countries.
Developing countries might find it extremely difficult to develop the broad range of
skills and educational infrastructure that is required by the nature of biotechnology
(Wiegele, 1991 :23). An inability or refusal to enter the commercial or political
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relationships of the biotechnology arena could exacerbate this. There are various
problems in developing countries for which biotechnology seems to provide some
solutions. However, as Hueth, Kung and Colwell (1992:367) rightly point out, the
success of the use of biotechnology by developing countries depends on the
assistance by international organisations and "institution building". They suggest that
developing countries form "joint ventures" with the private sector or multinational
firms in an effort to ensure that appropriate technologies are developed.
Issues of particular concern to developing countries are "the challenges to and
opportunities for science and technology-led international development" (Hassan,
2000: 1). Two critical challenges need to be met. First is the growing disparities in
the "production and utilisation" of scientific and technological knowledge between
developed and developing countries. The challenge here for developing countries is
to close the knowledge gap and to respond to and benefit from globalisation by
building capacity in science, technology and knowledge which will work towards
sustainable economic growth (Hassan, 2000:3). Sagar and Ashiya (1999 (a):2)
support this view when they say that the development of the "relevant national
technological capabilities is crucial for any developing country to adapt, implement,
diffuse and innovate in a new sector of technology". One way of doing this is by
means of appropriate and timely technology transfer, which is discussed in the
following section. Second is the growing complexity of environmental problems
impeding developing countries' transition to environmentally and equitably
sustainable development. This challenge is related to the depletion of biological
resources, desertification, climate change, air and water pollution, and the negative
impact thereof on poverty, health, food, and energy and water shortage. It is of the
utmost importance to developing countries to maintain their biodiversity and to
implement and use technologies that do not degrade their fragile environments in the
long term. Unfortunately modern technology and development tend to have just the
opposite effect if one considers the magnitude of environmental degradation in the
industrialised North. This also holds true in certain instances of technology transfer,
an aspect of capacity building which is often recognised but trivialised due to
inadequate attention being paid to the specific needs and circumstances of local
communities, especially in rural areas.
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3. Technology Transfer as a Mode of Capacity Building
The origins of international technology transfer can be traced back to President
Truman of the United States when he submitted a programme for development to
Congress during his tenure of 1945-53. Point four of the programme presented the
idea that the standard of living of non-industrialised people and countries could be
improved by technology (Ogburn, 1957:4). During the 1940s and 1950s, American
business leaders recognised the potential growth in their markets of exporting new
technology to so-called backward people who had been eking out a living in agrarian
simplicity up to then. This realisation was soon informed by the experience that
knowledge of the use and repair of the transferred "machinery" that accompanied the
technology was necessary (Ogburn, 1957:5). Thus, technology transfer from
developed to developing countries was "born".
Modern agriculture can be seen as "an industry which applies technology to the soil"
(Miller, 1957:324). Advances in technology that have influenced agriculture were
already recognised in the 1950s. The following technological improvements to
agriculture mentioned by Miller (1957:324) illustrate this: mechanisation and
electrification, improvement of plants and animals through breeding and selection
(early forms of "genetic engineering"), the use of fertilisers and other additives to
improve soil quality, and improvements in managerial and marketing techniques.
These are all processes intended to improve agriculture in terms of higher production
levels, pest and disease resistant crops and livestock, and reduction in labour
intensive processes. However, innovations such as the processes involved in
biotechnology have the potential to become a part of the problem instead of the
solution. Ecological disruption caused by fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, as
well as the possibility that products of this technology may become "out of control"
because of unforeseen results or circumstances, are a cause of concern (Wilson,
1992:321). It is here where receivers of technology transfer need to pay particular
attention to the nature of the product or process being transferred.
Recipients of technology need to determine which specific technology is involved and
in which form it will be transferred. Technology often involves proprietary systems.
and intellectual property rights of which the receiver should be aware. The transfer
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costs involved with the new technology should also be stipulated. Particular attention
should be paid to possible hidden costs involved with the future control of the
technology or other rights that the originator of the technology might claim, such as
with purchasing clauses, licensing, patents, legal expenses and copy rights.
Developing countries also need to be aware of the stage of development and
maturity of the technology they are to receive. MNCs and industrialised countries
sometimes transfer their older technologies that might not comply with their home
countries' health and safety regulations anymore. Lastly the mode of technology
transfer is important as different originators of technology handle their products in
different manners. The mode of inter-firm transfer will differ from the mode used
between firms and states, NGOs and states, or MNCs and local communities.
Developing countries need to be aware that private originators of technology have a
financial profit interest that they will want to protect. MNCs and private firms tend to
protect their ownership more vigorously in an effort to regain their investment in
research and development and in keeping with the IPR they have established over
their product (Fourie, 2000:89-91; Wilson, 1992:319).
Other factors developing countries need to consider when taking part in technology
transfer include the following:
• They need to ensure that they will be able to transfer capacity with the
technology. The transfer of the technology on its own will not suffice. Receivers
of technology will need to operate and maintain their new equipment and this
requires new skills and competencies that need to be developed. This involves
not only the ability to handle and use the technology, but also to develop local
human and institutional capacities to deal with the technology in the long term.
• The transfer should also be seen as successful only when the technology can be
indigenised with the recipient country's culture and social circumstances. It
should be remembered that technology is not value free or value neutral. It is a
reflection of the culture in which it originates (Anderson in Wilson, 1992) and
carries the code of a society's genetics with it (Reddy in Wilson, 1992).
• Lastly, where appropriateness is concerned, recipient countries need to assess
whether their physical environments are suited for the introduction of the
technology intended for transfer. Climatic conditions, topography, and
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ecosystems need to be considered for suitability (Fourie, 2000:95-98; Wilson,
1992:319).
The process of technology transfer will be greatly enhanced by disseminating any
results of research done on the specific technology in a user-friendly manner to the
recipient. Simultaneously and wherever possible, the farmers' needs and problems
have to be communicated to the researchers, which, if done properly, will include an
assessment of household systems and production constraints (Van Rooyen &
Bembridge, 1998:84). Such feedback on farmers' problems is the only meaningful
way of ensuring that technology transfer to rural communities is "adaptive, relevant
and acceptable, to farmers" (Van Rooyen and Bembridge, 1998:85). Thus, the
complexity of the technology and its expected long term impacts on the environment
need to be known for the recipient country to partake in the transfer with confidence.
Put in another way, recipients should be able to control the technology, the
technology should not control the recipient. The phenomenon where technology
starts determining the nature of society is what Wilson (1992:322) calls technological
determinism. In the countries of the developed world societies have accepted this
phenomenon because their exposure to new technologies has been gradual
compared to that of developing countries that have to make revolutionary adaptations
to their habits and cultures in the face of rapid technology transfers. The following
statement by Galbraith (in Wilson, 1992:322) made in 1972 illustrates how such
economic determinism through technology transfer may end up being yet another
form of neo-colonialism: "The imperatives of technology, not the images of ideology,
are what determine the shape of economic society".
4. Biotechnology and Developing Country Prospects
This study set out to explore and describe some of the most pertinent issues about
biotechnology in international political economy, specifically its role in international
relations, trade, and agriculture. It seems that developing countries have held onto
the wronq :end of the stick where the governance, trade and regulation of
biotechnology have been concerned. It was demonstrated that poor countries have,
until the Cartagena Protocol, been kept at the periphery of decisions concerning their
own and other natural resources that could be enhanced through biotechnology. The
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Cartagena Protocol on biosafety, however, is a regulatory framework that seeks to
correct some of these imbalances by addressing the specific needs of developing
countries, especially where their interests in terms of safety during the transboundary
movement of GMOs are concerned. This protocol also has broader implications for
the way that global public goods, biosafety, and food supply will be handled in the
future. Unfortunately the challenges and constraints facing developing countries
when dealing with these biotechnology issues are extremely daunting and may at
times seem insurmountable.
Modern biotechnology does not hold all the answers to food insecurity and poverty.
Biotechnology does, however, hold significant advantages in certain areas for
specific communities if it can be given a chance through well thought out policies.
These policies should guide increased public investment in research and
development in biotechnology and make provision for regulatory mechanisms that
inform and protect the public from any risks arising from the release of GMOs. They
should also make provision for intellectual property management to encourage
greater private-sector investment; and have the capacity to regulate the private seed
and agricultural research sector so that the interests of small farmers and poor
consumers in developing countries are protected (Persley and Doyle, 1999:2).
The development challenges facing poor countries certainly seem very daunting.
Without the building of relevant capacities, the challenges of dealing with new
mechanisms such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety seem almost
insurmountable. These challenges are made even more difficult by the quagmire of
opposing opinions and moral and ethic viewpoints on issues such as the introduction
of genetically manipulated organisms. Leisinger (1999) aptly indicates that the
controversies over biotechnology have a lot to do with the plurality of opinion that is
expressed as well as the lack of balance with which many arguments are presented.
He cautions that because we live in heterogeneous social systems with a plurality of
value judgements and interests, we should expect different evaluations to exist. On
the one side it is evident that biotechnology has a lot to offer in terms of alleviating
food shortages and helping poor communities with their food supplies and
environmental sustainability. On the other hand, it js also true that the use of
biotechnology products does entail certain economic, social and ecological risks, but
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that not all of these risks are necessarily the result of the technology itself. The
question, thus, should not be: "Should we use biotechnology?". The use of this
technology can and will not be stopped by treaties, protocols, environmental activists
or any other grouping or mechanism. The question should rather be, "How can this
technology be used in a safe manner to benefit all in society who want to make use
of it?". In the final analysis it needs to be asked if the Cartagena Protocol will mean
anything to developing countries. Phrased in Coxian/Gramscian terms: What
prospects do developing countries and communities have of seeing this protocol
change any of the agricultural predicaments they experience?
The theoretical orthodoxy (realism/neo-realism) that has reigned during the best part
of the twentieth century no longer adequately accounts for the changes that have
taken place during the last two decades. These changes have been sited repeatedly
by various scholars, a comprehensive list of which would be neigh impossible to
assemble. Suffice it to say that events such as the demise of the Soviet Union, the
establishment of a European Community, the end of the so-called Cold War, the
dramatic advances made in communications and service delivery together with
renewed nationalist, ethnic and cultural sentiments (the combined effects of which
are popularly referred to as globalisation), and a surge in environmental awareness
and activism in the light of pollution, natural resource depletion, and chanqes in
global climatic patterns have altered dramatically the way individuals and society
experience reality. This "ontological shift", as Cox calls it, is evident in many aspects
of political economy: the prospect of a post-Westphalian order; economic
globalisation and societal restructuring; the intervention of the biosphere into world
politics; and the "implications of a multicultural post-hegemonic world order (Cox,
1995:36).
It is with the role of the biosphere in international political economics, that this thesis
is concerned. The Cartagena Protocol is one of the first supra-state institutionalised
mechanisms that could effect marked changes in the way humans have organised
their relationship with nature. It may be part of a "countermovement", as Cox
(1995:40-1) calls it, to the disruption caused by the restructuring of production, the
consequences of which include a shift from dominant s~bordinate relationships at the
national economy level to the social relationship level; the marginalisation of the
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majority of the world's population into obscurity and poverty; and a mass migration
from South to North and from East to West. In other words, the significance of the
Cartagena Protocol lies in its potential to be part of a real starting point of a change in
our ontology of global power relationships.
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APPENDIX A
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
The Parties to this Protocol,
ê~g Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, hereinafter referred to
as "the--convention",
Recalling Article 19, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Articles 8 (g) and 17 of the
Convention,
Recalline also decision 11/5of 17 November 1995 of the Conference of theParties to the onvention to develop a Protocol on biosafety, specifically focusing on
transboundary movement of any living modified organism resulting from modern
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use
of biological diversity, setting out for consideration, in particular, appropriate
procedures for advance informed agreement,
Reaffirming the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development,
Aware of the rapid expansion of modern biotechnology and the growing public
concern over its potential adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also into
account risks to human health,
Recognizing that modern biotechnology has great potential for human well-
being if developed and used with adequate safety measures for the environment and
human health,
Recognizing also the crucial importance to humankind of centres of origin and
centres of genetic diversity,
Taking into account the limited capabilities of many countries, particularly
developing countries, to cope with the nature and scale of known and potential risks
associated with living modified organisms,
RecoQnizinQ that trade and environment agreements should be mutually
supportive With a view to achieving sustainable development,
Emphasizinn that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a changein the rights and oblgations of a Party under any existing international agreements,
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this
Protocol to other international agreements,
.Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
OBJECTIVE
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to
contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer,
handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology
that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on
transboundary movements.
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Article 2
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Each Party shall take necessary and appropriate legal, administrative and
other measures to implement its obligations under this Protocol.
2. The Parties shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use,
transfer and release of any living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner
that prevents or reduces the risks to biological diversity, taking also into account risks
to human health.
3. Nothing in this Protocol shall affect in any way the sovereignty of States over
their territorial sea established in accordance with international law, and the
sovereign rights and the jurisdiction which States have in their exclusive economic
zones and their continental shelves in accordance with international law, and the
exercise by ships and aircraft of all States of navigational rights and freedoms as
provided for in international law and as reflected in relevant international instruments.
4. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the right of a Party to
take action that is more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity than that called for in tHis Protocol, provided that such action is
consistent with the objective and the provisions of this Protocol and is in accordance
with that Party's other obligations under international law.
5. The Parties are encouraged to take into account, as appropriate, available
expertise, instruments and work undertaken in international forums with competence
in the area of risks to human health.
Article 3
USE OF TERMS
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) "Conference of the Parties" means the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention;
(b) "Contained use" means any operation, undertaken within a facility,
installation or other physical structure, which involves living modified organisms that
are controlled by specific measures that effectively limit their contact with, and their
impact on, the external environment;
(c) "Export" means intentional transboundary movement from one Party to
another Party;
(d) "Exporter" means any legal or natural person, under the jurisdiction of
the Party of export, who arranges for a living modified organism to be exported;
(e) "Import" means intentional transboundary movement into one Party
from another Party;
(f) "Importer" means any legal or natural person, under the jurisdiction of
the Party of import, who arranges for a living modified organism to be imported;
(g) "Living modified organism" means any living organism that possesses a
novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern
biotechnology;
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(h) "Living organism" means any biological entity capable of transferring or
replicating genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viraids;
(i) "Modern biotechnology" means the application of:
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family,
that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that
are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection;
U) "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have
transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Protocol and which
has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify,
accept, approve or accede to it;
(k) "Transboundary movement" means the movement of a living modified
organism from one Party to another Party, save that for the purposes of Articles 17
and 24 transboundary movement extends to movement between Parties and non-
Parties.
Article 4
SCOPE
This Protocol shall apply to the transboundary movement, transit, handling and
use of all living modified organisms that may have adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks
to human health.
Article 5
PHARMACEUTICALS
Notwithstanding Article 4 and without prejudice to any right of a Party to
subject all living modified organisms to risk assessment prior to the making of
decisions on import, this Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement of
living modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed
by other relevant international agreements or organisations.
Article 6
TRANSIT AND CONTAINED USE
1. Notwithstanding Article 4 and without prejudice to any right of a Party of transit
to regulate the transport of living modified organisms through its territory and make
available to the Biosafety Clearing-House, any decision of that Party, subject to
Article 2, paragraph 3, regarding the transit through its territory of a specific living
modified organism, the provisions of this Protocol with respect. to the advance
informed agreement procedure shall not apply to living modified organisms in transit.
2. Notwithstanding Article 4 and without prejudice to any right of a Party to
subject all living modified organisms to risk assessment prior to decisions on import
and to set standards for contained use within its jurisdiction, the provisions of this
Protocol with respect to the advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply
to the transboundary movement of living modified organisms destined for contained
use undertaken in accordance with the standards of the Party of import.
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Article 7
APPLICATION OFTHE ADVANCE INFORMEDAGREEMENT PROCEDURE
1. Subject to Articles 5 and 6, the advance informed agreement procedure in
Articles 8 to 10 and 12 shall apply prior to the first intentional transboundary
movement of living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the
environment of the Party of import.
2. "Intentional introduction into the environment" in paragraph 1 above, does not
refer to living modified organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for
processing.
3. Article 11 shall apply prior to the first transboundary movement of living
modified organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing.
4. The advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to the intentional
transboundary movement of living modified organisms identified in a decision of the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as
being not likely to have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.
Article 8
NOTIFICATION
1. The Party of export shall notify, or require the exporter to ensure notification to,
in writing, the competent national authority of the Party of import prior to the
intentional transboundary movement of a living modified organism that falls within the
scope of Article 7, paragraph 1. The notification shall contain, at a minimum, the
information specified in Annex I.
2. The Party of export shall ensure that there is a legal requirement for the
accuracy of information provided by the exporter.
Article 9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTOF RECEIPTOF NOTIFICATION
1. The Party of import shall acknowledge receipt of the notification, in writing, to
the notifier within ninety days of its receipt.
2. The acknowledgement shall state:
(a) The date of receipt of the notification;
(b) Whether the notification, prima facie, contains the information referred
to in Article 8;
(c) Whether to proceed according to the domestic regulatory framework of
the Party of import or according to the procedure specified in Article 10.
3. The domestic regulatory framework referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above, shall
be consistent with this Protocol.
4. A failure by the Party of import to acknowledge receipt of a notification shall
not imply its consent to an intentional transboundary movement.
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Article 10
DECISION PROCEDURE
1. Decisions taken by the Party of import shall be in accordance with Article 15.
2. The Party of import shall, within the period of time referred to in Article g,
inform the notifier, in writing, whether the intentional transboundary movement may
proceed:
(a) Only after the Party of import has given its written consent; or
(b) After no less than ninety days without a subsequent written consent.
3. Within two hundred and seventy days of the date of receipt of notification, the
Party of import shall communicate, in writing, to the notifier and to the Biosafety
Clearing-House the decision referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above:
(a) Approving the import, with or without conditions, including how the
decision will apply to subsequent imports of the same living modified organism;
(b) Prohibiting the import;
(c) Requesting additional relevant information in accordance with its
domestic regulatory framework or Annex I; in calculating the time within which the
Party of import is to respond, the number of days it has to wait for additional relevant
information shall not be taken into account; or
(d) Informing the notifier that the period specified in this paragraph is
extended by a defined period of time.
4. Except in a case in which consent is unconditional, a decision under
paragraph 3 above, shall set out the reasons on which it is based.
5. A failure by the Party of import to communicate its decision within two hundred
and seventy days of the date of receipt of the notification shall not imply its consent to
an intentional transboundary movement.
6. Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party
of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party
from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or
minimize such potential adverse effects.
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties shall, at its
first meeting, decide upon appropriate procedures and mechanisms to facilitate
decision-making by Parties of import.
Article 11
PROCEDURE FOR LIVING MODIFIED ORGANISMS INTENDED FOR DIRECT USE
AS FOOD OR FEED, OR FOR PROCESSING
1. A Party that makes a final decision regarding domestic use, including placing
on the market, _ofa living modified organism that may be subject to transboundary
movement for direct use as food or feed, or for processing shall, within fifteen days of
making that decision, inform the Parties through the Biosafety Clearing-House. This
information shall contain, at a minimum, the information specified in Annex II. The
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Party shall provide a copy of the information, in writing, to the national focal point of
each Party that informs the Secretariat in advance that it does not have access to the
Biosafety Clearing-House. This provision shall not apply to decisions regarding field
trials.
2. The Party making a decision under paragraph 1 above, shall ensure that there
is a legal requirement for the accuracy of information provided by the applicant.
3. Any Party may request additional information from the authority identified in
paragraph (b) of Annex II.
4. A Party may take a decision on the import of living modified organisms
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, under its domestic
regulatory framework that is consistent with the objective of this Protocol.
5. Each Party shall make available to the Biosafety Clearing-House copies of any
national laws, regulations and guidelines applicable to the import of living modified
organisms intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, if available.
6. A developing country Party or a Party with an economy in transition may, in the
absence of the domestic regulatory framework referred to in paragraph 4 above, and
in exercise of its domestic jurisdiction, declare through the Biosafety Clearing-House
that its decision prior to the first import of a living modified organism intended for
direct use as food or feed, or for processing, on which information has been provided
under paragraph 1 above, will be taken according to the following:
(a) A risk assessment undertaken in accordance with Annex III; and
(b) A decision made within a predictable timeframe, not exceeding two
hundred and seventy days.
7. Failure by a Party to communicate its decision according to paragraph 6
above, shall not imply its consent or refusal to the import of a living modified organism
intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, unless otherwise specified
by the Party.
8. Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party
of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party
from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of that living modified
organism intended for direct use as food or feed, or for processing, in order to avoid
or minimize such potential adverse effects.
9. A Party may indicate its needs for financial and technical assistance and
capacity-building with respect to living modified organisms intended for direct use as
food or feed, or for processing. Parties shall cooperate to meet these needs in
accordance with Articles 22 and 28.
Article 12
REVIEW OF DECISIONS
1. A Party of import may, at any time, in light of new scientific information on
potential adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account the risks to human health, review and change a
decision regarding an intentional transboundary movement. In such case, the Party
shall, within thirty days, inform any notifier that has previously notified movements of
the living modified organism referred to in such decision, as well as the Biosafety
Clearing-House, and shall set out the reasons for its decision.
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2. A Party of export or a notifier may request the Party of import to review a
decision it has made in respect of it under Article 10 where the Party of export or the
notifier considers that:
(a) A change in circumstances has occurred that may influence the
outcome of the risk assessment upon which the decision was based; or
(b)
available.
Additional relevant scientific or technical information has become
3. The Party of import shall respond in writing to such a request within ninety
days and set out the reasons for its decision.
4. The Party of import may, at its discretion, require a risk assessment for
subsequent imports.
Article 13
SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE
1. A Party of import may, provided that adequate measures are applied to ensure
the safe intentional transboundary movement of living modified organisms in
accordance with the objective of this Protocol, specify in advance to the Biosafety
Clearing-House:
(a) Cases in which intentional transboundary movement to it may take
place at the same time as the movement is notified to the Party of import; and
(b) Imports of living modified organisms to it to be exempted from the
advance informed agreement procedure.
Notifications under subparagraph (a) above, may apply to subsequent similar
movements to the same Party.
2. The information relating to an intentional transboundary movement that is to
be provided in the notifications referred to in paragraph 1 (a) above, shall be the
information specified in Annex I.
Article 14
BILATERAL, REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND
ARRANGEMENTS
1. Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and
arrangements regarding intentional transboundary movements of living modified
organisms, consistent with the objective of this Protocol and provided that such
agreements and arrangements do not result in a lower level of protection than that
provided for by the Protocol.
2. The Parties shall inform each other, through the Biosafety Clearing-House, of
any such bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements that they
have entered into before or after the date of entry into force of this Protocol.
3. The provisions of this Protocol shall not affect intentional transboundary
movements that take place pursuant to such agreements and arrangements as
between the parties to those agreements or arrangements.
4. Any Party may determine that its domestic regulations shall apply with respect
to specific imports to it and shall notify the Biosafety Clearing-House of its decision.
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Article 15
RISK ASSESSMENT
1. Risk assessments undertaken pursuant to this Protocol shall be carried out in
a scientifically sound manner, in accordance with Annex III and taking into account
recognized risk assessment techniques. Such risk assessments shall be based, at a
minimum, on information provided in accordance with Article 8 and other available
scientific evidence in order to identify and evaluate the possible adverse effects of
living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.
2. The Party of import shall ensure that risk assessments are carried out for
decisions taken under Article 10. It may require the exporter to carry out the risk
assessment.
3. The cost of risk assessment shall be borne by the notifier if the Party of import
so requires.
Article 16
RISK MANAGEMENT
1. The Parties shall, taking into account Article 8 (g) of the Convention, establish
and maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures and strategies to regulate, manage
and control risks identified in the risk assessment provisions of this Protocol
associated with the use, handling and transboundary movement of living modified
organisms.
2. Measures based on risk assessment shall be imposed to the extent necessary
to prevent adverse effects of the living modified organism on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversIty, taking also into account risks to human health,
within the territory of the Party of import.
3. Each Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent unintentional
transboundary movements of living modified organisms, including such measures as
requiring a risk assessment to be carried out prior to the first release of a living
modified organism.
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 above, each Party shall endeavour to ensure
that any living modified organism, whether imported or locally developed, has
undergone an appropriate period of observation that is commensurate with its life-
cycle or generation time before it is put to its intended use.
5. Parties shall cooperate with a view to:
(a) Identifying living modified organisms or specific traits of living modified
organisms that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health; and
(b) Taking appropriate measures regarding the treatment of such living
modified organisms or specific traits.
Article 17
UNINTENTIONAL TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS AND EMERGENCY
MEASURES
1. Each Party shall take appropriate measures to notify affected or potentially
affected States, the Biosafety Clearing-House and, where appropriate, relevant
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international organizations, when it knows of an occurrence under its jurisdiction
resulting in a release that leads, or may lead, to an unintentional transboundary
movement of a living modified organism that is likely to have significant adverse
effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into
account risks to human health in such States. The notification shall be provided as
soon as the Party knows of the above situation.
2. Each Party shall, no later than the date of entry into force of this Protocol for it,
make available to the Biosafety Clearing-House the relevant details setting out its
point of contact for the purposes of receiving notifications under this Article.
3. Any notification arising from paragraph 1 above, should include:
(a) Available relevant information on the estimated quantities and relevant
characteristics and/or traits of the living modified organism;
(b) Information on the circumstances and estimated date of the release,
and on the use of the living modified organism in the originating Party;
(c) Any available information about the possible adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks
to human health, as well as available information about possible risk management
measures;
(d) Any other relevant information; and
(e) A point of contact for further information.
4. In order to minimize any significant adverse effects on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health,
each Party, under whose jurisdiction the release of the living modified organism
referred to in paragraph 1 above, occurs, shall immediately consult the affected or
potentially affected States to enable them to determine appropriate responses and
initiate necessary action, including emergency measures.
Article 18
HANDLING, TRANSPORT, PACKAGING AND IDENTIFICATION
1. In order to avoid adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, each Party shall
take necessary measures to require that living modified organisms that are subject to
intentional transboundary movement within the scope of this Protocol are handled,
packaged and transported under conditions of safety, taking into consideration
relevant international rules and standards.
2. Each Party shall take measures to require that documentation accompanying:
(a) Living modified organisms that are intended for direct use as food or
feed, or for processing, clearly identifies that they "may contain" living modified
organisms and are not intended for intentional introduction into the environment, as
well as a contact point for further information. The Conference of the Parties serving
as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take a decision on the detailed
requirements for this purpose, including specification of their identity and any unique
identification, no later than two years after the date of entry into force of this Protocol;
(b) Living modified organisms that are destined for contained use clearly
identifies them as living modified organisms; and specifies any requirements for the
safe handling, storage, transport and use, the contact point for further information,
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including the name and address of the individual and institution to whom the living
modified organisms are consigned; and
(c) Living modified organisms that are intended for intentional introduction
into the environment of the Party of import and any other living modified organisms
within the scope of the Protocol, clearly identifies them as living modified organisms;
specifies the identity and relevant traits and/or characteristics, any requirements for
the safe handling, storage, transport and use, the contact point for further information
and, as appropriate, the name and address of the importer and exporter; and
contains a declaration that the movement is in conformity with the requirements of
this Protocol applicable to the exporter.
3. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall consider the need for and modalities of developing standards with
regard to identification, handling, packaging and transport practices, in consultation
with other relevant international bodies.
Article 19
COMPETENT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL FOCAL POINTS
1. Each Party shall designate one national focal point to be responsible on its
behalf for liaison with the Secretariat. Each Party shall also designate one or more
competent national authorities, which shall be responsible for performing the
administrative functions required by this Protocol and which shall be authorized to act
on its behalf with respect to those functions. A Party may designate a single entity to
fulfil the functions of both focal point and competent national authority.
2. Each Party shall, no later than the date of entry into force of this Protocol for it,
notify the Secretariat of the names and addresses of its focal point and its competent
national authority or authorities. Where a Party designates more than one competent
national authority, it shall convey to the Secretariat, with its notification thereof,
relevant information on the respective responsibilities of those authorities. Where
applicable, such information shall, at a minimum, specify which competent authority is
responsible for which type of living modified organism. Each Party shall forthwith
notify the Secretariat of any changes in the designation of its national focal point or in
the name and address or responsibilities of its competent national authority or
authorities.
3. The Secretariat shall forthwith inform the Parties of the notifications it receives
under paragraph 2 above, and shall also make such information available through the
Biosafety Clearing-House.
Article 20
INFORMATION SHARING AND THE BIOSAFETY CLEARING-HOUSE
1. A Biosafety Clearing-House is hereby established as part of the clearing-
house mechanism under Article 18, paragraph 3, of the Convention, in order to:
(a) Facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal
information on, and experience with, living modified organisms; and
(b) Assist Parties to implement the Protocol, taking into account the special
needs of developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and small
island developing States among them, and countries with economies in transition as
well as countries that are centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity.
2. The Biosafety Clearing-House shall serve as a means through which
information is made available for the purposes of paragraph 1 above. It shall provide
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access to information made available by the Parties relevant to the implementation of
the Protocol. It shall also provide access, where possible, to other international
biosafety information exchange mechanisms.
3. Without prejudice to the protection of confidential information, each Party shall
make available to the Biosafety Clearing-House any information required to be made
available to the Biosafety Clearing-House under this Protocol, and:
(a) Any existing laws, regulations and guidelines for implementation of the
Protocol, as well as information required by the Parties for the advance informed
agreement procedure;
(b) Any bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements;
(c) Summaries of its risk assessments or environmental reviews of living
modified organisms generated by its regulatory process, and carried out in
accordance with Article 15, including, where appropriate, relevant information
regarding products thereof, namely, processed materials that are of living modified
organism origin, containing detectable novel combinations of replicable genetic
material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology;
(d) Its final decisions regarding the importation or release of living modified
organisms; and
(e) Reports submitted by it pursuant to Article 33, including those on
implementation of the advance informed agreement procedure.
4. The modalities of the operation of the Biosafety Clearing-House, including
reports on its activities, shall be considered and decided upon by the Conference of
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first meeting,
and kept under review thereafter.
Article 21
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
1. The Party of import shall permit the notifier to identify information submitted
under the procedures of this Protocol or required by the Party of import as part of the
advance informed agreement procedure of the Protocol that is to be treated as
confidential. Justification shall be given in such·cases upon request.
2. The Party of import shall consult the notifier if it decides that information
identified by the notifier as confidential does not qualify for such treatment and shall,
prior to any disclosure, inform the notifier of its decision, providing reasons on
request, as well as an opportunity for consultation and for an internal review of the
decision prior to disclosure.
3. Each Party shall protect confidential information received under this Protocol,
including any confidential information received in the context of the advance informed
agreement procedure of the Protocol. Each Party shall ensure that it has procedures
to protect such information and shall protect the confidentiality of such information in
a manner no less favourable than its treatment of confidential information in
connection with domestically produced living modified organisms.
4. The Party of import shall not use such information for a commercial purpose,
except with the written consent of the notifier.
5. If a notifier withdraws or has withdrawn a notification, the Party of import shall
respect the confidentiality of commercial and industrial information, including research
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and development information as well as information on which the Party and the
notifier disagree as to its confidentiality.
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 5 above, the following information shall not be
considered confidential:
(a) The nameand address of the notifier;
(b) A general description of the living modified organism or organisms;
(c) A summary of the risk assessment of the effects on the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human
health; and
(d) Any methods and plans for emergency response.
Article 22
CAPACITY-BUILDING
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the development and/or strengthening of human
resources and institutional capacities in biosafety, including biotechnology to the
extent that it is required for biosafety, for the purpose of the effective implementation
of this Protocol, in developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and
small island developing States among them, and in Parties with economies in
transition, including through existing global, regional, subregional and national
institutions and organizations and, as appropriate, through facilitating private sector
involvement. •
2. For the purposes of implementing paragraph 1 above, in relation to
cooperation, the needs of developing country Parties, in particular the least
developed and small island developing States among them, for financial resources
and access to and transfer of technology and know-how in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Convention, shall be taken fully into account for capacity-
building in biosafety. Cooperation in capacity-building shall, subject to the different
situation, capabilities and requirements of each Party, include scientific and technical
training in the proper and safe management of biotechnology, and in the use of risk
assessment and risk management for biosafety, and the enhancement of
technological and institutional capacities in biosafety. The needs of Parties with
economies in transition shall also be taken fully into account for such capacity-
building in biosafety.
Article 23
PUBLICAWARENESSAND PARTICIPATION
1. The Parties shall:
(a) Promote and facilitate public awareness, education and participation
concerning the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms in relation
to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into
account risks to human health. In doing so, the Parties shall cooperate, as
appropriate, with other States and international bodies;
(b) Endeavour to ensure that public awareness and education encompass
access to information on living modified organisms identified in accordance with this
Protocol that may be imported.
2. The Parties shall, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations,
consult the public in the decision-making process regarding living modified organisms
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and shall make the results of such decisions available to the public, while respecting
confidential information in accordance with Article 21.
3. Each Party shall endeavour to inform its public about the means of public
access to the Biosafety Clearing-House.
Article 24
NON-PARTIES
1. Transboundary movements of living modified organisms between Parties and
non-Parties shall be consistent with the objective of this Protocol. The Parties may
enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements and arrangements with non-
Parties regarding such transboundary movements.
2. The Parties shall encourage non-Parties to adhere to this Protocol and to
contribute appropriate information to the Biosafety Clearing-House on living modified
organisms released in, or moved into or out of, areas within their national
jurisdictions.
Article 25
ILLEGAL TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS
1. Each Party shall adopt appropriate domestic measures aimed at preventing
and, if appropriate, penalizing transboundary movements of living modified organisms
carried out in contravention of its domestic measures to implement this Protocol.
Such movements shall be deemed illegal transboundary movements.
2. In the case of an illegal transboundary movement, the affected Party may
request the Party of origin to dispose, at its own expense, of the living modified
organism in question by repatriation or destruction, as appropriate.
3. Each Party shall make available to the Biosafety Clearing-House information
concerning cases of illegal transboundary movements pertaining to it.
Article 26
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or under its
domestic measures implementing the Protocol, may take into account, consistent with
their international obligations, socio-economic considerations arising from the impact
of living modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous and
local communities.
2. The Parties are encouraged to cooperate on research and information
exchange on any socio-economic impacts of living modified organisms, especially on
indigenous and local communities.
Article 27
LIABILITY AND REDRESS
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall, at its first meeting, adopt a process with respect to the appropriate
elaboration of international rules and procedures in the field of liability and redress for
damage resulting from transboundary movements of living modified organisms,
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analysing and taking due account of the ongoing processes in international law on
these matters, and shall endeavour to complete this process within four years.
Article 28
FINANCIAL MECHANISM AND RESOURCES
1. In considering financial resources for the implementation of this Protocol, the
Parties shall take into account the provisions of Article 20 of the Convention.
2. The financial mechanism established in Article 21 of the Convention shall,
through the institutional structure entrusted with its operation, be the financial
mechanism for this Protocol.
3. Regarding the capacity-building referred to in Article 22 of this Protocol, the
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, in
providing guidance with respect to the financial mechanism referred to in paragraph 2
above, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties, shall take into account the
need for financial resources by developing country Parties, in particular the least
developed and the small island developing States among them.
4. In the context of paragraph 1 above, the Parties shall also take into account
the needs of the developing country Parties, in particular the least developed and the
small island developing States among them, and of the Parties with economies in
transition, in their efforts to identify and implement their capacity-building
requirements for the purposes of the implementation of this Protocol.
5. The guidance to the financial mechanism of the Convention in relevant
decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed before the
adoption of this Protocol, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the provisions of this
Article.
6. The developed country Parties may also provide, and the developing country
Parties and the Parties with economies in transition avail themselves of, financial and
technological resources for the implementation of the provisions of this Protocol
through bilateral, regional and multilateral channels.
Article 29
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES SERVING AS THE MEETING OF
THE PARTIES TO THIS PROTOCOL
1. The Conference of the Parties shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate
as observers in the proceedings of any meeting of the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of the
Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under this
Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to it.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to
this Protocol, any member of the bureau of the Conference of the Parties
representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol,
shall be substituted by a member to be elected by and from among the Parties to this
Protocol.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall
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make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective
implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall:
(a) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the
implementation of this Protocol;
(b) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the
implementation of this Protocol;
(c) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of,
and information provided by, competent international organizations and
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies;
(d) Establish the form and the intervals for transmitting the information to be
submitted in accordance with Article 33 of this Protocol and consider such information
as well as reports submitted by any subsidiary body;
(e) Consider and adopt, as required, amendments to this Protocol and its
annexes, as well as any additional annexes to this Protocol, that are deemed
necessary for the implementation of this Protocol; and
(f) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the
implementation of this Protocol.
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial rules of
the Convention shall be applied, mutatis mutandis, under this Protocol, except as
may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. .
6. The first meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of
the Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the Secretariat in conjunction with
the first meeting of the Conferencé of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of
the entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary meetings of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held in
conjunction with ordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise
decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol.
7. Extraordinary meetings of the Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be
deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the
Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six
months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat, it is
supported by at least one third of the Parties.
8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic
Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party
to the Convention, may be represented as observers at meetings of the Conference
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Any body or
agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, that is
qualified in matters covered by this Protocol and that has informed the Secretariat of
its wish to be represented at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as a
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, may be so admitted, unless at
least one third of the Parties present object. Except as otherwise provided in this
Article, the admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of
procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above.
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Article 30
SUBSIDIARY BODIES
1. Any subsidiary body established by or under the Convention may, upon a
decision by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol, serve the Protocol, in which case the meeting of the Parties shall specify
which functions that body shall exercise.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate
as observers in the proceedings of any meeting of any such subsidiary bodies. When
a subsidiary body of the Convention serves as a subsidiary body to this Protocol,
decisions under the Protocol shall be taken only by the Parties to the Protocol.
3. When a subsidiary body of the Convention exercises its functions with regard
to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the bureau of that subsidiary
body representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to the
Protocol, shall be substituted by a member to be elected by and from among the
Parties to the Protocol.
Article 31
SECRETARIAT
1. The Secretariat established by Article 24 of the Convention shall serve as the
secretariat to this Protocol.
2. Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the functions of the Secretariat
shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Protocol.
3. To the extent that they are distinct, the costs of the secretariat services for this
Protocol shall be met by the Parties hereto. The Conference of the Parties serving as
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first meeting, decide on the
necessary budgetary arrangements to this end.
Article 32
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CONVENTION
Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the provisions of the Convention
relating to its protocols shall apply to this Protocol.
Article 33
MONITORING AND REPORTING
Each Party shall monitor the implementation of its obligations under this
Protocol, and shall, at intervals to be determined by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, report to the Conference of the
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol on measures that it has
taken to implement the Protocol.
Article 34
COMPLIANCE
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall, at its first meeting, consider and approve cooperative procedures and
institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the provisions of this Protocol
and to address cases of non-compliance. These procedures and mechanisms shall
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include provisions to offer advice or assistance, where appropriate. They shall be
separate from, and without prejudice to, the dispute settlement procedures and
mechanisms established by Article 27 of the Convention.
Article 35
ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol shall undertake, five years after the entry into force of this Protocol and at
least every five years thereafter, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Protocol,
including an assessment of its procedures and annexes.
Article 36
SIGNATURE
This Protocol shall be open for signature at the United Nations Office at
Nairobi by States and regional economic integration organizations from 15 to 26 May
2000, and at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 June 2000 to 4 June
2001.
Article 37
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by
States or regional economic integration organizations that are Parties to the
Convention.
2. This Protocol shall enter into-force for a State or regional economic integration
organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after
its entry into force pursuant to paraqrapht above, on the ninetieth day after the date
on which that State or regional economic integration organization deposits its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or on the date on which
the Convention enters into force for that State or regional economic integration
organization, whichever shall be the later.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those
deposited by member States of such organization.
Article 38
RESERVATIONS
No reservations may be made to this Protocol.
Article 39
WITHDRAWAL
1. At any time after two years from the date on which this Protocol has entered
into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from the Protocol by giving written
notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take place upon expiry of one year after the date of
its receipt by the Depositary, or on such later date as may be specified in the
notification of the withdrawal.
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Article 40
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have
signed this Protocol.
DONE at Montreal on this twenty-ninth day of January, two thousand.
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Annex I
INFORMATION REQUIRED IN NOTIFICATIONS UNDER ARTICLES 8,10 AND 13
(a) Name, address and contact details of the exporter.
(b) Name, address and contact details of the importer.
(c) Name and identity of the living modified organism, as well as the
domestic classification, if any, of the biosafety level of the living modified organism in
the State of export.
(d) Intended date or dates of the transboundary movement, if known.
(e) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of recipient organism or parental organisms related to biosafety.
(f) Centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity, if known, of the
recipient organism and/or the parental organisms and a description of the habitats
where the organisms may persist or proliferate.
(g) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of the donor organism or organisms related to biosafety.
(h) Description of the nucleic acid or the modification introduced, the
technique used, and the resulting characteristics of the living modified organism.
(i) Intended use of the living modified organism or products thereof,
namely, processed materials that are of living modified organism origin, containing
detectable novel combinations of replicable genetic material obtained through the use
of modern biotechnology.
(j)
(k)
Annex III.
(I) Suggested methods for the safe handling, storage, transport and use,
including packaging, labelling, documentation, disposal and contingency procedures,
where appropriate.
Quantity or volume of the living modified organism to be transferred.
A previous and existing risk assessment report consistent with
(rn) Regulatory status of the living modified organism within the State of
export (for example, whether it is prohibited in the State of export, whether there are
other restrictions, or whether it has been approved for general release) and, if the
living modified organism is banned in the State of export, the reason or reasons for
the ban.
(n) Result and purpose of any notification by the exporter to other States
regarding the living modified organism to be transferred.
(0) A declaration that the above-mentioned information is factually correct.
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Annex II
INFORMATION REQUIRED CONCERNING LIVING MODIFIED
ORGANISMS INTENDED FOR DIRECT USE AS FOOD OR FEED, OR FOR
PROCESSING UNDER ARTICLE 11
(a) The name and contact details of the applicant for a decision for
domestic use.
(b) The name and contact details of the authority responsible for the
decision.
(c) Name and identity of the living modified organism.
(d) Description of the gene modification, the technique used, and the
resulting characteristics of the living modified organism.
(e) Any unique identification of the living modified organism.
(f) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of recipient organism or parental organisms related to biosafety.
(g) Centres of origin and centres of genetic diversity, if known, of the
recipient organism and/or the parental organisms and a description of the habitats
where the organisms may persist or proliferate.
(h) Taxonomic status, common name, point of collection or acquisition, and
characteristics of the donor organism or organisms related to biosafety.
(i) Approved uses of the living modified organism.
(j) A risk assessment report consistent with Annex III.
(k) Suggested methods for the safe handling, storage, transport and use,
including packaging, labelling, documentation, disposal and contingency procedures,
where appropriate.
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Annex III
RISKASSESSMENT
Objective
1. The objective of risk assessment, under this Protocol, is to identify and
evaluate the potential adverse effects of living modified organisms on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the likely potential
receiving environment, taking also into account risks to human health.
Use of risk assessment
2. Risk assessment is, inter alia, used by competent authorities to make informed
decisions regarding living modified organisms.
General principles
3. Risk assessment should be carried out in a scientifically sound and
transparent manner, and can take into account expert advice of, and guidelines
developed by, relevant internationalorganizations.
4. Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be
interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable
risk.
5. Risks associated with living modified organisms or products thereof, namely,
processed materials that are of living modified organism origin, containing detectable
novel combinations of replicable genetic material obtained through the use of modern
biotechnology, should be considered in the context of the risks posed by the non-
modified recipients or parental orqanlsrns in the likely potential receiving environment.
6. Risk assessment should be carried out on a case-by-case basis. The required
information may vary in nature and level of detail from case to case, depending on
the living modified organism concerned, its intended use and the likely potential
receiving environment.
Methodology
7. The process of risk assessment mayan the one hand give rise to a need for
further information about specific subjects, which may be identified and requested
during the assessment process, while on the other hand information on other
subjects may not be relevant in some instances.
8. To fulfil its objective, risk assessment entails, as appropriate, the following
steps:
(a) An identification of any novel genotypic and phenotypic characteristics
associated with the living modified organism that may have adverse effects on
biological diversity in the likely potential receiving environment, taking also into
account risks to human health;
(b) An evaluation of the likelihood of these adverse effects being realized,
taking into account the level and kind of exposure of the likely potential receiving
environment to the living modified organism;
(c)
realized;
An evaluation of the consequences should these adverse effects be
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(d) An estimation of the overall risk posed by the living modified organism
based on the evaluation of the likelihood and consequences of the identified adverse
effects being realized;
(e) A recommendation as to whether or not the risks are acceptable or
manageable, including, where necessary, identification of strategies to manage these
risks; and
(f) Where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, it may be
addressed by requesting further information on the specific issues of concern or by
implementing appropriate risk management strategies and/or monitoring the living
modified organism in the receiving environment.
Points to consider
9. Depending on the case, risk assessment takes into account the relevant
technical and scientific details regarding the characteristics of the following subjects:
(a) Reci~ent organism or parental organisms. The biological
characteristics of t e recipient organism or parental organisms, including information
on taxonomic status, common name, origin, centres of origin and centres of genetic
diversity, if known, and a description of the habitat where the organisms may persist
or proliferate;
(b) Donor organism or or~anisms. Taxonomic status and common name,
source, and the relevant biological c aracteristics of the donor organisms;
(c) Vector. Characteristics of the vector, including its identity, if any, and its
source or origin, and its host range;
(d) Insert or inserts and/or characteristics of modification. Genetic
characteristics of the inserted nucleic acid and the function It specifies, and/or
characteristics of the modification introduced;
(e) Living modified or~anism. Identity of the living modified organism, and
the differences between the bió oglcal characteristics of the living modified organism
and those of the recipient organism or parental organisms;
(f) Detection and identification of the living modified organism. Suggested
detection and identification methods and their specificity, sensitivity and reliability;
(g) Information relating to the intended use. Information relating to the
intended use of the living modified organism, including new or changed use
compared to the recipient organism or parental organisms; and
(h) Receivin environment. Information on the location, geographical,
climatic and eco oqrca c arac ens ICS, including relevant information on biological
diversity and centres of origin of the likely potential receiving environment.
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